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This thesis studies the early history of international police cooperation and 
international crime control. It argues that the British Empire played an active and often 
decisive role in this history by encouraging the development of international police 
organizations, such as Interpol. Additionally, it contends that Britain’s support for these 
organizations was based in large part on the country’s experience policing its Empire. The 
effort to reform colonial police brought British police in regular contact with police 
throughout the world, and led to exchanges of philosophies and technologies between the 
international and colonial spheres. During the aftermath of the Second World War, the 
reforming zeal of Britain’s imperial police was translated into several foreign police 
missions in occupied Europe and elsewhere. The British police involved in these missions 
attempted to encourage the development of civilian, unarmed policing with little reference 
to local circumstances. The failure of these missions, combined with the development of 
several colonial emergencies, caused Britain to abandon their forward foreign policy with 
regard to policing. In this vacuum, the United States emerged as the leading force in 
international law enforcement, though without Britain’s emphasis on civilian style policing 
and pursuit of cooperation with other countries.  
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Introduction 
 
 In 2010, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime published a report entitled 
The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment.1 The 
report took stock of developments in transnational crime since the end of the Cold War and 
included chapters on arms smuggling, counterfeiting, cybercrime, and highs seas piracy as 
well as drug and human trafficking. It revealed that transnational crime had “reached 
macro-economic proportions,” with illicit goods being produced in one country, trafficked 
across another and sold in a third.2 The global underworld, the report continued, “has 
become inextricably linked to the global economy…through the illicit trade of legal 
products (like natural resources), or the use of established banking, trade and 
communication networks…that are moving growing amounts of illicit goods.”3 
Transnational crime had become “one of the world’s most sophisticated and profitable 
businesses,” with just over a billion in profits from arms trafficking and cybercrime, $3 
billion in annual profit from human trafficking, $10 billion in profit from counterfeit goods, 
and over $100 billion in annual profit from drug trafficking.4 UN Drug Czar Antonio Maria 
Costa argued in his summary of the report that national responses to the problem were not 
sufficient and that “states have to look beyond borders to protect their sovereignty.”5 
                                                 
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The globalization of crime: a transnational organized crime 
threat assessment (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010). 
2 Ibid., ii. 
3 Ibid., ii. 
4 Ibid., ii. Summary of profits on pp. 16 – 17.  
5 Ibid., iii. 
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Lost in Costa’s analysis, and indeed in much of the report, is the fact that national 
governments have long been aware of the need “to look beyond borders” with regard to 
crime. Indeed, the issue of tracking criminals across borders is as old as crime itself. The 
“hue and cry” has been used in one form or another since the development of ancient cities, 
and the policing of piracy and smuggling between states has existed since the Roman 
Empire. Yet it was not until the nineteenth century that an effort was made to establish this 
sort of policing on a regular basis. The nineteenth century is often credited by social 
scientists as marking the beginning of globalization because it featured several 
technological (railroad, steamship, and telegraph) and political (global empires) 
innovations that increased the amount and intensity of global connections.6 Much like other 
historical actors, criminals took advantage of these innovations to expand their economic 
and geographical horizons. By the end of the century the nations of the world found that 
they were fighting the same types of crimes perpetrated by the same criminals. For many 
nations this discovery came shortly after the initial development of domestic police 
institutions. It became apparent that these new institutions would need to adapt in order to 
meet the emerging threat.  
 Though the need for change was evident there was little consensus on what form it 
should take. Many states in Europe, for instance, tried to deal with international crime 
unilaterally, pursuing criminals in other countries using their own national police forces. 
                                                 
6 For this project, I am using the definition of globalization provided by A.G. Hopkins, ed., Globalization in 
World History (New York: Norton, 2002), 19: “[Globalization is] a process that transforms economic, 
political, social, and cultural relationships across countries, regions, and continents by spreading them more 
broadly, making them more intense, and increasing their velocity.” 
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This method, however, quickly proved untenable as countries began to object to such 
incursions on the basis of national sovereignty. Concerned nations responded by attempting 
to foster international cooperation between the police institutions of various countries. 
Early efforts in this regard included the exchange of dossiers prior to international events 
such as World’s Fairs, or after particularly egregious events such as an anarchist bombing 
or assassination.  
By the first decade of the twentieth century it became evident that such cooperation 
needed to have a more permanent standing if it was to have any chance of successfully 
combating international crime. This realization led to several international conferences, 
but, beyond a handful of informal extradition agreements, these meetings failed to produce 
anything lasting. The situation changed, however, following the First World War. The 
immediate post-war period found countries not only grappling with traditional problems 
such as international anarchy and smuggling, but also with emerging problems such as 
“white slavery” (sex trafficking) and counterfeiting.  Though the actual prevalence of these 
crimes remained – as they do today – in doubt, they nevertheless encouraged the 
establishment of a number of international policing bodies, including the International 
Police Conference and the International Criminal Police Commission (the precursor to 
Interpol). These organizations were designed to facilitate the exchange of information 
between member nations, allowing police to cut through red tape in their pursuit of 
criminals.  
Despite the proliferation of these organizations during the interwar period, few of 
these groups survived the Second World War. Interpol, the standard bearer for this 
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movement, emerged from the conflict with a tainted reputation after falling into Nazi hands 
in 1938. Though reconstituted after the war, Interpol encountered trouble in a world divided 
by Cold War ideologies. The organization’s position was further complicated in the 1970s 
by a public confrontation with the Church of Scientology over Interpol’s role in the legal 
case against L. Ron Hubbard. In addition, the last quarter of the twentieth century saw the 
establishment of several rival police organizations – including Europol, TREVI and 
UNPOL –  designed to make up for Interpol’s shortcomings. Though Interpol still grabs 
headlines by issuing red notices for prominent suspects such as Julian Assange or Roman 
Polanski, the agency’s public profile masks serious flaws in its operation. Current Interpol 
director Ronald Noble, for instance, was recently brought to tears on American television 
while describing his frustration with Interpol’s lack of use by member nations, particularly 
the United States.7 While Noble had done much to improve the reputation of the 
organization, it is still common for the group’s headquarters in Lyon to be referred to as a 
vacation resort where police officers go to chase wine, women and song rather than 
counterfeits, terrorists and traffickers.  
It is clear, given the human and financial toll of transnational crime, that 
international police cooperation is a topic worth serious study. Though the subject often 
falls prey to sensationalist media, political scientists and sociologist have gone a long way 
in giving the current debate on this issue a more rigorous grounding.8 It is the argument of 
                                                 
7 Ira Rosen, “The Man From Interpol,” Narr. Steve Kroft. Sixty Minutes. CBS. October 7, 2007. [Complete 
segment and transcript available online: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/04/60minutes/main3330289.shtml ] 
8 Malcolm Anderson, Policing the world: Interpol and the politics of international police co-operation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Ethan Avram Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The 
Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
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this dissertation, however, that the issue would benefit from a new historical analysis into 
its origins. Why did the struggle against transnational crime lead to the formation of 
international police organizations? Why were these organizations successful during the 
interwar period, yet now face mounting criticism and claims of uselessness? What about 
their interwar operations made them successful? Why did Interpol emerge as the leading 
group in international policing and why was it one of the few organizations to survive the 
Second World War? 
This dissertation attempts to answer these questions by studying the early history 
of international policing and international police organizations, such as Interpol. It focuses 
on the United Kingdom’s relationship with these efforts and contends that Britain played 
the leading role in the success of international policing during this period. This thesis will 
argue that Britain’s support for international policing derived from the country’s desire to 
spread its own policing methods across the world and through its own colonial empire. 
Furthermore, this thesis will contend that while Britain’s support for international police 
organizations allowed these bodies to flourish before the Second World War, Britain’s 
postwar decline led to the withering of these groups under the unilateral policies of the 
United States. 
 
                                                 
University Press, 1993); Mark Findlay, The globalization of crime (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); Nadelmann and Peter Andreas, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control In 
international Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Ben Bowling and James W. E. Sheptycki, 
Global Policing (Sage Publications Ltd, 2012). 
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EXISTING LITERATURE 
Though historical literature offers a treasure of material on crime and policing at 
the national level, there has been relatively little effort to extend these histories beyond 
national boundaries. Early books on international policing focused almost exclusively on 
the work of Interpol. These books were written primarily by journalists, and were filled 
with un-cited, sensationalist accounts of crime cases that played upon a Cold War 
audience’s eagerness to read Ian Fleming-like stories of international intrigue. The prime 
example of this sort of work is A.J. Forrest’s book Interpol released in 1955.9 The US 
edition of this book features a cover that could have been pulled directly from a spy novel 
– an Interpol agent chases a criminal, holding a satchel filled with marijuana leaves and 
syringes, through the Paris airport. “By radio, phone and streamlined office work,” the 
publishers of Interpol write, agents of the international crime fighting organization meet 
the murderer “off the plane at Marseilles” and confiscate “the drug-packed 
cigarettes…from the sleazy tramper scurrying through Panama.”10 Like any other book on 
crime designed for popular consumption, Forest’s book is filled with photographs of crime 
scenes and mug shots. Similarly, like any good popular spy book, it fetishizes the 
technology of both police and criminal, featuring descriptions and pictures of hidden 
surveillance cameras as well as examples of counterfeit art and currency.  
                                                 
9 A. J. Forrest, Interpol (London: A. Wingate, 1955). 
10 Forrest, back cover. Though written by the publishers, this quote best exemplifies the contents of 
Forrest’s book as a whole. 
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Striking a similar vein to Forrest’s book is Tom Tullet’s Inside Interpol.11 As the 
title suggests, Tullet’s book benefits from true insider access: he was a close friend of Sir 
Richard Jackson, a top officer in the London Metropolitan Police who served as president 
of Interpol from 1960 to 1963. Though the book lacks references and never refers to 
officers or criminals by their real names, Tullet’s book is obviously based on actual case 
files that can be verified today through archival work or by reading back issues of Interpol’s 
official journals.12 Although the reader can feel confident in the veracity of the anecdotal 
stories within Tullet’s book, they are still subjected to a prose with a novelistic sheen. When 
describing Interpol’s headquarters in France, Tullet remarks on the beauty of the 
organization’s secretaries, women who are “too attractive to deal with crime.”13 Readers 
are also offered idealized descriptions of the operations of the organization. For example, 
in a passage that could be pulled from a travel brochure, Tullet writes that “a smartly 
dressed detective in New York may well initiate an Interpol inquiry which will be handled 
later by a coloured policeman wearing bush-shirt and shorts and working in the heat of the 
jungle; [similarly] a crime committed in sunny South American can be pursued in Canada 
by a fur-clad ‘Mountie’ driving a sledge over ice and snow.”14 
 In addition to Forrest and Tullet, there appeared at this time a series of memoirs 
from police that had firsthand experience with the organization. These books tended to give 
the organization a more firm grounding in reality, though flights of exaggeration were not 
                                                 
11 Tom Tullett, Inside Interpol (New York: Walker, 1965). 
12 For instance, Tullet discusses the case of the pigeon blackmailer of the Rhineland, a favorite topic of 
discussion of early Interpol leader Florent Louwage of Belgium.  
13 Ibid., 33–34. 
14 Ibid., 182. 
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uncommon. Swedish police officer Harry Söderman’s Policeman’s Lot was one of the few 
books written by someone that had participated in the organization from its very early 
years.15 Söderman’s work featured a history of the organization that would continue to be 
referenced by subsequent writers, with very minor alterations, for the next 20 years. This 
history described the genesis of the organization in a 1914 international conference in 
Monaco at which the creation of a formal international police body was first discussed. 
After the First World War, this discussion led to the creation of the International Criminal 
Police Commission, or ICPC, in Vienna in 1923. Vienna played host to the group, 
Söderman contends, because of the city’s significant police archive and criminal laboratory 
as well as Austria’s concern with the proliferation of counterfeiters and displaced people 
that resulted from the breakup of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Söderman goes on to 
describe how the organization, after struggling to gain recognition and members in the 
1920s, found its footing in the 1930s.  
Interpol’s rising prestige, however, was cut short in 1938 as a result of the 
Anschluss. Nazi Germany, which had tried and failed to take over the organization earlier 
in the 1930s, moved Interpol and its archives to Berlin, where it essentially remained 
defunct during the Second World War. Söderman concludes by relating how the 
organization was reestablished in 1948 by a group of five senior police officers, including 
Söderman, Florent Louwage of Belgium and Sir Ronald Howe of the Metropolitan Police. 
Ronald Howe’s memoirs, The Pursuit of Crime¸ featured a rather long final chapter on the 
                                                 
15 Harry Söderman, Policeman’s Lot: A Criminologist’s Gallery of Friends and Felons (New York: Funk 
& Wagnalls, 1956). 
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organization in which he argued that Interpol remained a viable organization in spite of the 
Nazi takeover because it was one of the few international police initiatives that politicians 
had yet to get their hands on.16 
 Although these police memoirs were the first works to provide a history of Interpol, 
they often followed their journalist counterparts in embellishing the actual work of the 
organization. If one were to read these books by journalists and retired police without any 
reference to subsequent works they would probably be left with the impression that Interpol 
was a supra-national police force with near unlimited power and reach, instead of an 
information clearing house without even the power to arrest suspects. Interpol itself did 
little officially at this time to correct this perception. Marcel Sicot, who served as the 
organization’s general secretary throughout most of the 1950s, did produce a dispassionate 
overview of Interpol’s internal operations in 1961, but unlike the works of Forrest, Tullet, 
and Howe, it was never translated into another language from the original French.17 Recent 
writers Mathieu Deflem, Ethan Nadelmann and Peter Andreas have argued that Interpol, 
and police in general, saw little need to correct the perception of the organization because 
it supported the idea that international police organizations were merely the direct result of 
rising crime, rather than political gambits or moral agendas emanating from member 
nations. The lack of official definition certainly helped to feed the fictional portrayals of 
Interpol that appeared during the 1960s, including the American television series “The Man 
                                                 
16 Ronald Howe, The pursuit of crime. (London: A. Barker, 1961); The previously mentioned Sir Richard 
Jackson also wrote memoirs, but they only briefly discussed his international work: Richard Levfric 
Jackson, Occupied with Crime, 1st ed. in the U. S. A. (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). 
17 Marcel Sicot, A la barre de l’Interpol. (Paris: Les Productions de Paris, 1961). 
  10 
from Interpol,” the French radio show “The Dossiers of Interpol,” as well as the countless 
representations of the agency in spy novels and films.  
While these fictional representations undoubtedly helped to keep the organization 
in the public’s imagination, they also provided fodder for the Church of Scientology’s 
attack on Interpol. This attack is important to understand because it was responsible for 
much of the literature on the organization produced during the 1970s. The origins of this 
attack lie in the movements of the Church during the 1960s.18 Scientology founder L. Ron 
Hubbard moved his Church’s headquarters to Sussex, England in 1960, ostensibly to 
spread the religion but also to avoid an impending investigation by the United States 
government on the basis of tax evasion. Hubbard had previous connections, of a sort, to 
England, having been a leading member of the California branch of the Hermetic Order of 
the Golden Dawn, which followed the spiritual teachings of Aleister Crowley. His 
expulsion from the group for embezzlement was followed shortly thereafter by the 
publication of Dianetics, a theoretical work that forms the basis of the Church of 
Scientology. From its new headquarters in England, the Church of Scientology began to 
spread into continental Europe. In 1968, West German police, concerned about the opening 
of Scientology auditing centers in their country, requested information on the organization 
from Interpol. Interpol had yet to create a dossier on the Church, and thus asked the London 
Metropolitan Police (the Met) to develop one for the benefit of the entire organization.19  
                                                 
18 Most of the information for this section regarding the Church of Scientology is drawn from Hugh B. 
Urban, The Church of Scientology: A History of a New Religion (Princeton University Press, 2011). 
19 This correspondence between Interpol and the Met, as well as most of the documents relating to the 
subsequent controversy, can be found in the following file: “The Church of Scientology, the Hubbard 
Association of Scientologists International, and associated organisations: Police enquiries, reports and 
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The Met, using their own surveillance records as well as reports collected by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), finished this profile on Scientology in 1969, after 
which it was circulated to Interpol member nations. The Met’s profile portrayed the Church 
as an organization that used the trappings of religion to avoid taxation on what was 
essentially a massive confidence scam. The report described the Church’s auditing process 
as essentially a brain-washing technique that primed the potential member for financial 
exploitation. As the report details, “the organization caters to the inadequate. The promise 
of enhanced mental awareness appears to appeal to those already affected by mental 
instability, unhappiness and uncertainty.” In the eyes of the Met, the Church’s auditing 
process was little more than a street level confidence trick, referring to the Church’s 
auditing machine, “the E-meter,” as nothing more than “a electric meter held in a wooden 
box [that] has two terminals each of which is attached at the end of a electrode which is a 
steel or tin can resembling and sometimes actually being, a soup can…The E-meter would 
appear to be no more than a powerful gimmick for controlling [initiates] and developing in 
them a sense of awe and submission to a dependency upon the organization.” The report 
ended by saying that “the authorities in this country are extremely concerned about the 
organization…scientology is socially harmful; it alienates members of families from each 
other and attributes squalid and disgraceful motives to all who oppose it. Its authoritarian 
principles and practices are a potential menace to the personality and well-being of those 
so deluded as to become its followers.”20 
                                                 
correspondence; actions brought against Metropolitan Police; information material provided by the Church 
of Scientology.” 1954-1983, MEPO 2/10283/1, National Archives, Kew [Hereafter NA].  
20 MEPO 2/10283/1. 
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 The Church, well aware of its negative perception among national governments, 
had established an internal security bureau, referred to as the Guardian’s Office, in 1966 
under the leadership of L. Ron Hubbard’s wife, Mary Sue.21 Though it was designed 
primarily to police members of the Church, the Guardian’s Office also administered 
counter-surveillance projects. Beginning in the 1970s, the Guardian’s Office planted 
Church members as employees in several “enemy organizations,” mostly notably the 
American Medical Association, the Better Business Bureau and the Internal Revenue 
Service as well as several equivalent bodies in foreign countries. This initiative, codenamed 
Operation Snow White, led to the theft and destruction of hundreds of thousands of 
government documents relating to the Church of Scientology before it was discovered by 
the US government in 1977.22  
Though it has never been confirmed, it is more than likely that this operation also 
resulted in the public release of the Met’s profile of the Church of Scientology in West 
Germany in 1973. The release of this damning document led to a swift response by the 
Church, which filed suit against Interpol and the Metropolitan Police in German court. The 
Church followed this by organizing a propaganda campaign against Interpol that attacked 
the organization as a tool of totalitarianism, emphasizing in particular the organization’s 
Nazi past.23 The early wave of this attack featured short newspaper articles and pamphlets 
that offered surviving photographs of Nazi run Interpol conferences during the Second 
                                                 
21 Urban, The Church of Scientology, 110. 
22 Ibid., 167. 
23 S.A. Barram, “Interpol Unmasked,” The American Zionist, March/April 1975; “Interpol is spy threat-
minister,” Scottish Daily News¸ April 8, 1975; Calif. Church of Scientology Los Angeles, Interpol, private 
group, public menace: a police organization involved in criminal activities. (Los Angeles, CA: Church of 
Scientology, 1990). 
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World War. Subsequent attacks became more sophisticated, coming in the form of 
nonfiction publications that claimed to provide an unbiased discussion of Interpol’s 
historical and contemporary operation. In his 1976 book, The Secret World of Interpol, 
author Omar Garrison argued that Interpol maintains an “Orwellian dream”24 of 
establishing “a dossier-based dictatorship”25 that will bring an end to civil liberties around 
the world. In a more measured approach, authors Trevor Meldal- Johnsen and Vaughn 
Young write that Interpol has the opportunity to become an effective organization, but it 
must first curb its despotic lust for information and surveillance of even average civilians.26  
Scientology’s attack on Interpol could not have come at a worse time for the police 
group. The 1970s began with a drawn out debate in the United Nations concerning Intepol’s 
status as an official NGO. This was followed by Senate hearings in the United States in 
1976 and 1978 – partly inspired by Scientologist propaganda – that questioned the legality 
of Interpol’s operation as well as its benefits for America. Interpol, led by Secretary 
General Jean Népote, attempted to fight against these storms by opening its doors to a new 
series of journalist investigators including Michael Fooner, Iris Noble, Peter Lee, and 
Fenton Bresler.27 The researched approach of these writers helped to counter some of the 
                                                 
24 Omar V Garrison, The secret world of Interpol (New York: Ralston-Pilot, 1976), 229. 
25 Ibid., 231. 
26 Trevor Meldal-Johnsen and Vaughn Young, The Interpol connection: an inquiry into the International 
Criminal Police Organization (New York: Dial Press, 1979). 
27 Michael Fooner, Interpol; the Inside Story of the International Crime-Fighting Organization (Chicago: 
H. Regnery Co, 1973); Michael Fooner, Interpol: Issues in World Crime and International Criminal 
Justice, Criminal Justice and Public Safety (New York: Plenum Press, 1989); Iris Noble, Interpol, 
International Crime Fighter, 1st ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975); Peter G Lee, Interpol 
(New York: Stein and Day, 1976); Fenton S Bresler, Interpol (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992); Jean 
Népote also wrote his own essay on the organization's history included in Philip John Stead, Pioneers in 
policing (Montclair, N.J.: McGraw-Hill; Patterson Smith Pub. Corp., 1977). 
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more ridiculous arguments emanating from the Church of Scientology. Fenton Bresler’s 
work, in particular, has real lasting worth for historians, as it contains an in depth discussion 
of Interpol’s still missing interwar and Second World War archives.28  
Serious scholarly work on Interpol and international police cooperation more 
generally emerged in the 1980s and was driven primarily by political scientists and 
sociologists.29  A notable work in this category includes Malcolm Anderson’s Policing the 
World, which contains a few chapters of history on Interpol before moving forward into an 
analysis of the present day. Similarly, sociologist Ethan Nadelmann’s independent work, 
along with his cooperative work with Peter Andreas, places the history of Interpol within 
the context of America’s unilateral approach to international law enforcement during the 
second half of the 20th century.30  Outright historical work on international policing, to the 
extent that it exists, tends to focus on comparisons between national policing institutions 
rather than on cooperation between those institutions.31  
Exceptions, however, do exist – most notably Richard Bach Jensen’s article on the 
International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898. In this article, Jensen argues that 
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international police cooperation developed out of a desire to fight politically motivated 
international criminals, namely bomb throwing anarchists and revolutionary socialists.32 
Though unpublished, the Ph.D. dissertation of Richard Johnson offers a similar argument, 
using the overseas activities of Czarists Russia’s secret police as the primary example.33 
Also providing important insight is criminologist Cyrille Fijnaut, who has written several 
essays on the history of international police cooperation that concentrate on the influence 
of the Netherlands and the European Union after the Second World War.34  
Building on this work, sociologist Mathieu Deflem has provided a theoretical 
analysis of Interpol’s history using Max Weber’s theories regarding bureaucratization.35 
Deflem argues that the impetus for international policing developed in German states 
during the mid to late 19th century, as police searched for ways to increase their professional 
status within the modern state structure.  German historian Jens Jäger has developed work 
that considers Interpol’s history within the context of international criminal justice 
organizations and journals that emerged in Imperial Germany, paying particular attention 
to the use of photography in the official cataloguing of criminal records.36 More recently, 
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historian Paul Knepper released two volumes on the history of international crime, which 
briefly discuss international police cooperation as it pertained to the work of international 
political interest groups and the League of Nations.37 
The existing literature on international police cooperation has left us with a clear 
sense of present developments and at least the beginnings of a historical interpretation, but 
significant questions remain. For instance, why did the effort against international crime 
take the form of international police organizations and why did these organizations form 
at the particular moment that they did? Was it all, as Jensen argues, a matter of stopping 
political criminals or were there other factors involved? While political crimes certainly 
played a role in the development of international policing bodies, most of these 
organizations were forbidden by their members from dealing with political crime. What 
role then did more mundane, economically motivated crime play? Furthermore, why did 
Interpol capture the attention of police and the international community over similar 
organizations, in particular the International Police Conference? What were the successes 
and failures of these groups, and how do their trials compare to the efforts of dealing with 
international crime today? Finally, given that most histories on crime and policing deal 
with European countries alone, what role did non-European states or European colonial 
possessions play in these developments?38 
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APPROACH AND ARGUMENT 
This thesis attempts to provide answers to these questions by considering the British 
Empire’s involvement with international police cooperation from the interwar period 
through decolonization. Britain was a prominent member in all of the major international 
police organizations from their inception. The Empire sent delegates to the annual meetings 
of these groups and served as the host nation for conferences organized by the International 
Police Conference and the International Criminal Police Commission. In addition, many 
British police officers served on the governing bodies of these associations as well as the 
editorial boards that maintained each organization’s official journal. Thus, using British 
archival sources, we can see the motivations that drove the creation of these organizations 
as well as the problems that they faced during their lifespans.  
My hypothesis is that Britain’s encouragement of international policing was based 
in large part on the experience of policing its empire. Though still a small subject, imperial 
policing has received increasing attention over the past two decades, especially from 
historians David Anderson and David Killingray.39 Their edited volumes have provided a 
way to compare and contrast the experience of policing between different colonies. More 
recently, historians Georgina Sinclair and Chris Williams have begun to explore the 
relationship between the policing of imperial and metropolitan Britain, describing in 
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particular how the pressures of empire encouraged the exchange of policing techniques and 
personnel between colonies as well as between the colonies and the metropole.40 
This thesis attempts to build upon this work by connecting the history of imperial 
exchanges to wider international developments.41 Indeed, the effort to cooperate on 
policing within the British Empire in many ways preceded and paralleled the effort to 
coordinate policing globally. As this dissertation shows, several officials, both within 
Britain and in the colonies, attempted to establish an imperial police association during the 
interwar period that could not only fight crime within the British Empire, but also 
coordinate with international bodies to fight crime globally. Additionally, several of the 
British officers that participated in international police organizations were veterans of one 
or more colonial police departments. These colonial veterans were more aware than anyone 
else of the expanding reach of criminals. Like other colonial officials tasked with running 
the Empire, colonial police were acutely aware of the need for the center state to relinquish 
some power to the periphery in order for the policing of transnational offenders to be 
effective. The means to control crime is a critical aspect of national sovereignty and the 
legitimization of government, but in a globalized world it becomes impossible for a single 
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state to control all the variations of crime within its borders without help from the outside. 
I argue that colonial police veterans carried this notion of devolved sovereignty with them 
to their work in international policing.  
I believe that this imperial perspective is critical not only because of how it 
encouraged British participation in international policing, but how it influenced 
international police cooperation as a whole. I contend that Britain, inspired by empire, 
provided much of the early impetus for international policing and helped the organizations 
involved in this effort achieve a near global reach. Furthermore, I believe that it was 
Britain’s, and specifically the London Metropolitan Police’s, support of this movement that 
helped it avoid policing controversial political crimes and kept it going during the so-called 
end of globalization in the 1930s, even to the point of convincing other nations to remain 
in Interpol despite the Nazi takeover in 1938. Of course, there was nothing altruistic about 
this support. As the world’s preeminent economic and military power during this time, 
Britain had the most to lose from global crime and thus had the most to gain from efforts 
to make the policing of that crime more effective. Furthermore, British police and 
politicians were convinced that their police were the best in the world, and believed that 
converting other territories to their policing model offered the best means of maintaining 
international security. This is not to argue that Britain pursued imperialism with regard to 
criminal justice, but that the country’s own self-interest and hubris led them to try to 
globalize the fight against crime.  
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As shown by several historians of empire and globalization, the British Empire was 
the source for a wide assortment of international and transnational initiatives.42 I believe 
that it is time to consider international policing as one of those initiatives. Britain’s police 
– motivated by their country’s vulnerability to international crime, armed with their 
experience policing empire and convinced of the superiority of their own model of policing 
– worked to promote and sustain law enforcement cooperation in the international 
community. In addition, Britain’s waning as an international power following the Second 
World War helps to explain why international policing faltered, as the postwar period 
found British internationalism replaced by America’s unilateral approach to law 
enforcement, seen most clearly in the current wars on drugs and terror.  
 
DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
Chapter One provides a history of police cooperation prior to the creation of formal 
organizations from the prospective of the British Empire. It shows that while Britain 
remained hesitant of formal cooperation during the 19th century, the country nevertheless 
led many policing efforts around the globe. Chapter Two considers Britain’s early interest 
in international policing as it pertained to empire. This chapter concentrates on the career 
of colonial police officer Herbert Dowbiggin, whose tours of colonial police departments 
during the interwar period helped to establish Britain’s subsequent international agenda 
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regarding policing. Chapter Three discusses British influence on Interpol using the records 
of the Metropolitan Police, the primary liaison service between the British Empire and the 
organization. In particular, this chapter follows the career of Norman Kendal, the director 
of the Met’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) during the interwar period. It 
explains why, through Kendal’s influence, Interpol came to prominence instead of the 
American led International Police Conference. Chapter Four considers international 
policing during the Second World War. It discusses the Nazi takeover of Interpol as well 
as the wartime cooperation between American and British police. Chapter Five studies the 
highpoint of Britain’s influence on international policing during the immediate postwar 
period. Specifically, it describes Britain’s failed efforts to export its policing methods 
abroad to Germany and other occupied territories after the Second World War. In addition, 
this chapter discusses Britain’s role in reestablishing Interpol through the work of Met 
police officer Ronald Howe. Chapter Six shows how Britain’s influence on international 
police work declined starting in the late 1940s, as the country began to concentrate 
manpower and funding on policing colonial emergencies. The conclusion provides a 
discussion of Britain’s international policing work with reference to America’s war on 
crime, as well as offer some general concluding remarks on the dissertation as a whole. 
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Chapter One: The New Police and the World, 1829 – 1922 
 Prior to the 19th century, law enforcers rarely considered events outside of their own 
neighborhood, let alone their own country. When crime occurred, the criminal was often 
personally known by the watchman, and he could rely on his contacts in the community to 
quickly apprehend the offender. Yet with the advent of modern forms of transportation in 
the early 19th century, these ancient assurances disappeared. Steamships and railroads 
offered criminals a means of quick and permanent escape, while the general increase in 
population offered them anonymity. This development affected Britain as much as any 
other country. But whereas most countries considered these problems from a national 
viewpoint, Britain’s overseas possessions required the country to take an international 
perspective.  
Initially, these overseas possessions provided an easy means to manage the problem 
of travelling criminals through transportation. Yet as the practice of transportation waned 
in the 1840s, Britain was forced to establish professional police forces that could manage 
the occurrence of modern crime as well as recidivism. Unlike other countries, however, 
Britain attempted to meet this challenge using a model of policing based on civilian 
cooperation and an unarmed constabulary. The commitment to this style of policing 
initially made cooperation with foreign police departments difficult. As the 19th century 
wore on, however, Britain found itself adopting more foreign elements into their policing 
model, almost to the point of being indistinguishable from their overseas counterparts. 
Simultaneously, Britain’s policing of the empire began to undergo a shift away from 
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violent, military policing toward a more British style model. This shift resulted from not 
only the drive for a civilizing mission in the colonies, but also from a desire to uphold 
British prestige with regard to policing throughout the world.  
 
THE INTERNATIONAL WORK OF THE NEW POLICE 
From the outset, British policing was constructed with an eye to the wider world. Indeed, 
there was little ground for agreement in 1829 amongst British ministers regarding what 
roles Robert Peel’s New Police should perform, but there was always agreement on what 
he should not be: continental.1 The 30 years preceding the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act 
saw the steady spread across Europe of the French style gendarmerie, thanks in large part 
to Napoleon’s campaigns.2 This style of police, in British eyes, was a standing army in all 
but name, which left most of the police work to mounted soldiers in the countryside.3 The 
repressive nature of the gendarmerie was later built upon during the Concert of Europe 
with the development of plainclothes police and spies, designed to protect conservative 
continental monarchs against revolution.4 In an attempt to avoid any association with 
continental police, British Police were required to wear blue uniforms and to go armed with 
only a truncheon.  
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Despite these attempts to avoid the continental model, the Metropolitan Police 
faced heavy criticism – including claims of espionage – from the population. There was 
certainly some basis for these fears. Though garbed in blue and without a weapon, many 
of the early members of the Met came from military backgrounds.5 This recruitment 
resulted not only from necessity but also precedent. While serving as Secretary of Ireland 
in 1814, Robert Peel created his first police force, the Irish Peace Preservation Force, from 
former soldiers.6 The early formation of the Met also adopted the Irish practice of having 
their police patrol outside of their home districts so that they policed only strangers. Adding 
to the suspicion of the new police was the fact that most patrols focused on working class 
neighborhoods, where “Peelers” monitored not only bars and gambling houses but also 
trade union meetings.7 As a result of these practices a series of bloody anti-police riots 
occurred throughout the 1840s, and despite the precautions of Robert Peel, Bobbies were 
often compared to continental or Irish gendarmes.8 Many openly wondered if the new 
police were any better than the previous system of night watchmen and thief-takers.9 
 The reputation of the Bobby began to change, however, in 1848.10 The continent’s 
“Year of Revolution” saw a series of revolts violently put down by government repressions 
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often carried out by police. Britain, in contrast, found its own potential Chartist revolution 
handled by the police with a relatively small amount of violence, allowing the state to 
prosper like never before. This new appreciation – or at least acceptance – of the Bobby 
was solidified during the 1851 Great Exhibition in Hyde Park.11 While the Great Exhibition 
is seen today as a watermark in the development of industrial technology, at the time it was 
seen as an opportunity for dangerous revolutionaries to strike a deathblow to modern 
civilization.12 Continental visitors arrived to the exhibition in a state of mind not at all 
dissimilar from those visiting London for the 2012 Olympics: seeing potential 
revolutionaries and terrorists around every corner. The Home Office bought into this fear 
as well, forcing Metropolitan Police Commissioner Richard Mayne to share his position 
with Captain William Hay of the British Army a few months before the exhibition. 
Yet the exhibition, with Mayne directing security, passed off without incident, 
confirming to Britain and to the rest of the world that even in this tumultuous period a 
nation could maintain itself, and with an unarmed police no less. Mayne managed this feat 
thanks in large part to the presence of dozens of provincial British and foreign police 
officers as well as interpreters.13 The foreign police at the Exhibition came primarily from 
France and the German states, but also included officers from America and Russia. The 
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Metropolitan Police reported only eight cases of pick pocketing and ten cases of pilfering 
during the fair, but all the stolen property was recovered.14  
Foreign ministers and police were amazed that Britain survived this event without 
even the semblance of a political or internal espionage service.15 Met Commissioner 
Richard Mayne, however, viewed political policing as both unnecessary and potentially 
dangerous, and as a result the force contained only 8 plain clothes detectives by 1851. 
Mayne attempted to placate the visiting leaders of continental countries by inviting foreign 
detectives to shadow the Met during the Exhibition.16 Many of these continental detectives 
used this invitation as a means to spy on political refugees that had fled Europe in the wake 
of 1848. Though France had spied on Royalist refugees in Britain since the late eighteenth 
century, the fallout from 1848 led to a substantial increase in the number of Europeans 
seeking asylum in London.17  
For the most part, Britain resisted foreign police requests regarding this population, 
even as it swelled with several high profile anarchists and socialists during the 1860s and 
1870s. The basis for this resistance rested on the notion that Britain was a liberal state, and 
its police did not investigate political matters, particularly those concerning foreign 
countries. In fact, many in Britain believed that political policing would actually encourage 
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rebellious activity.18 The resistance of British police, however, did not prevent foreign 
police departments from trying to monitor their expatriate population themselves. France 
and Italy maintained close watch over their expatriate anarchists and socialists in London 
from the 1870s until the First World War.19 France, in particular, worked to follow those 
that participated in or helped to support the Paris Commune in 1871.20 Perhaps the most 
notorious foreign power in this regard was the Russian Okhrana, which deployed dozens 
of detectives in Russian immigrant communities in Paris, Berlin, and London.21 Though 
the Okhrana was largely unsuccessful in brokering a liaison with Scotland Yard, they often 
used this rejection by British police to encourage other foreign police to show up the Met 
by demonstrating their own “professional competence.”22 
Britain’s opposition to policing anarchism, and politics in general, began to waiver 
in the late 19th century. This change in policy resulted from the development of Fenian 
terrorism in the 1880s.23 Fenian attacks led the Metropolitan Police to establish the Special 
Irish Branch (later changed to the Special Branch) in 1883, a development that was quickly 
replicated in provincial forces throughout Britain.24 Although these branches were 
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specifically tasked with espionage and plainclothes policing, early Special Branch officers 
often retained their negative opinion of policing politics, and as a result relied on paying 
informants rather than conducting fieldwork themselves. When British detectives did 
conduct fieldwork, they often ruined their disguise by questioning suspects directly instead 
of gleaning information from open conversation. Yet as bombing attacks and disturbances 
continued, British police adopted a more continental approach and opinion of detective 
work.  
The creation of the Met’s Special Branch helped to establish the force as an imperial 
police department, rather than one simply tasked with policing London.25 The Fenian 
campaign led Special Branch detectives to maintain contact with police in Ireland and 
America, and also required them to serve as body guards for the Royal Family and members 
of the government during public events or tours abroad. Special Branch’s imperial work 
would expand further in the Edwardian period, when the department cooperated with the 
Indian Office to maintain surveillance on potential Indian revolutionaries living in 
Britain.26 Much of this surveillance centered on fears – held by Indian Viceroy George 
Curzon among others – that Russian agents living in London were attempting to inspire 
Indian students at Oxford and Cambridge to return home to their country to lead a revolt. 
Special Branch later extended this work to the United States and Canada, where they 
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encouraged local police to monitor and sometimes violently suppress the activities of the 
Ghadar Party.  
This move toward political policing was generally supported by the British public, 
which demonstrated a growing acceptance of plainclothes police work through the 
popularity of Sherlock Holmes.27 Even though Conan Doyle’s stories often portrayed the 
Metropolitan Police as bumbling fools, the British public nevertheless developed an 
expectation that British police were practicing the same methods of professional deduction 
pursued by Sherlock and other fictional detectives. Conan Doyle’s stories also helped to 
establish in the minds of the British public that the need for plainclothes and political 
policing originated from the development of foreign criminality in Britain. Early Holmes 
novels featured copious references to American criminality in particular, including the Ku 
Klux Klan, Mormon polygamy, and the devious habits of Irene Adler.28 It is also perhaps 
unsurprising in the context of Fenian bombings that Holmes’ greatest nemesis is a man 
with an Irish surname, Moriarty.  
 While the fear of foreign criminality helped to encourage the first moves toward 
political policing in Britain, this same fear helped to solidify and extend the already existing 
structures of political policing in Europe. States throughout the continent rushed to develop 
new means to understand and control foreign populations. Important milestones in this era 
included Cesare Lombroso’s work on the biology of the “born criminal” as well as 
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Alphonse Bertillon’s application of anthropometry to criminal records.29  The focus 
throughout this work remained on foreign criminal bodies, rather than on the incidence of 
crime itself, with many experts claiming that particular classes and races were predisposed 
to crime.30  
Unsurprisingly, the European police at the forefront of this new technology of 
identification tended to be concerned with border control or ports. Their work helped to 
establish the first personal identification papers that preceded the passport.31 The 
development of identification papers created a means through which police from different 
countries could communicate and exchange criminal information using similar 
technologies of description. This exchange was particularly fruitful among German States 
prior to unification. In 1851, several of these states formed a police union that exchanged 
crime notices and warrants by way of a printed magazine.32 This union and other forms of 
cooperation initially targeted select groups – particularly Gypsies and poor migrant 
workers – though later expanded to include anarchists and political activists. 
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ANARCHISM AND WHITE SLAVERY 
 Though British police and criminologists tended to disagree with the continental 
perception of criminal biology, they nevertheless moved toward cooperation with 
continental police by the end of the 19th century.33 This cooperation was based on the 
concern with anarchism and the sex trade, referred to at the time as white slavery. While 
the actual incidence of anarchist crime remained low throughout the 19th century, a series 
of stupendous anarchist attacks in the 1890s – the period of “propaganda by deed” – 
resulted in a general call for action. These attacks included a series of bombings in Paris 
(1892-1894)34 and the attempted bombing of the Greenwich Observatory (1894) as well as 
the assassinations of President Marie Carnot of France (1894), Spanish Prime Minister 
Antonio Canovas (1897), and the Empress Elizabeth of Austria (1898).35 In addition to 
these successful attacks, there were also dozens of attempted attacks, including one on 
King Humbert of Italy in 1897.36 Although these assassinations and bombings were largely 
the work of individuals, journalists encouraged European governments to believe that the 
attacks were perpetrated by an international anarchist conspiracy.37  
As a result of this apprehension, Italy convened an Anti-Anarchist Conference in 
Rome in 1898 to promote a coordinate response to the crisis. France, Germany, and Russia 
eagerly supported this venture, though Britain hesitated. They sent delegates to this 
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meeting only at the last minute, and only after being assured that the conference would not 
result in a binding treaty. Delegates at the Conference met from November 24 to December 
21 1898, and though they developed no binding treaties, the delegates did agree on a set of 
working practices to attempt to control the anarchist menace. In particular, the attendees 
agreed to push for the criminalization of the possession explosives, membership in 
anarchist associations, and producing anarchist propaganda.38 Representatives also agreed 
to encourage their states to make the death penalty the standard punishment for all assassins 
of heads of state. Despite his country’s early hesitation to join the conference, British 
Ambassador Philip Currie ended the conference by presenting a long speech that outlined 
his support for new legislation against anarchist criminals. Specifically, he promised that 
Britain would allow for the quick extradition of any anarchist in Britain found to be plotting 
against another nation, and would also work to suppress anarchist literature emanating from 
London.39  
While Currie’s promises never led to any new bills or acts, they did encourage 
European states and their police to believe that Britain would be more open to cooperation 
with regard to criminal justice in the future. Indeed, the Conference attendees included 
several police chiefs from throughout Europe who agreed at the meeting to forward to each 
other monthly lists of deported immigrants.40 Although the resulting lists from this 
agreement tended to be incomplete, the British participation in their circulation 
                                                 
38 Jensen, 328. 
39 Jensen, 329.  
40 Jensen, 332.  
  33 
demonstrated a dramatic change from precedent.41 The Met’s Special Branch also showed 
an increasing willingness after the Rome Conference to work with foreign intelligence 
bureaus – including the Russian Okhrana – operating in London to track potential 
terrorists.42 Special Branch officers and regular Bobbies began to shed their earlier 
reservations about political policing, especially when it came to investigating the endless 
rumors of German spy rings that flooded the Edwardian age. 
While most of the cooperation between British and foreign police on anarchism 
remained secret, the campaign to combat the sex trade led to publically sanctioned 
cooperation between British police and their overseas counterparts. Much like the 
campaign against anarchism, the effort against the sex trade in turn of the century Europe 
resulted from sensational journalism, most of which emanated from Britain. Indeed, W.T. 
Stead’s series of articles on “The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon,” which appeared in 
the Pall Mall Gazette in 1885, is commonly seen as the starting point for the panic over 
prostitution and “white slavery.” The perception during this panic was that women were 
being duped by dishonest foreigners (typically Jewish) to become prostitutes.43 Although 
this type of induction into prostitution was rare, the idea fit well with the Victorian image 
of the “fallen woman” as well as the belief that international travel through empire 
inevitably imperiled women and morality in general.44 The common depiction of pimps in 
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this trade as Jewish also satisfied the idea of criminal biology and global conspiracies 
regarding crime.45  
As a result of these characteristics, the sex trade became the basis for several 
international pressure groups, including Josephine Butler’s International Abolitionist 
Federation, Constance Rothschild’s Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and 
Women, and William Coote’s National Vigilance Association, which included W.T. Stead 
as a member of the board of directors. These British directed organizations used the 
personal fortunes and political connections of several wealthy philanthropists to agitate 
police throughout Europe to improve the safety of international travel for women, and to 
closely monitor border crossings, ports, and rail stations.46 The National Vigilance 
Association, in particular, developed a set of local branches in several countries throughout 
the world to investigate prostitution and bring cases of slavery or obscenity to the attention 
of police.  
The police – British and foreign alike – often felt dragooned into this work, but 
nevertheless developed a working relationship with these organizations, often relying on 
pressure groups to pursue prosecution of court cases.47 In addition, the issue of white 
slavery also gave police, especially in Europe, an opportunity to cooperate with one another 
without facing the same criticism and resistance they encountered while trying to police 
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international anarchism.48As the campaign against white slavery continued into the 20th 
century, police also found that their cooperation supported by international treaties. These 
treaties resulted from a series of international conferences on white slave traffic that began 
in London in 1899, with subsequent meetings held in Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Paris, and 
Madrid. The conferences served as a place to share reports on sex trafficking as well as a 
basis for various pressure groups to push for legislative change. International treaties in 
1904 and 1910 provided for not only harsher penalties for traffickers, but also encouraged 
the exchange of criminal information between foreign police departments.49 
 
THE BANALITY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME 
If one were to take the manuscripts on international anarchism and white slavery at face 
value, they would inevitably be left with the impression that turn of the century Britain was 
awash in unsavory foreign criminals who constantly preyed upon an unprepared 
population. Yet even a cursory study of relevant archives reveals that the presumed 
increase in international criminality at this time had little basis in fact. Indeed, even in the 
files of the Metropolitan Police – the force tasked with policing the “Modern Babylon” of 
London – the actual occurrence of international crime remained rare. When a crime 
occurred that did involve an international dimension, it often took a predictable, 
unsensational form.  
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 The most common type of international crime dealt with by the Metropolitan Police 
was advance fee fraud, better known as the Spanish Prisoner Scheme.50 In this confidence 
trick, the criminal contacted the victim via post offering a large sum of money, or other 
comparable treasure, in return for a small advance of funds that the criminal –  posing as a 
distressed yet reputable person –  could not provide because of some form of impediment 
(e.g. prison sentence, illness, etc.). Britain had long been a target of the Spanish Prisoner, 
dating back at least to the Peninsular War in the early 19th century. Waves of the scam hit 
the island every 20 years or so afterward, as criminals used the backdrop of successive 
Carlist Wars to spin tales of wrongful imprisonment, political intrigue, and hidden treasure 
for their victims.51 It should be noted that many of these criminals probably did not 
originate from Spain. In fact, as some members of the Met surmised, many of these 
“prisoners" were writing from England. Spain’s criminal reputation then was as much the 
indirect result of endemic conflict as with actual wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the fact that 
some of these letters originated from Spain makes the prisoner scheme one of the earliest 
and most enduring examples of international crime. 
The success of the prisoner swindle relied as much on the victim’s sentimentality 
and need for emotional connection as it did on their desire for easy money. The successful 
prisoner, then, was someone that could combine a too-good-to-be-true offer with a 
compelling narrative that the victim could, literally, buy into. The series of letters sent to 
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Mr. Paul Webb, a Sloane Street shopkeeper, by “Luis Ramos” in 1905 offer a good example 
of the scam.52 Using above average diction and writing in a pleasant cursive, the prisoner 
“Luis Ramos” implores Mr. Webb to send funds to assist and protect his daughter, “a young 
girl of fourteen years old who is now in a Prison House.”53 Ramos, drawing from recent 
history, explains that he was the private secretary of General Martinez Campos during “the 
last Cuban war,” but owing to the replacement of Campos by Valeriano Weyler – “a 
political adversary” – Ramos left the army and joined the rebellion on behalf of the 
republic. Thanks to “the greatest treason,” Ramos was “compelled to emigrate to English 
ground with all my property valuable £37.000.”54 He decided to return home after the death 
of his wife in order to take care of his daughter Mary. Ramos tells Webb that he left for 
Spain after depositing his money “in a sure English Bank,” but was intercepted by the 
authorities upon disembarking and placed in a military prison in Barcelona. Complaining 
of an illness and certain that he will have “a very short and fatal end,” Ramos begged Webb 
to send funding that would release his daughter and his confiscated luggage, which 
contained the receipt for his English bank account in a secret drawer.  
Webb responded to this correspondence by telegraphing Ramos’ designated 
intermediary, a prison chaplain named “Jean Richard,” and inquiring about the situation. 
This telegraph led to another Ramos letter, which reiterated his impending death as well as 
his fear that his daughter would surely be pursued by his political enemies if help did not 
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arrive soon.55 Ramos also warned Webb not to alert authorities in Spain or Britain 
regarding the situation as it would put his child at risk. This second Ramos letter, however, 
broke the drama, as it was sent to Webb, but addressed to a Mr. Thomas McGill, no doubt 
another potential target for the scheme. The criminal compounded the mistake by sending 
the same letter, now addressed to Webb, four days later.56 A follow up letter was sent the 
next week in which Ramos stated “I feel that my life is going away…I have made my will 
by which I name my daughter my only heiress, appointing you her guardian.”57 Ramos 
concluded by saying that he would “write no more, [as] neither my head nor my hand allow 
it to me; I pray you to forget not my prayer and to abandon us not as we have but you to 
save my poor Mary of her distress.”58  
That same day, Webb received a message from “Jean Richard,” the holy agent 
provocateur, written with a different hand on what appears to be church stationary.59 This 
letter verified the points of Ramos’ story, and encouraged Webb to act, promising that 
“God will protect you.”60 After nearly a month of silence, Richard wrote again to tell Webb 
that “Mr. Ramos, after several days of cruel agony died yesterday of hepatitis, after 
approaching God and receiving the last Holy Sacraments.”61 The chaplain included in this 
letter a copy of Ramos’ will, his death certificate, and a Spanish newspaper notice 
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regarding the prisoner’s death.62 Additionally, this final letter was the first to include the 
total of the advance needed from Webb in order to free Mary and Ramos’ luggage: £59. 
Webb, however, did not fall for the ruse, and reported the correspondence to the Met the 
following week.63 
In the “Ramos” letters we have all the elements of a classic Victorian drama: orphan 
child, faced with the death or imprisonment of parents, seeks new guardian to share large 
inheritance amidst the backdrop of continental political intrigue. This drama was held up 
by the educated content and appearance of the writing as well as a seemingly genuine 
collection of supporting documents. Webb’s telegraph after the first letter shows that, even 
if he was still skeptical, he believed the correspondence could be real. The criminal, of 
course, squandered his chance by addressing the next letter to the wrong person. This 
mistake was not the worst one that “Ramos” made, however. After receiving a long and 
detailed “Ramos” letter addressed to Mr. William Topley, the partners of Wm. Topley & 
Sons wrote to Scotland Yard informing them of the correspondence and explaining that the 
company’s namesake had been dead for over twenty years.64 A year later, Mrs. Mary Bates 
brought the police a similar letter addressed to her husband, who passed away seven years 
prior.65 Mr. Harry Robertson of Mincing Lane wrote the Met with another example in 1908. 
Robertson described that this was the fourth such letter he had received in his life, but the 
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first to switch his Christian and surname (Dear Robertson Harry,) and to claim familiarity 
through the prisoner’s deceased wife (Mrs. Mary Harry) – what Robertson drolly called a 
“new and rather amusing” touch.66 Other potential victims were not so amused, and went 
to great lengths to see that something was done. William Thomlinson, a mining executive 
based in British Columbia, wrote to Scotland Yard complaining about a prisoner letter and 
declaring that “if you are in touch with the authorities in Spain, perhaps these fakers can 
be caught and put to honest work, in jail.”67 
 Yet for as many of Ramos’ letters that missed their mark, just as many found a 
willing victim. “About 16th January last,” wrote Superintendent Gordon of the Stirlingshire 
Constabulary, “Mrs. Margaret McAllister…received letter No. 1 of the enclosures [from 
“Jean Richard Pbro”]…and cabled in reply that she agreed to co-operate with the writer.”68 
After receiving additional letters from Richard, “she sent a cheque for £60 payable to Jean 
Richard Pbro…She received letter No.7 dated 13th February in acknowledgement of the 
cheque; but although she immediately thereafter wrote asking for more information, she 
received no word.”69 Gordon wondered if “there is a chance of getting at Jean Richard 
Pbro,” and that if “the Barcelona Police would act much more readily for [the Met] than 
for [Stirlingshire].”70 “It seems a pity,” Gordon continued, “that there should be no way of 
getting at that scoundrel.”71  
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A similar situation confronted George and Mary Sophia Vooght of Cricklewood, 
who “received a letter from a man singing himself as Alvaro de Guzman, stating he was in 
Prison at Murcia, Spain, undergoing twelve years imprisonment…and that he had a 
daughter who was in a college in Spain who he was anxious to have sent to England to be 
educated and to live under the care of Mr. Vooght.”72 Guzman claimed to be a relative of 
Vooght through Guzman’s deceased wife Mary. “As Mr. Vooght had a sister Mary whom 
he had not seen for many years,” Sergeant W. Kemp reported, “he induced his wife to write 
to Guzman, offering to accept the girl Amelia, and have charge of her.”73 Guzman replied 
by requesting that Vooght send £200 to his intermediary, Chaplain Jose Roig, in order to 
secure the girl’s safe passage and the collection of her inheritance. Mrs. Vooght, becoming 
suspicious, wrote to a Magistrate in Murcia, but received a letter from Jose Roig, stating 
that this letter had been handed to him and that Guzman had passed away since their last 
exchange.74 Roig wrote that he needed £115 to help process the passage of Guzman’s estate 
to his daughter and her new guardians. Mrs. Vooght responded by sending the money, but 
did not receive a reply. Mr. Vooght then asked a friend to write to Roig asking for an 
explanation. Roig replied to this letter by “stating he was in Prison for some offence he 
could not explain, but required £35 more to enable him to bring Amelia to England.”75  
Mrs. Vooght went to the police after this letter, at which point Sergeant Kemp 
“informed [her] the whole thing was a swindle and that we could not assist her, beyond 
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forwarding the documents to the British Ambassador at Madrid.”76 The British Embassy 
in Madrid, when they received word of these frauds, forwarded notices on to Spanish 
authorities, but warned that individuals living at the local addresses used by the criminals 
often “turn out to be mere innocent accessories to the fraud, who can prove their ignorance 
of the contents of the letters sent to their address; while the real swindlers remain uncaught, 
and continue their correspondence under a different name.”77 The ability of these swindlers 
to intercept incoming letters from marks before they reached their local destination – as 
was the case with Mrs. Vooght’s letter to the Magistrate of Murcia – suggests that the 
“prisoners” were postal employees that handled foreign deliveries.78  
While most of these criminals eluded capture, authorities were sometimes 
successful in foiling their correspondence campaigns. In one instance, the Spanish 
Ambassador to Britain, Marquis de Villalobar, sent a list of addresses of potential British 
victims to Metropolitan Police Commissioner Edward Henry.79 The Met used this list to 
prevent at least one fraud aimed at Mr. Charles Clark, a London cycle dealer, who had 
already sent a positive reply to his first prisoner letter, but fortunately had not included any 
money.80 On other occasions, suspicious members of the public helped the police. In 1910, 
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a member of the advertising department of The Daily News warned police that he had 
received a series of strange notices for inclusion in the paper’s classified section and 
believed they could be related to fraud.81 The Met followed up with the individuals that 
had placed these ads, and found that they had each received a prisoner letter that instructed 
them to place their reply in the newspaper. The police responded by placing warnings 
regarding this fraud in post offices across the country. Of course, even with these 
precautions and examples of self-reporting, the letters continued to arrive and those that 
were duped often left the incident unreported because of embarrassment.  
 Along with Spanish Prisoner letters, international work for police at this time 
involved occasional extradition cases as well as protection detail for foreign dignitaries.82 
Though relatively rare, these cases easily caught the public’s imagination, and police 
themselves were often eager to play up their roles in this work. Nearly all of the British 
police memoirs written in the first half of the twentieth century contain a section on 
international crime, even though most of the narratives within these sections rely on 
newspaper articles rather than personal experience or police case files. Many of these books 
adopted the trappings of hardboiled detective novels. Some of these police memoirs were 
even ghost-written by hardboiled novelists, like Peter Cheyney.83 Yet even as these 
sensationalized books perpetuated the myth of international crime, they also provided 
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another means for police to establish their credibility to the public. People at this time 
assumed that international crime was rampant, and they wanted to be assured that their 
police were up to the task. In addition, the perpetuation of the international crime myth also 
gave readers a means to compare their police to those of another country. British police 
often played up this comparison in their memoirs to bolster the prestige of Scotland Yard 
and British policing in general.84 In his book on the famous Dr. Crippen murder case, Chief 
Inspector Walter Dew described travelling to North America in order to capture Crippen 
and his mistress.85 After arresting Crippen on board a ship in the St. Lawrence River, Dew 
described with pride his refusal to share information on the case with American journalist 
in order to “uphold the prestige of British justice and British police methods.”86 
 
BRITISH POLICING AND AMERICA 
The prestige of “British police methods” was undoubtedly important to the British 
themselves, but it also held a significance for police in the United States. Through its early 
history, America relied on the constabulary system developed by British administrators 
during the 18th century to manage their criminal justice needs. Yet as the United States 
encountered problems related to urbanization, industrialization, and westward expansion 
in the 19th century, American politicians and police often looked to Britain for assistance 
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or expertise on how to adapt law enforcement.87 The British influence on American 
policing often worked through official channels, but it also occurred through unexpected 
and informal means, as it did with Scottish immigrant Allan Pinkerton.  
Born in Glasgow in 1819, Pinkerton was an active participant in the Chartists 
movement in Scotland.88 His participation landed him into trouble with local authorities, 
eventually forcing him to leave his homeland for America with his family in 1842. Their 
passenger ship, however, wrecked in Canada, and they lost most of their possessions. 
Luckily for Pinkerton, he was offered help from the burgeoning Scottish community in 
Chicago, and found work there as a cooper. Like other new territories and states in the 
Midwest at the time, Illinois suffered from gangs of counterfeiters, which managed to 
flourish because federal laws regarding currency did not yet extend to the new territories. 
Pinkerton, along with other concerned businessmen in the area, worked to discover and 
destroy counterfeit camps in the area around Chicago beginning in 1847. Pinkerton was 
soon made a deputy of Kane County Illinois and later became a special agent for the 
Chicago post office. The focus of Pinkerton’s work for the post office was the protection 
of remittance letters, most being sent by Scottish immigrants to their families abroad. This 
work required Pinkerton and his men to spy on post office employees, a practice that would 
become the backbone of the subsequent Pinkerton Detective Agency.  
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The problem of mail robbery pointed to a common issue faced by American law 
enforcement in general at the time: namely, how to ward off criminal activity in a country 
that was growing, both in terms of geography and population, beyond the means of the 
state. This issue was no more evident than in regard to railroads, which cut through multiple 
municipal and state jurisdictions or, in some instances, through areas with no legal structure 
at all. To solve this problem, a conglomeration of six Midwestern railway companies hired 
Pinkerton in 1855 to develop a private police force that could protect westward bound 
cargo. Contrary to romantic notions of railway robbers like Jesse James, most crime 
involving railroads was perpetrated by railway employees, particularly conductors. As a 
result, most of the Agency’s time was spent “testing” conductors: agents posed as 
customers, offering conductors under the table deals for rides or for access to cargo. 
Pinkerton later applied this same method of testing to other industries in urbanized cities, 
in addition to providing spies and shock troops to combat labor strikes or riots. In this way 
a former Chartist became the trusted protector of America’s robber barons. 
Whereas Pinkerton’s model of state intelligence and espionage served the interests 
of American industry, British police served as the primary example for law enforcement in 
urban America, particularly with regard to criminal identification. The late 19th century 
saw the birth of criminal identification and criminology, fields initially dominated by the 
theoretical work of Cesare Lombroso and the anthropometry system created by Alphonse 
Bertillon.89 Dactyloscopy (fingerprinting), which had its origins in British India, was also 
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well known, but struggled in comparison with Bertillonage.90 Fingerprinting offered the 
truest means of identification, but it lacked an effective classification system, thus 
inhibiting recall during investigation. Though Bertillon’s system was prone to errors thanks 
to inaccurate physical measurements, it remained the preferred method because of its user 
friendly classification system based on photographs.91 Many American police departments, 
for instance, already used a photograph based “rogue’s gallery” collection – developed by 
Allan Pinkerton – that shared similarities with Bertillon’s system. Even after the 
introduction of the Fingerprint System by Edward Henry in Bengal in 1897, Bertillonage 
continued to predominate in police departments and prisons throughout the world, 
including those in Britain. 
Dactyloscopy had its coming out party, of sorts, during the Louisiana Purchase 
Exposition in St. Louis, most commonly referred to as the St. Louis World’s Fair, in 1904.92 
Edward Henry, now Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, sent Detective John 
Kenneth Ferrier to St. Louis to guard a display of the Crown Jewels. Ferrier, inspired by a 
nearby display on Bertillonage put on by the New York Prison System, set up an 
impromptu demonstration of Scotland Yard’s fingerprint system based on the Henry 
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model. By this time, America and most of the world was aware of Henry’s system, but 
foreign police had difficulty understanding Henry’s methods based on his cryptic written 
work. Ferrier, an accomplished showman, provided the necessary bridge between Henry’s 
theories and everyday police work. On April 14, 1904, Ferrier performed a demonstration 
of fingerprinting using the prints of a British confidence man, Percy Ogilvie, who had been 
arrested a few days before by the St. Louis Police. Ferrier put on several more 
demonstrations over the next month for police chiefs from across the world. At the end of 
the fair, Ferrier was hired by Robert W. McClaughry, warden of the federal penitentiary at 
Leavenworth, Kansas, to develop a dactyloscopy center at the prison and make impressions 
of all the inmates. By the end of the First World War, the Federal Bureau of Criminal 
Identification at Leavenworth housed the largest archive of fingerprints in the world. J. 
Edgar Hoover, in one of his first acts as Director of the FBI, had this archive transferred to 
Washington in 1924. Following the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby, Hoover promoted 
the utility of this archive and used it as a means to push for “universal identification” – the 
controversial campaign to fingerprint every man, woman and child in the United States.93 
 Along with identification, Britain also had a tremendous influence on the operation 
of American criminal justice overseas, particularly with regard to extradition94 and the 
white slave trade. Though the United States largely avoided entering into international 
treaties on these subjects, America’s police nevertheless remained keenly interested in 
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British opinions on these topics and others. The crisis of white slavery proved particularly 
important in this regard as it launched the career of American police expert Raymond 
Fosdick.95 In 1913, Fosdick, a progressive social worker in New York, was hired by John 
D. Rockefeller Jr. to produce a study on the police of Europe for his Bureau of Social 
Hygiene. Rockefeller created the Bureau in 1911 to increase pressure on policy makers to 
address prostitution and venereal disease. After producing several studies on prostitution, 
the Bureau became convinced that in order to bring a lasting change to the problem of 
white slavery America’s police would need to be reformed to avoid their close relationship 
with the vice. Thus Rockefeller paid for Fosdick and his wife to tour Europe throughout 
1913, visiting police in Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. 
Fosdick’s resulting study, European Police Systems, proved to be one of the 
greatest advertisements for the British policing model ever written.96 Although he believed 
that a nation’s police was largely determined by each nation’s particular character and 
history, Fosdick argued that the adoption of British policing would help to solve a number 
of social ills facing the United States. He idealized, in particular, the non-military, non-
political nature of British policing, and felt that the decentralized structure of British 
policing offered a model for the widely dispersed American police to follow.  
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Though Fosdick would later back away from his recommendation of British 
policing for America97, his high praise of the British model had a profound influence on 
police policy and studies in the United States. Most importantly, Fosdick’s work influenced 
Berkeley Police Chief and University of California criminologist August Vollmer. Vollmer 
became famous for applying scientific detection and modern bureaucratic ideas to policing, 
and served as an adviser to police reform efforts in several major cities throughout the 
United States. He believed that the Metropolitan Police provided the best model for these 
reforms because they managed to operate without significant political interference – a 
problem that vexed several American departments in major cities run by political 
machines.98 Vollmer called for the creation of an “American Scotland Yard” that could 
serve as a central department to not only direct reforms, but also to coordinate the exchange 
of criminal identification material between police departments throughout the country.99 
Not unlike police in Europe, Vollmer’s greatest concern was with the largely anonymous, 
travelling criminal who could avoid capture by crossing state or national boundary lines. 
This view was mirrored by Raymond Fosdick, who felt that the greatest threat to modern 
law enforcement was the lack of cooperation and the large amount of diplomatic red tape 
that existed between police forces around the world.   
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POLICING IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGE 
 Police in America did very little to encourage this cooperation, primarily because 
the country lacked a de facto national police force to speak for the country as a whole.100 
The New York Police Department and the Secret Service often received international 
correspondence, but neither of these forces attempted to build upon this correspondence to 
create more permanent structures of cooperation and exchange. As police in the United 
States pursued domestic reform, police throughout Europe continued to pursue the idea of 
cooperation through a series of international conference between 1902 and 1913.101 The 
discussions at these conferences culminated at the First International Criminal Police 
Congress in Monaco in 1914.102 Hosted by Prince Albert of Monaco, this congress was 
attended by nearly two hundred delegates from twenty four countries. From the beginning, 
congress participants set about trying to find a way to make international police cooperation 
a permanent feature of European relations, and openly debated the idea of creating an 
international organization for that purpose.103 Many delegates favored the idea of taking 
one nation’s police system and making it the standard for all international cooperation. Yet 
this proposal elicited significant criticism, especially from the German delegation, which 
feared that the French system would be adopted instead of its own.104 Largely as a result 
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of this conflict, the Monaco meeting led to no long-term agreement, but congress members 
did unanimously agree to reconvene in Bucharest in 1916.105 
The First World War ensured that the Bucharest meeting never occurred, but police 
throughout Europe emerged from the conflict committed to pursuing the ideas proposed at 
the Monaco conference. Indeed, the Great War worked to heighten prewar fears regarding 
international crime. Police and the public alike openly worried about the potential 
“brutalization effect” on soldiers returning from the war, as well as the return of old 
menaces such as international anarchism. Similarly the war encouraged concern over white 
slavery, which began to intersect with the developing anxiety over narcotics trafficking.106 
Simultaneously, the postwar period also found police better poised to take advantage of 
this fear of crime to promote their profession. The war witnessed a steady buildup in the 
surveillance power of police as well as a growing acceptance of professional policing as a 
necessary evil to stop the spread of bolshevism. The postwar period also offered police 
several models to follow with regard to international cooperation, not least of which was 
the League of Nations.  
 Of course, the League of Nations itself became an important institution in the 
policing of international crime during the interwar period.107 British representatives at the 
League played a critical role in this work. The League’s first Secretary General, British 
diplomat Eric Drummond, named Dame Rachel Crowdy head of the League’s Social 
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Questions and Opium Trafficking departments.108 Crowdy used this role to bring the 
agendas of various unofficial international pressure groups, such as Britain’s National 
Vigilance Association, to the attention of world leaders throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
Yet police interested in international cooperation tended to find the League’s focus on 
trafficking in women and narcotics limiting. They felt that although these issues were 
important, more pressing issues – particularly anarchism, bolshevism, and counterfeiting – 
existed. In addition, many police began to feel that a close association with the League or 
other official lines of international relations could hamper the effectiveness of international 
police cooperation. In order to pursue their own interests and avoid diplomatic red tape, 
police in the interwar period would develop their own international organizations, 
including the International Police Conference and Interpol. These organizations will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Three.  
 
POLICING EMPIRE IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGE  
This period of burgeoning internationalism also brought a new interest to colonial police, 
not only to Britain, but the wider world as well. Prior to this period, colonial policing rarely 
garnered much attention. This fact is remarkable because the police, perhaps more than any 
other group in the colonial enterprise, represented imperial rule for the colonized. 
Indigenous peoples rarely saw members of the Colonial Office, the Colonial Governor, 
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landlords, or politicians, but they encountered the colonial police on a daily basis. These 
encounters were not limited to law enforcement. Colonial police collected taxes, supervised 
public works, directed traffic, fought fires, oversaw court cases, delivered correspondence, 
provided escorts, and performed any number of other duties that either no one else wanted 
or no one else was around to do. Despite the fact that they served as the linchpin of empire 
in many colonies, particularly in the dependencies, the colonial police rarely received 
attention from colonial administrators unless something went wrong. Indeed, the less the 
official mind worried about the police, the more everyone seemed to agree that things were 
going well. 
This absent-minded approach to colonial policing – along with the absent-
mindedness of many other aspects of colonialism – came to an abrupt end during the 
interwar period. This change resulted from a mixture of external and internal pressures. 
The external pressure for change came from foreign governments, which took a renewed 
interest in the Empire due to its absorption of new territories under the Mandate System.109 
Additionally, many members of the international community assumed that empire was the 
breeding ground for the vices plaguing the interwar world, particularly narcotics110 and sex 
trafficking.111 Ironically, one of the leading figures drawing connections between empire 
and crime was British police officer Thomas Russell, better known as Russell Pasha.  
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Pasha’s career spanned work in the Egyptian Civil Service and continued as 
commander of the Cairo Police after Egyptian independence in 1922.112 He oversaw the 
creation of the Egyptian Government’s Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, which 
collected and distributed information on narcotics traffic and traffickers. Pasha was moved 
to pursue this work after seeing heroin addicts going through withdraw in prison. His goal 
in creating the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) was not to eliminate the production of the 
drug, but instead to control the trafficking of the substance. In particular, Pasha wanted to 
put pressure on the League of Nations to pursue opium traffickers in southern Europe and 
throughout the British Empire. In 1930, Pasha presented a damning report on the extent of 
heroin trafficking to the League of Nation’s Advisory Committee on Opium. This report 
raised awareness of the subject throughout the League and the international policing 
community more broadly. This led to cooperation between Pasha’s Central Narcotics 
Bureau and the Palestine police to destroy shipments of drugs moving from Syria. 
Additionally, Pasha’s work encouraged an information exchange between the CNB, and 
the US Treasury Department’s Narcotics Bureau, operated by the overactive Henry 
Anslinger.113  
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This renewed interest in colonial policing from outside was matched by a new 
dedication to its reform from within Britain, particularly within the Colonial Office.114 
While often portrayed as a period of despair and ennui115, the interwar period found the 
Colonial Office on an upswing, filled with ideas and optimism for the future. Colonial 
officials – partly inspired by the wartime experience and partly as a reaction to prewar 
figures such as Joseph Chamberlain and Alfred Milner – worked to develop a bold, forward 
policy of administration. They wanted a policy that would not only deflect domestic and 
foreign criticism of the Empire, but also inspire self-confidence and dedicated work within 
Britain and the colonies.  
The Colonial Office found the basic outlines for this policy in Lord Frederick 
Lugard’s The Dual Mandate, a book which argued that the development of colonial 
territories could be achieved in a way that benefited both the rulers and the ruled.116 
Colonial officials used Lugard’s analysis to repackage prewar paternalistic notions into a 
new policy called “trusteeship.” This policy argued that the purpose of the British Empire 
was to shepherd its dependencies toward eventual self-government in the distant, but not 
too distant, future. Additionally, this self-government would occur within the emerging 
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Commonwealth of Nations – a hastily put together international organization designed to 
rationalize the development of nationalism and de facto independence in the Dominions. 
With trusteeship, then, decolonization through the Commonwealth was theoretically on the 
table, but it would occur on a time table that suited the Colonial Office and proceed in a 
manner that would allow Britain to maintain its international stature. 
 Colonial Office secretaries agreed that the colonial police would play an important 
role in this process, but there remained a lack of agreement regarding how they would 
contribute. The primary worry at this time was that most of the colonial police were in fact 
armed gendarmes, modeled on the recently reviled and disbanded Royal Irish Constabulary 
(RIC). Though its use was largely despised by government leaders in Britain itself, the RIC 
model made possible the maintenance of empire in the absence of occupation soldiers 
through the use of arms and political surveillance.117 The steady expansion of the British 
Empire during the late 19th and early 20th centuries left little time to question the application 
of the Irish model, especially when the fear of a European war seemed to demand the quick 
and cheap establishment of law and order in the periphery.118 After the First World War, 
the colonial dedication to this semi-military model seemed to be reinforced when the RIC 
itself was disbanded, leading to the dispersal of RIC personnel across the empire 
(particularly to the Palestine Mandate).119 The presence of former RIC officers as well as 
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the military nature of most police training in the colonies meant that every force possessed 
the potential for another Amritsar or Bloody Sunday.120 This fact might have comforted 
the imperialists of the 19th century, but for the civil servants of the interwar period – under 
the watchful eye of international society and filled with their own paternalistic imperatives 
– this fact created a sense of dread.  
 Though the need to reform the colonial police was evident, the Colonial Office in 
the immediate postwar period remained shackled to their prewar role within imperial 
administration.121 Generally, the members of the Colonial Office served as advisors to 
Colonial Governors, who developed and administered colonial policy on the spot. This 
meant that the Colonial Office had to rely on requests from Governors for assistance or 
wait for an emergency to develop in order to take direct action. So while the philosophy 
and desire for change existed at the imperial core, the capacity to effect that change 
remained largely at the colonial periphery. As a result, the Colonial Office relied on 
dynamic colonial administrators from the periphery, such as Lord Lugard, in order to make 
the policy of trusteeship into something more than a mere rhetorical device. The next 
chapter will discuss the career of a colonial police officer that attempted to encourage the 
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development of civilian policing throughout the Empire, before moving on to the 
international sphere. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Britain’s police may have been created with an eye toward the rest of the world, but it took 
decades before they pursued cooperation with foreign police in a significant way. Yet even 
without formal cooperation, British police and others concerned with law enforcement 
played a significant role in patrolling the early stages of globalization – whether it was 
Allan Pinkerton in the American West or Dame Rachel Crowdy at the League of Nations. 
Throughout these interactions, however, Britons maintained a sense of superiority 
regarding their police in comparison with foreign departments. This conviction lingered 
even as the Metropolitan Police and other domestic forces adopted political policing to 
combat various real and perceived threats near the end of the 19th century. This sense of 
superiority also developed despite the widespread application of military style policing in 
the British Empire. As the international community turned to the issues of self-
determination and security after the First World War, this paradox became more and more 
difficult to maintain. Thus, the interwar period would find Britain not only continuing the 
promotion of their model of policing abroad, but also attempting to find a way to duplicate 
that model in their own colonial empire.
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Chapter Two: “Police quâ Police”: Herbert Dowbiggin and Colonial 
Policing 
 
Recent historical scholarship on colonial policing – particularly on the Mau Mau 
Uprising – would suggest that the Colonial Office never found a dynamic officer to help 
them reform the colonial police before the era of decolonization, thus leaving the door open 
for new police violence in the 1940s and 1950s.1 Yet the prevalence of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary model amongst imperial police departments never absolutely precluded 
policing along different lines. Charles Jeffries, a longtime member of the Colonial Office 
and author of several books on the topic, argued that the interwar period had in fact 
delivered a means of reform through the career and work of Sir Herbert Dowbiggin.2  
As Inspector General of the Ceylon Police from 1913 to 1937, Dowbiggin 
established a police force that managed to maintain order while also living up to the ideal 
of the London Metropolitan Police. Ceylonese officers and patrolmen walked their beat, 
armed with only a truncheon, and never participated in military exercises. Furthermore, the 
force featured an advanced Criminal Investigation Department that rivaled European police 
departments in terms of the scientific capacity to solve crime. Dowbiggin’s success led the 
Ceylon Police to become a “valuable quarry from which officers were drawn to take 
command of other Colonial forces…in Zanzibar, Uganda, Cyprus, Gambia, Mauritius, 
Nigeria, Trinidad, Tanganyika, Palestine, and Kenya.”3 Additionally, the Colonial Office 
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called on Dowbiggin himself to tour and report on troubled police departments in Cyprus, 
Palestine, and Northern Rhodesia. In this way, Jeffries wrote, a man that “only served in 
one Colony, and never held any central position of authority,” became synonymous during 
the interwar period with “the development and achievements not only of the Ceylon Police 
but of all the Colonial Police.”4  
In Jeffries’ mind, and in the mind of the Colonial Office, Dowbiggin’s achievement 
represented the whiggish conclusion of the imperial mission as it pertained to colonial 
policing. The Colonial Office used Dowbiggin’s career as a model for its policy initiatives 
following the Second World War, which included the creation of the post of Inspector 
General of Colonial Police and the development of the Colonial Police Commissioner’s 
Conference. These initiatives, however, failed to bring about the promised transition from 
military to civilian policing in the colonies. Was this failure the result, as is often said, of 
the exigencies of empire, or was there something fundamentally wrong with these policies? 
Why did the Colonial Office latch onto Dowbiggin as the appropriate model for reform? 
Was Dowbiggin’s reputation as the Empire’s model police officer deserved? How 
consistent was his approach to civilian policing?  
This chapter will follow Herbert Dowbiggin’s career and reveal why he became the 
model police officer for the British Empire during the era of trusteeship. It will provide a 
review of Dowbiggin’s interwar work for the Colonial Office, in particular his reports on 
police forces in Cyprus, Palestine, and Northern Rhodesia. It will also consider his world 
tours in 1935 and 1937, during which he visited police departments in China, Japan, and 
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the United States as well as several British overseas possessions. This chapter will argue 
that Dowbiggin’s insistence on civilian style policing drew from his belief that domestic 
and imperial policing rested on one continuum, and that what was possible in Britain was 
also possible in the colonies. This belief, however, did not necessarily rest on a sense of 
civil liberty. In Dowbiggin’s view, civilian policing was preferable to the Irish model 
because it produced better intelligence, which could be used to preserve imperial control 
without resorting to violence. In addition, this chapter will contend that Dowbiggin, 
because of his experience in the western and non-western world, represented the first true 
international police officer, and that his activity on the global stage helped to establish 
British authority in the field of international policing cooperation. A later chapter will 
consider how Dowbiggin’s career formed the basis of colonial police policy in the postwar 
era. 
 
CEYLON 
Described by fellow Ceylon Administrator Leonard Woolf as “not at all meek and 
mild either in word or deed,” Dowbiggin joined the Ceylon Police in 1901.5 He quickly 
rose through the ranks due to a combination of talent and disease – most of his superiors 
either died of fever or were forced to return home by illness.6 Dowbiggin took over the 
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police as Inspector General in 1913 at the age of 33. His appointment as Inspector General 
represented a significant change in two ways: he was the youngest person to ever hold the 
position and he replaced a long line of Inspector Generals that began their careers in the 
Royal Irish Constabulary.7 Thus, as a young, homegrown Inspector General, Dowbiggin 
was free to pursue his own course with regard to policing.  
Dowbiggin’s policing philosophy was firmly entrenched in the civil model 
established by the London Metropolitan Police. He stressed the idea that the police were 
merely a supplement to the free citizen in the pursuit of justice and that the consent of the 
population to policing was a necessity – no matter if the police worked in Britain or in the 
colonies. “The ideal to be aimed at,” Dowbiggin wrote, “is that the members of every Force 
should realize that they are the servants of the public; the public on their part should look 
upon the Police as a Force instituted to assist them, and that in many cases the Police 
perform duties that any reputable member of the public would voluntarily perform if he 
were on the scene at the time.”8 According to Dowbiggin, the difficulty of modern policing 
in both Britain and Ceylon resulted from the increased mobility of modern criminals.  He 
surmised that village headmen in Ceylon were just as effective at stopping crime prior to 
the railroad as their freeman counterparts in England, yet “the development of industry and 
commerce” meant that these pre-modern methods of deterrence could “no longer maintain 
law and order amongst [an] ever-increasing and changing population.”9 In Dowbiggin’s 
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mind, there was no reason why Britain should have a modern police force and Ceylon 
should not – both territories suffered from the same criminal ills, so both places should 
receive the same treatment. Without question, Dowbiggin’s views on colonial policing 
drew in part from his childhood split between England and Ceylon. Dowbiggin’s father, 
Reverend R.T. Dowbiggin, served as a missionary in Ceylon throughout most of the late 
19th century. It appears that H.L. Dowbiggin, born in 1880, spent many of his early years 
with his family in the colony before attending Merchant Taylors’ School in England.  
As Inspector General, Dowbiggin immediately set out to make over a force that had 
been “mainly occupied in providing Treasury and Jail guards” and doing “no real ‘police 
work’ in the modern sense of the word.”10 His first step was to create a Police Training 
School, replacing a training curriculum focused on firearms with one centered around 
unarmed detection and investigation. Dowbiggin’s favorite and oft-repeated maxim was 
that “a notebook is to the policeman what a rifle is to the soldier.”11 This saying not only 
reflected Dowbiggin’s policing philosophy, but also pointed to the fact that most colonial 
police officers were in fact soldiers in all but name. The Dowbiggin collection at Rhodes 
House Library bears witness to his belief in this maxim: the first box of the collection is 
packed with dozens of pocket-size notebooks filled with daily details from walking the 
beat or investigating cases.12 The Ceylon police remained armed in the sense that rifles and 
carbines were at every station, but police were not allowed to carry weapons on patrol. 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 205. 
11 Dowbiggin, “Report on Inspection of the Police Force by the Inspector General of the Ceylon Police,” 
1926-1927, CO 67/218/3, NA. 
12 “Dowbiggin (Col. H.B.L.) Papers”, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 10, RH.  
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Following the overhaul of police training, Dowbiggin established a Criminal Investigation 
Department for the island in 1915, which housed a forensics laboratory and the colony’s 
fingerprint and, because most of the colony was shoeless, a footprint archive.13 To help 
mitigate the problem of travelling criminals (as well as prevent the immigration of possible 
subversives), he required records kept of all individuals disembarking and embarking on 
ships in Ceylon as well as a record of all people staying at hotels, boarding houses, or rest 
homes.14 In order to prevent turnover in the force, Dowbiggin increased pay and housing 
for police of all ranks, and developed a pension fund for both retired police and widows. 
Finally, in an attempt to decrease future crime rates, Dowbiggin sponsored clubs for local 
boys that offered boxing lessons, in the hope that young men would use their fists rather 
than knives when violence started.  
Dowbiggin’s reforms were not always a complete success and Dowbiggin himself 
ordered police to fire on a crowd during the Sinhala-Muslim Riots of 1915.15 The name of 
these riots contradicts their actual cause. Though partially communal in nature, these riots 
resulted from an economic disagreement between Sinhalese and Muslim merchants.16 As 
one historian rightly noted, “religious sentiment [in Ceylon] often gave a sharp ideological 
focus and a cloak of respectability to sordid commercial rivalry.”17 Unfortunately, 
Dowbiggin, along with Colonial Governor Robert Chalmers, sensed sedition in these 
                                                 
13 An example of this work can be found in “Colombo (Ceylon) Police Case: Conviction Obtained by 
Footprint,” 1936, MEPO 2/5029, NA. 
14 Dowbiggin, “The Ceylon Police and Its Development,” 211. 
15 Arthur C Dep, Ceylon Police and Sinhala-Muslim Riots of 1915 (Ratmalana: Sarvodaya Vishva Lekha, 
2001). 
16 K. M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005). 
17 Ibid., 475. 
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activities and overreacted with violent force and prison sentences.18 This overreaction, 
itself partly a result of wartime panic, aided the development of Sinhalese nationalism 
following the First World War. In addition to the riots, criminal investigation tended to lag 
behind the ideal set by Dowbiggin. As Leonard Woolf commented in his official diary 
following the arrest of a young boy for stealing a gold watch, “the methods of police 
investigation were a very good example of what is so frequently condemned in the report 
of the Indian Police Commission – investigation, nil; method, obtain a confession; result, 
acquittal.”19  
Yet Woolf also judged that Ceylon “was the exact opposite of a ‘police state’” and 
life in the colony was marked by “the extraordinary absence of the use of force in everyday 
life and government.”20 This is high praise coming from one of the great critics of empire, 
but it could be argued that the lack of violence in Ceylon resulted from the economic 
makeup of the colony as much as the police. Ceylon, often referred to as the “model” or 
“premier” colony, benefited from a wealth of diverse natural resources (cinnamon, tea, 
coffee, and rubber) that allowed the colony to maintain low levels of unemployment. The 
diversity of these resources meant that Ceylon could easily manage a failure to one crop, 
either because of natural disaster or a fall in market prices, and keep the economy afloat 
with other exports – an incredible luxury compared to other colonies.  
                                                 
18 Kumari Jayawardena, “Economic and Political Factors in the 1915 Riots,” The Journal of Asian Studies 
29, no. 2 (February 1, 1970): 223–233. 
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Ceylon Historical Journal, 1962), 213–214. 
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Even with this economic steadiness, however, the ability of Ceylonese police to 
manage the colony without the regular use of violence is remarkable. Much of this ability 
drew from the level of devotion Dowbiggin elicited from his subordinates, European and 
indigenous alike. J.R. Granville Bantock, who served under Dowbiggin from 1921, 
portrayed the Inspector General in his letters home as exceedingly popular because of the 
care he took with the well-being of the police and their families, particularly through 
increases to the force’s pay and pension fund.21 Dowbiggin even gained the respect of 
subordinates, like N.P. Hadow, who felt that the Inspector General’s techniques were “not 
always appropriate.”22 “I was appointed,” wrote Hadow, “and had no course ever to regret 
my choice because the Ceylon Police Force under the truly remarkable and outstanding 
Inspector General – Sir Herbert Dowbiggin – had attained a general state of expertise and 
cultivation of police methods.” This esteem for Dowbiggin can also be seen in letters to 
the Inspector General from former subordinates, such as R.G.B. Spicer, who often wrote 
to Dowbiggin looking for advice.23 
 
                                                 
21 “Papers of J.R. Granville Bantock,” 1920 – 1939, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 287, RH. Bantock, a senior officer 
in the Ceylon Police, wrote often of Dowbiggin in his diaries and letters home, remarking that the Inspector 
General’s reforms and Christmas parties made him popular with both officers and duty men.  
22 “Law Enforcement XIX Uganda 2, B-MACN,” n.d., MSS. Afr. s. 1784, RH. 
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CYPRUS 
While Dowbiggin’s personal connections made him a favorite with his fellow 
police, his stature in the eyes of the Colonial Office relied initially on chance. Dowbiggin’s 
work for the Colonial Office originated with a letter from the Acting Governor of Cyprus, 
Reginald Popham Lobb, to Leopold Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on July 
28, 1926.24 Popham Lobb presided over Cyprus at a critical moment in the island’s 
history.25 The unintended prize in Greek-Turkish relations, Cyprus had been a protectorate 
of Britain, under Turkish suzerainty, from 1878 until 1914. The Empire annexed the 
territory at the beginning of the First World War and offered Cyprus to Greece in return 
for help during the Dardanelles campaign. Greece, however, feared wartime repercussions 
and refused the offer, thus leaving the door open for continued British occupation. Britain 
largely welcomed this occupation as Cyprus provided the Empire a further means to 
solidify their growing presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Turkey and 
Greece calmly recognized British control over the island as part of the Treaty of Lausanne 
in 1923, a move which made Cyprus “the orphan” of the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire.26 Britain declared Cyprus a crown colony in 1925, and set out to rule over a jilted, 
angry, and determined population of Greek Cypriots still seeking enosis.  
 In this anxious context, Popham Lobb, acting as governor between the departure of 
Malcolm Stevenson and the arrival of Ronald Storrs, wrote to the Colonial Office seeking 
                                                 
24 Popham Lobb to Amery, July 28, 1926, “Report on inspection of the Police Force by the Inspector 
General of the Ceylon Police,” CO 67/218/3, NA.  
25 R. F. Holland and Diana Weston Markides, The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the 
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26 Ibid., 182. 
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help. Citing a Colonial Office dispatch from 1912, Popham Lobb wrote that the Cyprus 
Police had not been inspected since 1911, and wondered if the government could “arrange 
for a senior officer from Egyptian Command to visit the Colony for that purpose or, perhaps 
preferably, that the Officer in command of the Police in one of the Eastern Colonies such 
as Ceylon or the Straits Settlement might be detailed to do so on his way to or from 
England.”27 That Popham Lobb would have to call upon a letter from 1912 to make a 
request in 1926 illustrates how little consideration the colonial police, even in a potentially 
unstable colony like Cyprus, received from administrators. It is also no coincidence that a 
request for help regarding the police was made shortly after Cypriot demands for self-
determination went unheeded by the international community. While there was no 
immediate fear of Sinn Fein style violence on the island, the growth of the enosis movement 
made it a potential future problem.28 Popham Lobb’s mention of Ceylon and Malaya 
appears strange next to Egypt, but the suggestion, as Amery and the Colonial Office 
surmised, was probably made because Cyprus wanted a Police Commissioner familiar with 
policing an island with a mixed population. 
 Based on Popham Lobb’s suggestion, the Colonial Office’s search for candidates 
centered on senior colonial police officers that happened to be on leave in England when 
the letter arrived on August 12, 1926. Running an empire was often less about finding the 
best solution to a problem than using what was around to create the most efficient solution. 
Dowbiggin’s name was mentioned in only the second entry on the minute’s list, and 
                                                 
27 Popham Lobb to Amery, July 28, 1926, “Report on inspection of the Police Force by the Inspector 
General of the Ceylon Police,” CO 67/218/3, NA.  
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eventually rose above the other candidates, including his protégé R.G.B. Spicer, thanks to 
a persuasive minute by Alexander Fiddian: 
I think it is either Mr. Dowbiggin or Mr. Hannigan [Inspector General of the 
Federated Malay States or F.M.S.]; and after carefully reading Mr. Hannigan’s 
Promotion File (herewith) and hearing what the Ceylon Department have to say 
about Mr. Dowbiggin, I am strongly disposed to favour the latter, who has always 
been known to us as an excellent officer of Police. I daresay, too, that Ceylon 
conditions are a little more like those of Cyprus than are those of the F.M.S. 
 
Fiddian furthered his case by relating a conversation he had with the future Governor of 
Cyprus, Ronald Storrs: 
I spoke to Sir Ronald Storrs, and he said he could not propose one of the Palestine 
senior men going because of the relationship between [A.S.] Mavrogodato who is 
Deputy Inspector of Police and Prisons in Palestine, and the Island from which his 
family is derived, and in which he himself served in the Police up to 1913. 
Moreover, the less Palestine we have in Cyprus the better…I do not think we want 
a military officer. A police force, however military their functions may be, is none 
the less essentially a police force, and the worst of military officers is that they 
usually confine themselves to questions of drill and discipline. I am disposed to 
suggest opening negotiations with Mr. Dowbiggin at once.29 
 
The other concerned members of the Colonial Office quickly agreed, and letters were sent 
to Dowbiggin and the Governor of Ceylon for permission. Ceylon freed Dowbiggin’s 
schedule and the Government of Cyprus agreed to offer the Inspector General a £50 
honorarium for his work. Fiddian’s minute, in addition to settling the Cyprus issue, reveals 
two important features of the Colonial Office’s thinking with regard to policing. First, it 
reveals that the Colonial Office viewed the paramilitary style of policing in Palestine, 
recently bolstered with the transfer of former members of the Royal Irish Constabulary, 
                                                 
29 Alexander Fiddian, Minute, August 18, 1926, “Report on inspection of the Police Force by the Inspector 
General of the Ceylon Police,” CO 67/218/3, NA. Original emphasis. Dowbiggin, through his report on the 
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with concern and did not want to see that form of policing spread to other colonies. Second, 
it shows a desire to begin to remove the military burden from the colonial police through 
reform. With Dowbiggin, the Colonial Office had a well-respected expert that could help 
them achieve both goals. 
Dowbiggin conducted his inspection of Cyprus from November 4th to 11th 1926.30 
His tour of the island included visits to the training depot, the Chief Commandant’s 
headquarters, the Central Prison, a farm for juvenile offenders, and the headquarters of 
three districts (Nicosia, Larnaka, and Limassol) as well as the out-stations for each of these 
districts. Dowbiggin wanted to visit the headquarters of all six districts in Cyprus, but the 
limit of his travel allowance meant that he could only stop at a few of the districts. His tour 
included visits with district commissioners, constables, judges, advocates, and local 
villagers.  
In his report, Dowbiggin remarked on his surprise at the level of development on 
the island. “One imagines,” he wrote, “that a colony within a week’s journey of London is 
likely to be more advanced than Colonies far more distant.”31 He discovered on Cyprus, 
however, an island without a daily newspaper and with large tracts of land only available 
through camel, donkey, or mule as transportation. This low level of development meant 
the government often relied on the police to work in place of regular infrastructure. “The 
Cyprus Police,” Dowbiggin wrote, “are responsible for the counting of sheep, pigs, and 
goats for taxation purposes. They are responsible for the collection and destruction of rats' 
                                                 
30 H.L. Dowbiggin, “Cyprus Military Police. Inspection, November 1926,” CO 67/218/3, NA. Dowbiggin 
completed his report from Port Said, Egypt on November 16.  
31 Herbert Dowbiggin, Report on Cyprus Police, CO 67/218/3, NA, 2.  
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tails, bats and sparrows' eggs…70,000 letters were delivered by hand by the Police in 1925 
in the villages for the District Commissioners. Food samples are obtained and sent to the 
Government Analyst by the Police. The Police are responsible for the supervision of rural 
constables, and the Police act as the local Fire Brigade.”32  
Dowbiggin understood that necessity often required this work, but he stressed that 
in order for this to be an effective police department, officers would have to be divested of 
these extra duties. In particular, he said that police should be freed from escorting tax 
collectors, serving as orderlies for the court system, and working as telephone operators. 
Furthermore, he opined that someone should relieve the seven police officers that served 
as local barbers, saying “it is clearly undesirable that a trained policeman should spend his 
day hair-cutting.”33 Dowbiggin argued that “the policeman is picked on account of his good 
physique and good character, and he is trained to be tactful and considerate in his dealings 
with the public. To employ a policeman on a duty such as that of a telephone operator, 
which does not require a man of outstanding good physique, or in the carrying of papers 
from one room to another, is bound to result in the deterioration of the man.”34 On the other 
hand, he concluded, it was in some ways “a tribute to the efficiency of the Force that they 
were called upon to undertake all these duties. It would appear that whenever there was a 
new job to be done the Police were called in.”35 
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 Dowbiggin worried that if the Cyprus police were not allowed to concentrate on 
their police duties the island would be unable to deal with the new forms of criminality 
sweeping the globe. “I was informed,” he wrote, “that the criminal has not yet taken to 
moving from one District to another, and the travelling criminal who practices fraud and 
lives on cheating by moving from place to place, where he is not known, or does not yet 
exist...If, as means of communication in the Island improve, the travelling criminal 
becomes a nuisance, it may be necessary to start a separate C.I.D. Branch which will study 
and record the modus operandi adopted by criminals, and be responsible for recording and 
notifying all Districts concerned of the movements and modus operandi adopted by 
travelling criminals.”36 Dowbiggin also recommended that officers carry a notebook as a 
way to manage without a tradition investigation department: “The notebook is to the 
Policeman what his rifle is to the soldier. It is as useless for the Policeman to be at the scene 
of crime or accident without a notebook as it is for the soldier to go into action without his 
rifle....It is impossible for a Police Officer to rely on his memory when reporting the 
number of a motor car concerned in an offense and it is dangerous for a Police Officer to 
attempt to remember the exact words used by a person on arrest or the statement of a dying 
man.”37 Dowbiggin suggested that this work be supplemented by visits from outside 
experts from Britain and surrounding colonies to deliver lectures or courses on modern 
police techniques. Additionally, he stressed that an allowance needed to be set up so that 
young officers could attend Metropolitan Police training courses in England while on leave. 
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These officers should then be able to share their knowledge in a new local police journal, 
which could also be used to encourage esprit amongst the force. 
 Dowbiggin’s report eased the minds of many in Cyprus and the Colonial Office. 
He found the Cyprus Police to be, on the whole, capable and willing. All that was needed 
was encouragement along appropriate lines of development in the coming years. Amery 
and Popham Lobb received the report with enthusiasm, but the Commandant of Cyprus 
Police, A.E. Gallagher, worried over the cost of some of Dowbiggin’s proposals, 
particularly the allowance for officers to attend Metropolitan Police courses in England.38 
Amery, however, writing to Governor Ronald Storrs the following year, reiterated his 
desire to see Dowbiggin’s recommendations carried out, and stated that allowances would 
be available for officers to attend courses at the Met as well as to take instruction in Greek 
and Turkish.39 Dowbiggin’s report contained little to help the police deal with enosis and 
political violence40, but this fact was seen by the Colonial Office as a positive. As Popham 
Lobb, a former administrator of St. Vincent, put it, “[Dowbiggin’s] visit shows the value 
of periodical inspections of colonial Police Forces by trained Police officers as opposed to 
those carried out by military officers purely from the standpoint of home defence, as in the 
West Indian colonies. Similar inspections in those and other colonies would do much to 
raise the standard of the local Police quâ Police.”41 The tenor of Dowbiggin’s report was 
what made it useful to a Colonial Office looking to make changes.  
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PALESTINE 
Dowbiggin’s mission to Palestine in 1930 served as part of the Colonial Office’s 
response to the 1929 Wailing Wall Riots. The riots, which resulted partly from competition 
over the religious site and partly from the general increase of Jewish immigration to 
Palestine, found Arabs attacking Jewish communities in Jerusalem as well as settlements 
in Hebron and Jaffa. The police charged with reestablishing order often found themselves 
shorthanded, as many Arab and Jewish officers avoided the riots because of personal 
loyalties.42  The Shaw Commission, tasked with reviewing the riots, recommended the 
reorganization of the police under the guidance of a senior colonial police officer.43 
Dowbiggin was chosen not only for his past work in Cyprus, but also because of his 
experience policing a colonial population with a dangerous mixture of political, racial, and 
religious differences.44 
The 1929 riots came after several years of relative quiet in the Mandate.  This quiet 
allowed Palestine High Commissioner Herbert Plumer to disband the gendarmerie and 
dismiss the remaining military forces in 1926. Plumer’s decision fell in line with the 
general downsizing of ground forces in the Middle East in favor of regional policing using 
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contingents of the Royal Air Force.45 This policy, combined with the ineptitude of the 
police during the riots, forced Britain to send troops from Egypt and Malta to quell the 
uprising.46 Plumer’s dismissal of both the military and paramilitary arms of Palestine’s 
security forces was motivated not only by economy, but also by a desire to build a force 
along civilian lines.47 The Wailing Wall Riots revealed the weaknesses of this approach, 
but the Dowbiggin mission clearly represented a commitment on the part of the Colonial 
Office to make the civilian model work in Palestine. Indeed, if the Government wanted a 
military solution to the problem, they would have sent in anyone other than Dowbiggin. 
 Dowbiggin’s report, however, made clear that the civilian model would need 
immediate assistance from the British military in order to survive. He argued that until a 
political solution developed, Palestine would need two battalions of British infantry, two 
companies of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, a squadron of the Royal Air Force, and three 
sections of Armored Cars.48 He stressed that this measure would be a temporary solution 
to a problem that could only be solved by a constitutional resolution. Furthermore, he 
argued that the police should remain outside of any political dealings between the 
Government and the divided sides. “A Police Officer,” Dowbiggin wrote, “should not 
concern himself with politics, but should concentrate his energies on maintaining good 
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order amongst the different classes he is called upon to serve and do his duty amongst them 
as he finds them.”49 
 In addition to military support, Dowbiggin believed the police needed regular 
drilling in riot procedure. To make his point, Dowbiggin drew parallels between the 1929 
Palestine Riots and the riots in Ceylon in 1915. Though the 1915 riots occurred because 
“Moors had, by successful business methods and by their industry, undercut the Sinhalese 
tradesmen,” Sinhalese leaders cried that “the Moors were attacking the Temples.” He 
contended that it was impossible “to prevent and to deal with riots [like this] in a country 
such as Palestine, where the religious cry can be raised at a moment’s notice, unless there 
is adequate force on the spot.”50 The danger of quick escalation, Dowbiggin argued, 
necessitated that every police officer should memorize and be thoroughly trained in the 
protocol for riot control because officers were not always going to have a superior on hand 
to defer to. He argued that the Palestine police, as well as all police in the empire, should 
have access to a standardized book on the subject and suggested that the Ceylon book on 
maintaining public safety could be used as a basis for this new book.51 
 As with Cyprus, however, Dowbiggin did not spend his entire report in criticism of 
the local police. “To expect the Palestinian Police at the present time,” he wrote, “to prevent 
and impartially to deal with racial disturbances is, in my opinion, asking the impossible of 
them.”52 He felt that the Palestine Police deserved more leeway than other forces because 
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it was, at that time, “the youngest, if not the youngest, Police Force in the world.”53 “The 
Metropolitan Police Force,” Dowbiggin wrote, “has been in existence for 101 years, the 
Ceylon Police for 65 years. It would be easy to mention a list of things which are being 
done in other Forces, but which are not yet being done in Palestine. Merely to criticize 
would not be helpful. Full allowances must be made for the difficulties under which the 
Force has been evolved, and for the strain which the members of the Force have been 
through in recent times.”54 Again, Dowbiggin always consider the British police and 
colonial police on the same plane, as though each force rested on different levels of the 
same evolutionary chain.  
 In spite of the Palestine force’s failings, Dowbiggin argued against the idea of 
importing police from outside the Mandate to supplement the local police: 
If it is agreed that it is a Police Force which is now required in Palestine, the Force 
must largely be composed of the people of the country. The main object of a Police 
Force is to collect and communicate intelligence, to prevent crime and a breach of 
the peace so far as is possible by getting information in good time and taking steps 
to prevent trouble arising, to detect crime when it occurs, and prosecute the 
offenders in a Court of Law. This is a duty which only be done by Police. It cannot 
be done by troops or by a body of men known as "Police," who rely entirely on 
their rifles to keep order. If there are different nationalities amongst the general 
population of the country, then there must be representatives of each of these 
nationalities in the Police Force. Unless the Police Force is largely composed of 
men corresponding in nationality with the different nationalities occupying the 
country, it will be almost impossible to get information of what is going on or is 
likely to happen, to identify offenders, to get witnesses to come forward when a 
crime has been committed, to trace stolen property, to trace absconders and 
generally to bring offenders to justice.55  
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To bring foreign officers to Palestine, no matter the reason, would defeat the entire purpose 
of a civilian style police, in Dowbiggin’s eyes. To be effective, either in preventing 
insurrection or stopping crime, the police needed to be drawn from the local population.56 
To illustrate his point further, Dowbiggin conjectured that if “a body of most highly trained 
and intelligent German Police were brought to London…the public would regard them 
much as they would regard a foreign army introduced to maintain order. The public would 
have nothing to do with them and the Force would fail for want of public support.”57 
Dowbiggin did, however, believe that the common tactic of policing strangers should be 
maintained, and recommended that Arab and Jewish police should not be allowed to serve 
in their home district until after 10 years of service. He also reiterated that police work 
required cooperation between the public, courts, and the police, but that this process would 
take time. “The London Police,” Dowbiggin wrote, “have a reputation of being the best 
Police Force in the world. They are, and why? I submit that it is not due entirely to the fact 
that they have the best public in the world to deal with, the most law-abiding public with a 
wonderful sense of proportion and a keen sense of humour, and the best Magistrates in the 
world before whom they take their cases? I venture to submit that it is the combination of 
all three that makes for good order in London.”58 Dowbiggin firmly believed that this type 
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of good order was attainable in Palestine, and argued, along racialist lines, that there was 
“enough good material” in the Mandate to make a solid police force. “The Jew,” he 
contended, “is intelligent above the average. As a general rule it would be harder to find 
men of good physique amongst the Jews than amongst the Arabs…I consider the material 
at hand in Palestine is good and much better than the material available in many districts 
in India, in Ceylon, and I imagine better than that available as a general rule in Africa.”59  
 Dowbiggin stressed, as with his report on Cyprus, the need for the progressive 
training of all police officers. In particular, he recommended that police should be 
encouraged as much as possible to develop knowledge through museum visits and 
instruction on wireless technology. He also recommended that instructors of the new force 
should be allowed to visit training centers in Ceylon so that they could learn how to train 
a force composed of multiple nationalities.60 He felt that if Arab and Jewish police could 
live together, it would serve as an example for the rest of the country. Like in Cyprus, 
Dowbiggin believed that the sharing of policing knowledge and techniques was critical to 
the sustained success of the force:  
Weekly Police Orders issued by the Commandant should include a note or report 
on any case or point of special interest which has come to notice in the investigation 
of crime, and any new method of dealing with traffic or preventing crime which 
has proved successful, so that all may profit by the experience gained. Members of 
the Force may be encouraged to send up to the Commandant any new and 
interesting point in a case which has come to their notice in the course of an 
investigation which should be brought to the notice of other officers…A Police 
officer who has in the course of his work come across some interesting and new 
idea gives his knowledge to the rest of the Force in exactly the same way as a 
Medical man who has made a new discovery or discovers a new way of carrying 
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out an operation makes his knowledge known to other medical men by means of 
the British Medical Journal.61  
 
This type of professionalism would undoubtedly seem rudimentary or taken for granted by 
the average London Bobby, but in the colonial context this type of work was unheard of. 
Additionally, Dowbiggin encouraged the Palestine police to consult Police Journal, the 
most well know professional journal for police in Britain. “In this journal,” Dowbiggin 
advertised, “the latest methods in Police Forces all over the world in the prevention and 
detection of crime, the control of traffic as well as professional criticisms of present day 
methods and the views of scientific authorities on criminal cases are made available to 
Police officers throughout the world and prove to be of the greatest assistance in promoting 
professional keenness and in keeping a Police Force up to date.”62 The basis for these 
suggestions, of course, was to bring the Palestine police up to the level of the rest of 
Britain’s police.  By keeping Palestinian police in close contact with their domestic 
counterparts, Dowbiggin hoped the younger force would gain “some of the good qualities 
of impartiality, courage, tact, courtesy, and good nature which go to make the ideal 
Policeman.”63  
 Dowbiggin wagered that the ideal Policeman for Palestine would need to be an 
expert at collecting and communicating intelligence, especially when the next riot was a 
matter of when not if. To this end it was important that intelligence gathering be done by 
locals because they could read the unspoken opinion of citizens through body language and 
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general atmosphere. “A Police officer,” Dowbiggin wrote, “who has a knack of getting 
information and who has a flair for seeing what people are ‘thinking’ and not necessarily 
waiting to hear what they are ‘saying,’ may in these few minutes be able to bring on the 
spot a force of military or British police who may just make all the difference.”64 He 
reiterated his dictum that “a notebook is to the Policeman what a rifle is to the soldier,” and 
further recommended that the Palestine Police should pay rewards for good record keeping 
amongst the force, and draw these rewards from the account used to pay police informants. 
Dowbiggin hoped to encourage better policing in Palestine, but also looked to make sure 
that development occurred under British rule.  
 The type of information Dowbiggin suggested the Palestine Police collect reminds 
one more of MI5 than the Metropolitan Police. Indeed, his oft repeated phrase regarding 
notebooks should not be confused with a nonviolent, “pen is mightier than the sword” 
approach. He wanted all conversations, even supposedly carefree ones, recorded, and he 
wanted officers to question men coming off of patrol to reveal what information they 
received that day. This information would also be repeated at weekly instructional classes, 
so that officers could teach patrolmen how to process and digest the intelligence they 
received off the street. The point of this exercise was to prevent an intelligence drought 
before it occurred. To supplement this record keeping, Dowbiggin encouraged the force to 
keep up with police journals, books on crime and policing, and, most importantly, attend 
conferences relating to investigation and policing. Even though Dowbiggin’s 
recommendations regarding information gathering reeked of political policing, he wanted 
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the investigation portion of their work to be conducted with the gloves on. In particular, he 
worried over the continuation of Ottoman police tactics. “In Turkish times,” Dowbiggin 
wrote, “did not the ‘investigation’ start when there was a prisoner in custody? I do not 
gather that in Turkish times the Police looked for finger prints on the scene of crime or that 
they were trained to look for circumstantial evidence. Was it not a case of ‘beating up’ to 
get evidence as to who committed a crime and then relying on the confession of the 
prisoner, which was possibly obtained by similar means? Are we satisfied that the methods 
which the Turks adopted are methods which can be carried out under a British 
Administration? If the answer is “no” what have we given the Palestinian police to fall 
back on in place of the Turkish methods?”65 
 In his conclusion, Dowbiggin reasoned if Britain succeeded in Palestine, they 
would enjoy increased stability and stature throughout the Middle East. The key to this 
success would be preventing riots, and preventing riots meant that the police needed the 
right people in the right positions, particularly in the CID. “The position as I found it,” he 
wrote, “was that here was a country in which there is always the possibility of a riot 
breaking out any time. If a riot did break out the consequences might, on account of the 
acute racial feeling which exists, be more serious in Palestine than almost anywhere else 
in the world. A country which the eyes of the world are on.”66 He reiterated his belief that 
local police could be relied upon, but that these police needed better intelligence support 
than they had received in the past. Dowbiggin laid the blame for this lack of support 
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squarely at the feet of the head of the Criminal Investigation Department, Joseph 
Broadhurst. “All they need,” Dowbiggin argued, “is accurate information in time to enable 
them to take up positions which will, it is hoped, have the necessary deterrent effect and 
prevent trouble. The Officer to whom the Government of Palestine, the people of the 
country, the troops and the Police Force are entitled to look for a word of warning, namely, 
the head of the Criminal Investigation Branch, cannot speak a word of Arabic....In my 
opinion the payment of a sum of £884 10s. a year in pay and allowances to Mr. Broadhurst 
is a waste of public funds.”67 Dowbiggin’s tirade against Broadhurst went on to include his 
inappropriate use of police funds for travel as well as his generally lax approach to 
intelligence work, especially his failure to look after the seizure of propaganda and the 
deportation of aliens. To prevent this sort of abuse in the future, Dowbiggin encouraged 
the Government to coordinate with village headmen, as was done in Ceylon, and to use 
them as an outside check on  police to make sure they were keeping up with all assignments 
and not abusing their power. “The village Headman,” Dowbiggin said, in a line reminiscent 
of Lugard, “is one of the most important members of the ‘team’ responsible for maintaining 
law and order,” and he encouraged the government or the police department to decorate 
these allies with gifts and medals to build up their loyalty.68 
 To oversee the application of his recommendations, Dowbiggin urged that his 
protégé R.G.B. Spicer be made head of the Palestine Police. Spicer joined the Ceylon 
police in 1909 and served under Dowbiggin, with a wartime interlude of 3 years, until 
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1925.69 Spicer was then poached by the Kenyan Police, which he served for five years as 
commissioner, overseeing the creation of the colony’s Criminal Investigation 
Department.70 With regard to Palestine, “Sir Herbert Dowbiggin was [Spicer’s] ‘Moses the 
Master’ and his report [on Palestine] the “Police Bible.’”71 Taking over in July 1931, Spicer 
set about following Dowbiggin’s holy scripture nearly to the letter, paying particular 
attention to the CID. His force managed to foil several terrorist plots and avoid a major 
revolt until the Arab Uprising in 1936.  
This revolt led the Government to call on Charles Tegart, veteran of the Calcutta 
Police and counterinsurgency expert, to conduct another review of the Palestine Police and 
make recommendations on reform. Tegart reinstituted much of the old military style to the 
police, and topped off his reforms with the construction of dozens of fortified police 
stations, the so-called Tegart forts, which were designed to reinforce key position as well 
as relieve the housing crisis for police officers.72 Even Tegart’s reforms, however, were no 
match for the tide of history, and further changes came to the police following the 1945 
Jewish Rebellion and the subsequent work of the United Resistance Movement. There is 
little question that, even in 1929, Palestine represented a hopeless situation for the British 
Mandate. This hopelessness, however, makes the Colonial Office decision to rely on 
Dowbiggin for advice all the more remarkable.  
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1935 WORLD TOUR 
 Dowbiggin viewed law enforcement as a combined enterprise that required the 
cooperation of police around the world. As his constant harping on progressive training 
and communication demonstrated, he endeavored at all times to participate in the growing, 
world-wide discussion on policing and policing techniques. This desire is confirmed by 
Dowbiggin’s 1935 leave, when he went on what amounted to a tour of the world’s police.73 
This tour was much more than a joyride – he both visited the police in each stop, and wrote 
reports on their condition and practices. His goal was to build up awareness among British 
police – in both the empire and in Britain – about developments in policing in other 
countries. He was particularly interested to learn the ways police around the world were 
dealing with new forms of crime or police work: cocaine trafficking, communist 
insurgency, traffic management, wireless radio, and cinema censorship.  
Through this tour, Dowbiggin helped to build up the growing informal, fraternity 
of police officers participating in international work. Certainly, the work of international 
police bodies remained an important venue for these sorts of connections, but it was the 
work of British officers – whose careers often straddled between the western and the non-
western world – that made the most significant contribution to the development of a truly 
international body of police officers and creating a regime of international crime control. 
Dowbiggin hoped that his tour would make for both lasting contacts between police as well 
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as increase the institutional capacity of imperial policing. He sent copies of his reports to 
his Ceylon subordinate J.R. Bantock as well as R.G. B. Spicer in Palestine. 
 Dowbiggin’s tour began in Penang in the Malaya Straits on March 28, 1935, where 
he found a colony with similar problems to Ceylon. Police in Penang were responsible for 
a large, mixed population made up of Chinese, Malays, and Sikhs. His tour reports also 
included travelogue material that contained discussion of the colony’s social life, sports, 
and traffic. As with his formal reports on Cyprus and Palestine, Dowbiggin’s tour files 
contained a substantial review of the police. These reviews detailed the state of the force’s 
buildings, arms, uniforms, and, of course, their training. It pleased Dowbiggin to learn that 
Penang had developed a Criminal Investigation Department, complete with a finance 
account to pay off informants, as well as a fingerprint exchange program with Kuala 
Lumpur. Dowbiggin also noted that Penang was responsible for censoring films for the 
whole of Malaya. Dowbiggin’s tour of Malaya continued in Singapore, where he worried 
over the firearm training for members of the police. The force was trained in the use of 
handguns because local gangs used these weapons, but Dowbiggin believed that the crime 
rate was too low, and the use of handguns too dangerous, to warrant this training. 
Dowbiggin also expressed concern with the buildup of Chinese criminals in the city, as the 
old tactic of merely deporting these criminals back to China no longer worked because 
most were born in Malaya. 
 Dowbiggin’s next stop, Hong Kong, also left him worried over the use of firearms. 
The whole of the Hong Kong force was trained in the use of revolvers, and shootouts with 
criminals were so common that police there had developed a periscope pistol with which 
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to fire over corners and over the top of walls. The main cause of crime in Hong Kong, as 
Dowbiggin discovered, was criminal activity by local merchantmen – a fact that 
necessitated the employment of sailors and prostitutes as informants. Additionally, Hong 
Kong police had been quick to adopt wireless radio, particularly for harbor work, as a 
means to combat off shore piracy and opium smuggling.74 
 His tour continued in Shanghai, where the force included British, Russian, 
Japanese, Sikh, and Chinese officers.75 Dowbiggin was most impressed by the Chinese 
officers, particularly what he viewed as the stronger and more rugged northern Chinese (a 
racialist interpretation he first showed in Palestine). Dowbiggin also remarked on the high 
rate of firearm use in the city and the force in general, which unfortunately necessitated 
that the police mark their bullets in order to identify who shot whom after a gunfight. 
Additionally, the police maintained a cartridge bureau that kept shell casings for every 
licensed pistol or revolver in the area of the International Settlement. Though the police 
force struck Dowbiggin as particularly capable, he remarked that law enforcement in the 
city was hampered by the legal realities of the international settlement, which allowed each 
national contingent to maintain their own court system and to try their criminals in their 
own jurisdiction.  
 The one area that Dowbiggin visited that included no discussion of police was 
Japan, where he toured the cities of Kobe, Nara, Kyoto, Tokyo, and Yokohama. This fact 
probably resulted from his unfamiliarity with the language and the lack of contacts between 
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Japanese police and other national forces. His writing on Japan reads more like a 
travelogue, in which the penny-pinching Inspector General celebrated the cheapness of the 
food and hotels as well as the cleanliness of the houses and roads. Dowbiggin continued 
his journey in Honolulu, where he marveled at the local department’s use of technology 
and their technique of mapping crimes, of which burglary and sexual offenses 
predominated. In Honolulu, Dowbiggin discussed police administration with W.A. 
Gabrielson, a police officer from the Berkeley Police Department that had been sent to 
Hawaii three years prior to help build the force. Not unlike members of a formal police 
conference, Gabrielson provided Dowbiggin with local material, including the 
department’s prison report for 1935. In return, Dowbiggin sent Gabrielson Ceylon’s police 
reviews for 1934 and 1935 as well as the department’s Finger Print collection form.  
 Perhaps the most important stop in Dowbiggin’s 1935 tour came with his visit to 
Berkeley, California. There Dowbiggin met August Vollmer, the doyen of American police 
studies and criminology. The longtime head of the Berkeley Police Department, Vollmer 
led the modernization of American policing through his prolific writing as well as his 
courses on criminal justice at the University of California. He was the most well-known 
police officer in the United States next to J. Edgar Hoover. In Vollmer, Dowbiggin found 
“the best man I have ever spoken to on Police work,”76 and spent the entire day of April 
30, 1935 in his company. Vollmer shared several reports and books with Dowbiggin for 
his force in Ceylon as well as with C.T. Symons at Scotland Yard. Vollmer reviewed with 
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Dowbiggin his syllabi for courses at Berkeley, a fact that the training obsessed Dowbiggin 
greatly enjoyed. The meeting seemed to have made an impression on Vollmer as well, as 
his 1935 book, Crime and the State Police, includes a section on policing methods in 
Ceylon.77 
Dowbiggin’s spent a great deal of time in his report on comparisons between 
American and British policing. This habit fell in line with other British police, who looked 
to America for advice on controlling gangs and motor bandits.78 The Inspector General 
marveled at the American use of technology, particularly their advanced wireless 
communication system, their scientific crime laboratories, the lie detector, and, perhaps 
most impressive to a British police officer, their experience with traffic control – a subject 
he expanded upon in his later trips to San Francisco and Los Angeles. On the other hand, 
Dowbiggin felt that American police were too hamstrung by politics, particularly because 
higher level officers were either voted to their post or given their position by political 
appointment.  This presence of politics, he argued, prevented the same level of esprit found 
in British or Colonial forces.79 Most distressing for Dowbiggin, however, was the manifest 
sentimentality of the American public toward criminals. Indeed, the year before 
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Dowbiggin’s tour witnessed the crime sprees of Bonny and Clyde as well as John Dillinger 
and Charles “Pretty Boy” Floyd. 
 After travelling through the Panama Canal Zone, Dowbiggin landed in Havana, 
Cuba. In Havana he found police using a modified version of the Henry fingerprinting 
system to great success. From Havana, Dowbiggin travelled to New York, where the 
Inspector met with Commissioner Lewis Valentine and the department’s training 
instructor, who shared with Dowbiggin Henry Söderman’s most recent work on police 
investigation. Of particular interest in New York for Dowbiggin was the NYPD’s special 
branch division, which had expanded recently due to the growth of the local communist 
party and the search for the Lindbergh baby. Based on a recommendation from August 
Vollmer, Dowbiggin travelled by plane to Boston, where he met with Massachusetts State 
Traffic Engineer Clarence Taylor. Taylor, a protégé of Vollmer, developed traffic policy 
and routines in Boston that became influential in the creation of national motor vehicle 
policy in the 1940s. From Boston, Dowbiggin travelled to Washington D.C. to visit the 
FBI, a place he naively believed was the only police department in the United States clear 
of any political influence. As with most British police, Dowbiggin was less interested in 
the cases of the FBI than he was with the department’s filing system – he made detailed 
notes of how the force collected and collated information, even going so far as to describe 
the Bureau’s filing covers and boxes. His meeting with J. Edgar Hoover saw the two 
swapping arrest stories. Hoover, never to be outdone, went so far as to show Dowbiggin 
the arrest form for John Dillinger, and gave the Inspector General a large collection of 
pamphlets as he left.  
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His journey to Chicago found Dowbiggin again marveling at America’s 
technological prowess in the form of the lie detector: “the U.S.A. are amazingly 
imaginative and ingenious in the way of machinery and mechanical appliances. This is 
where they are most ahead of us. For example, look at Edison and Ford. This is the type of 
genius [the] U.S.A. produces. So that whereas we are satisfied in watching a person's face 
they want to see a mechanical record of it. That is about what it comes to. The only great 
advantage of the Polygraph that I can see is the moral effect caused to a person on whom 
it is fitted. It takes some time to fit and get going and there must be more moral effect in 
this than just putting a person in a chair and asking him questions right away.”80 In Chicago, 
Dowbiggin also came across the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology as well as the 
American Journal of Police Science, which he encouraged Ceylon to subscribe to. In 
Detroit he again commented on American technology, discussing in particular that Detroit 
was the first police department in the world to develop wireless between cars and 
headquarters in 1928.  
 After Detroit, Dowbiggin quickly made his way through Niagara Falls, Toronto 
(where he took in a baseball game), Montreal, and Quebec City before landing in England. 
In London, Dowbiggin compared his report on American traffic advancements with the 
report produced by H. Alker Tripp in 1934. Tripp, Assistant Commissioner of the Met and 
head of the Traffic Department, had visited New York, Chicago, Montreal, Detroit, and 
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Boston in 1934 to study American traffic management.81 Dowbiggin agreed with much of 
Tripp’s report, and quoted him when he said that “Until Peel made the change in 1829 we 
showed extreme slowness in recognizing that Liberty does not consist in having your house 
robbed by organized gangs of thieves. We are now equally slow in realizing that liberty 
does not consist in the right to kill and to be killed on the road.” Dowbiggin sent Tripp’s 
report, along with several other papers and pamphlets, back to Ceylon and to Spicer in 
Palestine. While at the Met, Dowbiggin met with the force’s wireless department and 
encouraged them to visit the United States to study their system. Furthermore, he visited 
with H. Battley, the head of the Met’s Criminal Records Office, to show him what he had 
learned about American filing techniques and systems. 
 
1937 WORLD TOUR AND NORTHERN RHODESIA 
 Dowbiggin’s 1937 tour began with a request from Northern Rhodesia for a police 
review. The tour took him through Madras, Rangoon, and Burma. In Zanzibar, he met with 
Inspector General A.I. Sheringham, a former subordinate from Ceylon. Across the bay, 
Dowbiggin visited with former subordinates W. Duncan and A.E. Hooper, both working 
for the Dar Es Salam Police. After arriving in Rhodesia, Dowbiggin spent 11 days at police 
headquarters in Lusaka, and then inspected all police stations, posts, and offices in the 
territory – including 9 of the colony’s prisons. His report continued in the tradition of his 
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reports regarding Cyprus and Palestine.82 The problems facing Northern Rhodesia were 
both greater and less than the issues facing Cyprus and Palestine. Northern Rhodesia had 
to worry less about crime, but it did have trouble with communication due to poor 
infrastructure, above all telegraphic communication outside of the colonies main industrial 
district around the copper belt and its attached rail lines. To deal with this problem, 
Dowbiggin recommended the construction of aerodromes to supply outlying districts and 
to provide backup for regional forces within 5 ½ hours of Lusaka.  
 The major feature of Northern Rhodesia at this time, and throughout most of the 
twentieth century, was the difference between life along the colony’s Copper Belt and in 
the hinterlands. In the “Tribal Area,” law was carried out by native authorities, with limited 
advice from District Commissioners and District Officers. Dowbiggin warned, however, 
that “we live in a quickly changing world and it is not safe to assume that this happy state 
of affairs will last forever and that in outlying districts there never will be occasion for 
recourse to armed resistance or force.”83 Dowbiggin also argued that the Copper Belt police 
needed reforming:  
The Police Force required in such areas are not the type of police employed in some 
undeveloped colonies…in other words, a semi-military force…What is required in 
this part of Northern Rhodesia is a civil police force trained to act through 
individual Constables. Every Constable in such a force should be able to record in 
his note-book the number, colour, and description of a car that has been involved 
in an accident or has been used in a case of crime. He should be able to record a 
dying statement, the statement of a witness, the description of property lost or stolen 
and of an absconder. He should be trained to speak on the telephone, to direct a 
person asking the way to some particular house or street, to render first aid and to 
rescue persons from drowning. He should have a good knowledge of the criminals 
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living in his area and of the most dangerous travelling criminals whom he may at 
any time find in his district.84 
 
This statement amounts to a thesis on Dowbiggin’s ideas of civilian policing as well as a 
statement on what was appropriate for that particular part of the colony because it was 
civilized. Dowbiggin encouraged the continuation of separate policing between the tribal 
areas and the Copper Belt because they were in essence two different countries. Again, as 
advised by Dowbiggin, what was needed was a clear delineation of roles between police 
and soldiers: “...the training necessary for a man to become an efficient policeman is very 
much a whole-time occupation. To try and train a man to be a soldier as well as a policeman 
means that the time available for training him to be a policeman will be seriously curtailed 
and the result will be that the man turns out to be an inefficient policeman and a bad 
soldier.”85 
 Despite these general declarations in favor of civilian style policing, Dowbiggin’s 
recommendations also included more political policing than in previous reports: “the C.I.D. 
should be definitely charged with the duty of getting information in advance and, in 
addition to keeping the Government, the Police and the Military informed of what is likely 
to happen, they should themselves take all possible steps to prevent a disturbance by seizing 
seditious pamphlets, searching and raiding, on a Sear Warrant, places where seditious 
pamphlets or inflammatory propaganda are being printed or published.”86 Prevention, 
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rather than repression after the fact, was the goal, but in many ways this prevention 
included tactics that were just as violent and repressive as crackdowns after a riot.  
 Dowbiggin spared Northern Rhodesian police some of his harshest criticism 
because they had yet to be trained. As in Palestine, he argued that training was all that was 
needed because the local police, including indigenous detectives and patrolmen, showed 
potential. Most of the European members of the force had served previously in South 
Africa or had come directly from Britain. In noting the European contingent of the force, 
Dowbiggin remarked if the officer had attended training courses or visited English police 
forces while on leave. As with his other reports, Dowbiggin included his remonstration on 
notebooks and proper training as well as encouraging progressive training through 
publication subscriptions, museum visits, and conference attendance.  
 Dowbiggin placed the blame for the Northern Rhodesian police’s lack of training 
at the feet of the resident Commissioner, who had failed to make the police into either an 
effective military or police force. He argued that the Commissioner had avoided criticism 
up until his tour because he was living off the past reputation of the colony’s Military 
Company. Having seen demonstrations of firearm training, Dowbiggin concluded that few 
of the police knew how to properly use their weapons. He contended that it would be at 
least 10 years before the police force was up to standard. Yet he remained positive: “the 
Force is at present suffering from an inferiority complex. They are a young body; they have 
had bad teething pains, but there is not reason at all why they should not develop into a 
Force which is capable of meeting its responsibilities.”87 Dowbiggin was in Northern 
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Rhodesia for three months, conducting his survey and compiling his report. As usual, his 
report ran long, and led to complaining on the part of Northern Rhodesian stenographers 
assigned to help: “I worked,” reported H.D. Eastwood, “as many as ten hours overtime 
some days, and consider the average time for the five weeks during which Sir Herbert was 
actually writing his Report, spent by me out of office hours of this work, was 6 hours a 
day, the total for five weeks being 210 hours overtime.”88 
 After completing his report, Dowbiggin continued his tour in South Africa and then 
travelled to Australia, where he visited with police in Adelaide, Canberra, Melbourne, and 
Sydney.89 In New Zealand, Dowbiggin, an avid hiker, lost track of policing and spent his 
report discussing the glazier he scaled. He then traveled to Fiji and Samoa, before returning 
to Honolulu, where he wondered at the ethnic harmony of the islands as compared with 
Palestine. From Honolulu, he moved to Los Angeles and Seattle before visiting with 
Canadian Mounted Police officers in Vancouver. After a brief spell of hiking around Lake 
Louise, Dowbiggin travelled to Ottawa and the headquarters of the Mounted Police.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 The reliance on Herbert Dowbiggin by the Colonial Office during the interwar 
period reveals a desire on the part of colonial administration to make civilian policing a 
reality in the colonial context. It is also telling that the Colonial Office sent Dowbiggin to 
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troublesome territories like Cyprus and Palestine. This shows the depth of the Official 
Mind’s commitment to civilian policing, but it also shows an assumption of British rule in 
the foreseeable future – no one was under the assumption that police reform along 
Dowbiggin’s lines would be quick and easy. The Inspector General certainly agreed with 
this idea by recommending civilian policing not only to put a better face on imperialism 
but also to better maintain control.  Dowbiggin, for his part, saw his reports as a means to 
not only argue for reform, but also to encourage colonial police, as well as their British 
counterparts, to extend their horizons to the international scene. His world tours in 1935 
and 1937 represent perhaps the first world tour of police that included both western and 
non-western destinations. Dowbiggin’s reports from these journeys essentially represent a 
snapshot of world policing during the 1930s. His enthusiasm for policing as well as his 
reputation among his fellow officers made him a key asset in the Colonial Office’s plans 
regarding policing. 
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Chapter Three: The Kendal Version: Britain and International Police 
Cooperation, 1922 – 1937 
 
Through his reports for the Colonial Office and his tours of foreign police 
departments, Herbert Dowbiggin operated in many ways as an unofficial ambassador for 
British policing. His visits to police around the world created channels for the exchange of 
criminal justice information and expertise that lasted long after his retirement. Yet British 
police were also intimately involved in the more official manifestations of global law 
enforcement during this period, specifically international police associations. 
Organizations such as the International Police Conference (IPC) and the International 
Criminal Police Commission (Interpol) called attention to the threat posed by international 
criminals, and encouraged the exchange of information and technology between police 
forces.  
While the actual incidence of international crime during this period remained a 
matter of debate, the world’s police were nevertheless eager to participate in these sorts of 
organizations. The motivation behind this participation, of course, varied from country to 
country. Police in Austria, home of Interpol, were largely inspired by what they saw as a 
genuine rise in international crime. The successor states in Eastern Europe, on the other 
hand, saw these organizations as a means to help professionalize recently created forces as 
well as a new venue to establish their countries as members of the international community. 
The architects of the IPC in the United States hoped that their organization, through contact 
with centralized justice systems in Europe, would inspire individual state police forces in 
America to cooperate. 
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 British police, on the whole, believed that the rate of international crime fell well 
below the levels imagined by Austria, but they worried greatly over future trends. In 
particular, they worried over the application of technology (for example the automobile, 
the telephone, and photography) to criminal work, and they believed that foreign police 
forces could help them adapt their methods to meet this new threat.1 They also felt that 
working with other countries could provide them with a better means of classifying and 
recording criminal activity, which would lead to higher clearance rates and lower levels of 
recidivism. International police groups, then, provided British police with the means to 
keep abreast of developments in crime and criminology, giving them the tools to reform 
and update a system they considered to be antiquated.  
International police organizations, for their part, were eager to court British 
participation because of the reputation for excellence of the Bobby – a perception that relied 
mostly on fictional portrayals rather than actual performance.2 British police, particularly 
members of the London Metropolitan Police, were only too happy to accept this association 
with excellence, even though they worried constantly over their own backwardness with 
regard to technology. Additionally, foreign police felt that Britain’s formal and informal 
presence in the wider world could give international police organizations the appearance 
of global reach as well as the ability to draw in members from outside Europe and North 
America.  
                                                 
1 Clive Emsley, “‘Mother, What Did Policemen Do When There Weren’t Any Motors?’ The Law, the 
Police and the Regulation of Motor Traffic in England, 1900–1939,” The Historical Journal 36, no. 02 
(1993): 357–81. 
2 Sherlock Holmes was often brought up with reference to British policing at meetings of Interpol, though 
these references often omitted, or forgot, that Holmes was not a member of the police and often showed up 
the Bobbies tasked with assisting him. 
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Because Britain lacked a centralized police system – thus leaving it without a 
national police force – the country’s relationship with these international police bodies was 
managed by the London Metropolitan Police (Met). The Met, of course, was already 
regarded at home and abroad as the de facto national police force for Britain, even though 
this idea had no basis in law. As described in Chapter One, however, the Met had a long 
record of international responsibilities. The force offered not only a natural option for 
representation in international organizations but also a body of officers experienced with 
international and imperial work.  
This chapter will consider Britain’s involvement with formal international police 
organizations during the interwar period. It will show that Britain made meaningful 
contributions to the development of international crime control, and argue that most of this 
work was accomplished by a small, but influential group of Metropolitan Police officers. 
In particular, the chapter will describe the work of Met officer Norman Kendal, who helped 
encourage the United States to work with Interpol and also helped to establish Interpol as 
the main body for international police cooperation instead of the International Police 
Conference.  
 
INTERNATIONAL POLICE CONFERENCE 
 The apparent rise in international crime during the early 1920s led many police to 
call for the establishment of international police organizations. The most important 
organizations to come out of this period were the International Police Conference, 
established in 1922, and the International Criminal Police Commission, established in 
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1923. While Interpol could claim a history going back to the prewar era, the International 
Police Conference was an upstart. Founded at a meeting of the National Police Conference 
of the United States of America (NPC), the International Police Conference was the 
brainchild of New York Police Commissioner Richard Enright. The NPC included police 
chiefs from hundreds of cities in the United States as well as a small number of 
representatives from Canada, Mexico, and Latin America. Enright, however, had global 
pretentions, and used a personal tour of Europe in 1922 to campaign for foreign 
participation in his organization.  
Writing to Metropolitan Police Commissioner William Horwood, Enright declared 
that “the suppression of criminality is not only a city, State, or National concern, but it is 
in fact a matter of international concern…It is the earnest wish of the responsible officers 
of every department which I have visited at home or abroad that an efficient and 
sympathetic system of co-operation be immediately established between the Police 
Departments all over the world.”3 “The forthcoming Police Conference at New York,” 
Enright advertised, “will go far towards establishing an entente cordiale which will make 
for greater efficiency and a co-ordination of police work throughout the world.”4 Horwood 
took the idea of attending the conference to the Home Office, stating that while the cost 
would be significant it was nevertheless “most desirable that considerably more liaison 
should exist between the Police Forces in this country and those of America, and this would 
                                                 
3 Richard Enright to William Horwood, July 12, 1922, MEPO 3/2477, NA.  
4 Ibid. 
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no doubt be effected by a representative of this force attending the Conference in New 
York.”5 
 The Home Office selected Major General Llewellyn Atcherley, the country’s 
Inspector General of Constabulary, to attend the conference as Britain’s representative.6 
Other foreign countries represented at the conference included Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, 
Denmark, France, and Germany. The conference program reflected the general concerns 
of police worldwide during this time period. Topics for discussion included industrial 
conflict, drug trafficking, vehicle traffic control, and criminal identification. Atcherley 
himself delivered a paper on identification based on modus operandi.7 The discussion 
raised by these topics, particularly drug trafficking, led to a resolution to rechristen the 
NPC as the International Police Conference.8 According to Atcherley’s report, this new 
organization would promote standardization in police procedure across the world, 
encourage cooperation between national police forces, and work to establish “an efficient 
method of distributing information regarding the movements of known criminals from 
place to place.”9  
Atcherley reported that he did not volunteer British membership in this new venture 
because he wanted to confer with the Home Office. He wrote, however, that the delegates 
from Canada and South America, as well as those from Belgium and Denmark, pledged 
                                                 
5 Horwood to Under Secretary of State, Home Office, July 14, 1922, MEPO 3/2477, NA. 
6 National Police Conference, Proceedings of the National Police Conference (The Conference, Bureau of 
Printing, Police Dept., 1921), 259. 
7 Ibid., 262. 
8 Ibid., 488. 
9 L.W. Atcherley, “Memorandum on National Police Conference, New York, September, 1922,” December 
4, 1922, MEPO 3/2477, NA.  
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their “whole-hearted support” for the new scheme.10 Though Atcherley lacked this level of 
enthusiasm, he did recommend future British participation. “New developments,” 
Atcherley remarked, “are constantly arising which affect numbers and efficiency of Forces 
concerned. This visit will have provided a greater sense of proportion in regard to the risks 
and requirements of the future in many aspects of Police work, and by a wider experience 
of general condition elsewhere to assist in a judgment of the best solution of our own 
particular difficulties.”11 
 After considering Atcherley’s report and fielding his assistant commissioners for 
advice, William Horwood wrote to the Home Office arguing for continued participation in 
Enright’s organization.12 Horwood, like Atcherley, expressed skepticism regarding the 
feasibility and usefulness of the organization, but concluded that he did “not think it would 
be advisable for [Britain] to remain outside any international conference on Police 
matters.”13 “We have our prestige to uphold,” Horwood declared, “and our voluntary 
absence from such a conference might well be criticized by other nations.”14 Horwood 
worried, however, that the International Police Conference would “tend to develop into an 
organization which will eventually endeavor to codify and draft International Criminal 
Law.”15 He was particularly concerned over attempts by the conference to standardize 
vehicle driving on the right-hand side of the road. 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 10. 
11 Ibid., 10.  
12 Horwood to Home Office, January 30, 1923, MEPO 3/2477, NA. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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 Horwood himself attended the 1923 meeting of the International Police 
Conference.16 The meeting saw members discuss drug trafficking, traffic control, 
extradition, and distant identification. Horwood felt, in general, that no progress could be 
made on international work as long as American police remained so disorganized. “In my 
opinion,” Horwood wrote, “the real origin of the Conference was the chaotic state of 
American Police work generally. This is due to the absence of any central police 
department for the country as a whole, the existence of State laws which differ so widely 
and the varying form which Police administration takes in the different States. Even if it 
were possible to arrive at agreements on questions of international importance, 
America…before she could carry out her own undertaking, would have to reduce her 
internal Police organization to something approaching order.”17  
Horwood also remained skeptical of the effectiveness of any such international 
work, with or without America. He judged that if problems such as alien control, drug 
trafficking, and extradition were “to be treated as international and taken up as of world 
wide importance, it is for public opinion to move the respective Governments to take the 
necessary steps to introduce legislation and to attempt uniformity and co-ordination of 
procedure internationally, presumably through the League of Nations or some such 
body.”18  Moreover, Horwood felt that it would be too difficult for the organization to 
                                                 
16 Horwood to Home Office, June 7, 1923, MEPO 3/2477, NA. This letter contains Horwood’s report on 
the proceedings. 
17 Ibid., 8.  
18 Ibid., 8.  
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standardize police work “between countries whose laws, habits, temperaments, and 
standards of civilization differ so widely.”19 
Despite these reservations, Horwood recommended continued participation – on 
the part of the Met and British police more generally – because of political considerations. 
“I felt,” Horwood admitted, “that I had little to learn [at the conference], but was conscious 
that the American and other delegates looked upon the Chief of the London Police as the 
representative of the centre of the British Empire, and as such, in a position not so much to 
learn, as to impart knowledge to others and help in the difficulties of those Police Chiefs 
less fortunately situated.”20 In particular, many delegates looked to the Met for assistance 
and understanding on the international narcotics trade, which many American police still 
associated with British India.21 Horwood remarked that several participants told him that 
the presence of the London Metropolitan Police at the meeting “raised the status of the 
Conference.”22 
 The high opinion of British policing led Richard Enright to attempt to hold the 1927 
meeting of the conference in London. Writing to British Consul General Harry Armstrong 
in New York, Enright argued that “London is splendidly situated with respect to 
transportation, and we would doubtless have a much larger and more representative 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 9.  
20 Ibid., 8.  
21 “Police: International Police Conference: Resolution That Drug Addicts Be Kept in Custody 
Indefinitely,” 1923, HO 144/22315, NA. Horwood was accosted at the 1923 IPC meeting by Dr. Carleton 
Simon, a Special Deputy Police Commissioner of the NYPD concerned with narcotics. Simon blamed 
Britain for encouraging the distribution of narcotics throughout the United States from India. Horwood 
reported that this view was not shared by the rest of the conference, and that Simon was largely ignored 
because he was a Special Deputy rather than an actual police officer. 
22 Horwood to Home Office, June 7, 1923, MEPO 3/2477, NA, 9. 
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conference in that city than in any other place in Europe.”23 Enright, now the former Chief 
of Police in New York, said that the International Police Conference would pay for the 
conference, and told Armstrong that his colleague Barron Collier was sailing for London 
to present the idea to William Horwood and the Home Office.  
Collier, whom Horwood had met at the 1923 conference, was a powerful 
advertising tycoon fascinated with policing and international crime.24 According to 
Armstrong, Collier “found the funds that Mr. Enright had at his disposal for entertainment 
and celebrations [at his conferences].”25 This relationship “incurred a good deal of odium” 
because Enright returned the favor by granting Collier the title of Deputy Commissioner 
(complete with badge) and allowing the tycoon several privileges, including the ability to 
drive his “motor through the streets [of New York]…without regard to traffic 
regulations.”26 Ronald Howe, a member of the Met that came into contact with Collier in 
the 1930s, judged that the title of Deputy Commissioner gave Collier “more pleasure than 
any of his financial triumphs” because beneath his advertising millions “there was a 
policeman struggling to get through.”27 
 After learning of Enright’s plan and Collier’s impending visit, Armstrong contacted 
a local New York police expert, H.W. Marsh, to enquire about the current state of the 
International Police Conference as well as Enright’s standing amongst American police 
                                                 
23 Richard Enright to Sir Harry Gloster Armstrong, July 7, 1927, MEPO 3/2477, NA.  
24 Ethan Avram Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law 
Enforcement (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 91. 
25 Harry Armstrong to William Horwood, July 8, 1927, MEPO 3/2477, NA.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ronald Howe, The Pursuit of Crime. (London: A. Barker, 1961), 127. 
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more generally. Marsh wrote to the director of the Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover 
on the subject, and forwarded this correspondence to Armstrong. Hoover believed that the 
end of Enright’s reign as head of the NYPD meant that his organization “had practically 
passed into oblivion” and that the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) now 
represented the only such body in America.28 Hoover stated that “[Enright] has almost been 
forgotten by the law enforcement officials in the United States, and it would certainly be 
most unfortunate for his organization to be revived or recognized by the foreign police 
authorities.”29 He went on to declare that the United States intended to ease the method of 
cooperation with foreign police departments by making the Bureau of Investigation the 
clearing house for international cooperation.  
Viewing Enright and his organization as a potential threat to this plan, Hoover 
suggested that Marsh present negative articles on Enright from newspapers in New York 
to foreign police considering cooperation with the IPC. In an ironic twist, he wanted foreign 
police to know in particular that the NYPD had to “forcibly bring back to Police 
Headquarters many papers and documents which Enright had taken with him and which 
did not belong to him.”30 Hoover, however, had little need to fear competition from Enright 
and his cohort. After receiving word of Collier’s impending visit, Horwood declared that 
                                                 
28 J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. H.W. Marsh, July 19, 1927, MEPO 3/2477, NA. Established in 1893 as the 
National Chiefs of Police Union, the IACP organized several international conferences during the early 20th 
century, though these conferences rarely included police outside of the United States. During the interwar 
period, the IACP fell under the sway of the FBI, becoming the basis for J. Edgar Hoover’s attempt to 
standardize the collection of criminal statistics at the national level. For more information, see Ethan 
Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid. 
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the idea of a London conference would “be turned down with a heavy hand.”31 Collier left 
the Met empty handed and resolved – based on a suggestion from the Home Office – to try 
to hold the conference in Paris instead.32  
Britain’s relationship with the International Police Conference showed that the 
country was interested in international criminal justice, but not on the basis proposed by 
the Americans. In particular, they did not want to be involved in an organization with 
supranational intentions, such as the standardization of criminal law or traffic control 
proposed by Enright. This preference did not represent a lack of enthusiasm for 
cooperation, but instead showed a desire to focus on the possible rather than reach for the 
unattainable. Britain wanted an organization that was truly international, and not a 
mislabeled association focused primarily on North America. Finally, British police sought 
an international police organization that was serious. The juvenile antics of Enright and 
Collier – along with what Horwood considered to be the joyride nature of their conferences 
– led the Metropolitan Police and other foreign police departments to avoid the IPC and 
search for an alternative. 
 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE COMMISSION (INTERPOL) 
The alternative that emerged was the International Criminal Police Commission, an 
organization founded at an International Criminal Police Congress in Vienna in 1923. This 
congress was called by Johann Schober, Austria’s former Chancellor and a longtime 
                                                 
31 William Horwood to Harry Armstrong, July 20, 1927, MEPO 3/2477, NA.  
32 Barron Collier to A.L. Dixon, Home Office, October 29, 1927, MEPO 3/2477, NA.  
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member of the Vienna police. Schober envisioned the congress as the successor to the 
prewar congress held in Monaco in 1914, but he made sure that this new meeting did not 
disperse until the congress members agreed on a formal international body. The resulting 
organization included representatives from 20 countries as well as a body of administrative 
officers from Vienna. Interpol was designed to facilitate the fight against crime between 
member countries through communication, rather than proposing supranational changes to 
international law. The members of Interpol would communicate through a common 
correspondence and telegraphic code, which would be maintained by members of the 
Viennese police. Though the organization forbid the policing of political crime, many of 
the early representatives of the group were the heads of political police divisions, and there 
is some reason to believe that some informal information exchange on communist 
subversives occurred.33 
Britain played an important role in the informal discussions that led up to the 
founding of Interpol. In particular, Sir Basil Thomson, the head of the Metropolitan 
Police’s Criminal Investigation Department and Special Branch, had worked with Dutch 
police officer M.C. van Houten in 1919 to hold a police congress as part of League of 
Nations.34 This work, however, fell apart in 1921 when Thomson was forced to resign his 
post at the Met by British Prime Minister Lloyd George. Thomson’s departure left Britain 
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without a representative at Schober’s 1923 congress, though the Home Office confirmed 
Britain’s membership in Interpol at the group’s second meeting in 1926.  
The first regular British representative to Interpol was Leonard Dunning, the former 
Chief Constable of Liverpool, who attended the organization’s 1927 conference in 
Amsterdam.35 The Home Office selected Dunning because William Horwood (no doubt 
still discouraged by his meeting with the International Police Conference) refused to send 
a representative from the Met.36 Dunning was asked “to report whether British attendance 
at [these] meetings is likely to have any practical value.”37 “I say at once,” Dunning 
answered, “that it has, and that, so far as this meeting at all events is concerned, 
[Horwood’s] description of a joy-ride does not apply.”38 The meeting did not compare to 
the conferences organized by Richard Enright, which “were organized mainly at the 
expense of wealthy citizens, who, for reasons of which I know nothing, put large sums of 
money at his disposal for the purpose.”39 “The Commission,” Dunning wrote, “met from 9 
a.m. to 1 p.m. on each of three days, [and] the discussions were earnest and thorough,” 
while the conference meals were “simple affairs.”40 Even the conference photograph, in 
Dunning’s estimate, managed to suggest “business rather than pleasure.”41 
                                                 
35 “9th Meeting of Commission in Amsterdam July 1927: Reports and Resolutions,” 1928-1929, MEPO 
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“For years,” Dunning summarized, “we have recognized the importance of bringing 
our many separate police forces to pool their resources and to cultivate the friendly 
relations which will encourage common action. It is equally important that the same ideas 
should govern the relations between the police of the different European countries.”42 For 
their part, Dunning reported that European countries had long hoped for and valued the 
inclusion of Britain in the proceedings.43 Dunning also negated fears that the organization 
hoped to become a supranational organization, writing that Interpol “does not aim at 
influencing legislation, nor does it seek to touch matters which are more properly 
approached through diplomatic channels.”44 Dunning encouraged a continuation of British 
participation in Interpol, and recommended further that the country would be better 
represented by an officer from the Criminal Investigation Department of the Metropolitan 
Police. In particular, Dunning suggested that “greater advantage might have been gained 
by somebody knowing German and better able to follow spoken French than I am. The 
interpreter attached to me was not a policeman and missed the point of many technical 
expressions.”45Dunning’s recommendation led the Met to select Norman Kendal, a 
member and eventual head of the Met’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID), to attend 
the 1928 meeting of the commission in Berne, Switzerland.46 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 2.  
43 Ibid., 3.  
44 Ibid., 2.  
45 Ibid., 2.  
46 In 1928, Kendal served as the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the CID under Trevor Bigham. He 
would later replace Bingham as the head of the CID in 1931.  
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Kendal’s work with Interpol as well as other international associations during the 
interwar period would make him into the de facto foreign minister for British policing. A 
product of Oriel College Oxford, Kendal worked the Northern Circuit after being called to 
the Bar in 1906. He served in the 5th Cheshire Regiment during the First World War, and, 
after suffering an injury in combat, took up a position with the Ministry of National Service 
in 1917. Following the war, Kendal gained employment as the Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner in the Met’s CID. Kendal was part of a new wave of officers at the Met 
during the interwar period. His appointment represented a move away from the old practice 
of promoting assistant commissioners from within the department, a habit that often led to 
score settling and infighting. The selection of educated men like Kendal also helped to 
build the professionalism and scientific capacity of the CID. His work at the CID relied 
heavily on his law background, as he spent most of his time reviewing case files for the 
strength of evidence before sending them on to the Director of Public Prosecution.  
Kendal was ideal for liaising with international police bodies, not only because of 
his education and position within the CID, but also because of his experience working as 
the Met’s representative to the National Vigilance Association’s International Bureau.47 
This Bureau, established in 1899, functioned as the directing body for the organization’s 
overseas research into the trafficking of women and children. It organized conferences 
between associated national committees in France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark.48 The Bureau, along with the various 
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national committees, put pressure on governments in those countries to coordinate 
information on trafficking collected through the surveillance of ports and railway stations 
as well as information gleaned from prostitutes themselves. In addition, the Bureau 
sometimes oversaw the repatriation of foreign prostitutes to their country of origin. After 
an interruption during the First World War, the International Bureau began to reestablish 
itself during the early 1920s. The group, which featured a veritable Who’s Who of British 
elite, met in the Jerusalem Chamber of Westminster Abbey. Kendal’s involvement with 
the organization began in 1922, when he was called in to sit in the place of Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner William Horwood.49 
Kendal’s position in the Bureau gave him the opportunity to work with an 
international organization and encouraged him to think globally with regard to crime. His 
place on the board exposed him to the group’s reports from research teams about the 
proliferation and nature of global trafficking and prostitution. Kendal also served as the 
Bureau’s representative for the 1924 International Conference for the Suppression of 
Traffic in Women and Children at Graz, Austria.50 He spoke at this conference on the 
spread of obscene publications and the use of women police for international work. The 
International Bureau also worked closely with the Advisory Commission on Women and 
Child Slavery at Geneva, giving Kendal early exposure in dealing with the League of 
Nations. Much of Kendal’s regular work for the CID, of course, included incidences of 
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international crime. These cases could include requests for information from foreign police 
officers51, the extradition of foreign criminals52, the investigation of illegal smuggling into 
London53, or murder on the high seas.54 Though Kendal himself often expressed doubts as 
to the rise in this crime as well as the threat it posed, he did believe that the establishment 
of a formal organization would help streamline correspondence and dossier exchange when 
these cases occurred.55 
In his report on Interpol’s Berne conference to Scotland Yard, Kendal stated that 
the main items of concern to the commission were the use of wireless, the methods of 
combating international criminals, and the question of the expenses and management of 
the organization.56 “As to the wireless waves,” Kendal wrote, “it soon became obvious that 
nobody except the Germans and ourselves had any Police owned wireless stations of any 
importance.”57 The subcommittee agreed that “the wave length allocated in the 
International Radiotelegraph Convention…[of] 3000 – 8000 metres was not likely to be of 
much use as apart from the prohibitive expense no police owned wireless sets [that] would 
be able to send messages on so long a wave.”58 On the issue of international criminals, the 
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sub-committee decided “that all countries should be invited to send particulars of 
international criminals of importance with their finger prints to Vienna, [with] Vienna to 
undertake to distribute information about them to the subscribing countries.”59  
Kendal emphasized to the subcommittee that this system, however “must not be 
allowed in any way to affect direct communication between one country and another 
country upon matters as to which it was obvious that such other country must be 
interested.”60 In other words, the Commission’s exchange system should never be a 
hindrance to direct communication between individual police officers from concerning 
countries. “I made it clear,” Kendal wrote, “that from our point of view the problem was 
not nearly so difficult or important as from the point of view of other European States, but 
I said that as the majority of countries were obviously in favour of the establishment of an 
international bureau Great Britain was prepared to do everything possible to assist.”61 
Kendal concluded that the meeting was, on the whole, a success, but complained that “there 
was far too much paper distributed.”62 “Masses of memoranda,” he wrote, “were handed 
round, most of them running to 20 or 30 pages.” Outside of the regular sessions, the 
conference included visits to a local Swiss penitentiary and the headquarters of the Berne 
Police. Kendal recommended that London should be suggested as a possible meeting place 
for the commission in 1929 or 1930.63 
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 While the Met and the Home Office were not quite ready to host one of the 
commission’s conferences, they did encourage Kendal’s attendance at future meetings. The 
next meeting of Interpol, held in Vienna in 1930, saw Kendal elected as a Vice President 
of the Commission.64 One of the determining factors in Kendal’s selection as a Vice 
President included the ongoing international status of the Commission vis-à-vis the League 
of Nations. “There was a good deal of discussion,” wrote Kendal, “as to the relations 
between the Commission and the Advisory Committees of the League of Nations, most of 
the members being very strongly of the opinion that the Advisory Committees ought to ask 
the Commission to send a representative to give them information upon any questions 
vitally affecting the Police.”65 Kendal, along with Florent Louwage of Belgium, urged that 
the Commission limit the number of contacts within the group’s directory to only the most 
important individuals at the country’s central headquarters.66 Kendal, however, reiterated 
the need for British participation. “Whilst the discussions at the meetings are largely 
academic,” Kendal wrote, “I felt more certain than ever that we cannot possibly afford to 
stand out. Practically every European country is represented and in the vast majority of 
cases represented by persons of position and intelligence, who quite realise that the real 
value of these Conferences lies in getting to know one’s opposite number, and who also 
realise that the enthusiasts at Vienna must be gently but firmly restrained from producing 
too much unnecessary paper.”67 Following from this point, Kendal repeated that “there was 
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considerable complaint as to the amount of paper which had been prepared for each 
delegate. I was greeted with a pile of foolscap about three inches high.”68 
Kendal’s attendance at the 1930 conference was extended on the suggestion of the 
Home Office to allow the Assistant Commissioner time to acquire “personal knowledge of 
the methods employed by the Vienna police.”69 Thus after the conference, Kendal 
proceeded on a tour of police forces in Vienna, Dresden, and Berlin. His report closely 
resembled Dowbiggin’s tour reports and reports for the Colonial Office.70 It showed an 
interest in all police operations, but most particularly with regard to record keeping and 
traffic work. Kendal was impressed by the buildings and office space available to the 
Viennese police, but wondered how much the department really needed the amenities. In 
particular, he felt that the curriculum of the Police Training School, which featured lectures 
from local university professors, dealt with subjects that were “too scientific, theoretical 
and advanced to be of great practical value.”71 Kendal’s report reviewed the department’s 
communication, training, and transportation divisions. He spent the most time discussing 
Vienna’s criminal records office, which served as the basis for Interpol’s operations. 
Kendal, however, was not impressed by their system, stating that the records were 
maintained on similar lines to the Met’s Criminal Records Office. The one major difference 
between the two offices was the inclusion of a stolen property index in Vienna. 
Additionally, Kendal remarked that Vienna’s wireless headquarters was “little if any bigger 
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than ours here.”72 This revelation undoubtedly gave Kendal assurance that the London Met, 
and British police more generally, were not so far behind their continental counterparts 
with regard to technology as they assumed.  
 Kendal spent his only day in Dresden touring the local department’s Criminal 
Investigation Department. Similar to the Met, this department was led by a lawyer with a 
university degree. The Dresden CID was keenly interested in handwriting, and kept up an 
extensive collection of handwriting examples through collection from local prisons. 
Kendal was extremely impressed with Dresden’s photographic department, stating that it 
was “more up to date than that in Vienna and infinitely better equipped than our department 
here.”73 In Berlin, he found a department that was organized and run on a system almost 
exactly the same as the Met. In particular, the Berlin CID used the Henry system of 
fingerprinting, with the only difference in data collection being that the Berlin police also 
collected the palm prints for burglars and hotel thieves. “The wireless installations in 
Berlin,” Kendal wrote, were “almost staggering. There is a very large series of wireless 
rooms at headquarters and the head of each of the six uniform districts has a wireless for 
sending and receiving.”74 “The messages are dispatched from headquarters but all 
provincial or international messages are dispatched from their large station at Adlershof, 
which is over 20 kilometres outside of Berlin. At this station there are really big masts and 
a very powerful apparatus worked by electricity. In reserve there is a large oil engine 
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capable of working the dynamos in case the electric current should be cut off. This station 
alone cost nearly half a million marks.”75  
Kendal also reported that the Berlin police headquarters had been fitted with a 
Lorenz picture sending and receiving machine, and that the department had also 
experimented with a Fultograph (an ancestor to the modern fax machine) but found that it 
useless.76 Though German and Austrian police were confident that the technology should 
be adopted and used, Kendal remained skeptical. “On occasion,” Kendal wrote, “the quick 
transmission of a portrait would be useful, but I cannot help feeling that, having regard to 
the expense, to the improvements which are being made and to the other means of rapid 
communication available, this matter is not one in which any hurried steps need be 
taken.”77 While the Berlin police appeared quite advanced in some respects, they also 
lagged behind the British in others. For instance, the Berlin Police did not have mobile 
wireless units, which were forbidden by a provision in the Treaty of Versailles. 
 In his concluding remarks, Kendal argued that continental police were given more 
resources, space, and generally more training than officers at the Met. Yet he maintained 
that much of this funding and space was wasted, particularly the photography department, 
which had better technology and methods than the Met, but could claim no better clearance 
rate than Scotland Yard. Kendal believed that this fact resulted from the alternative, 
political purpose for much of this technology. “It is obvious,” Kendal wrote, “that the 
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amount of money spent on wireless installations could not possibly be justified, expect for 
the fact that at the back of their mind all the time is the fear of political trouble. They 
believe it necessary to have a complete reserve method of communication in case the 
telegraph and telephone should be tampered with. In the meantime they are making use of 
their systems for purposes of criminal investigation and urging other countries to adopt 
wireless for police work.”78 The fear of political crime or uprising would become a familiar 
trope in Austrian and German relations with the Met and with Interpol during the interwar 
period. This fear led, according to Kendal, to “too many officials and far too much paper 
work…[they] think it worthwhile to undertake work which is of little, if any, practical use 
in most cases, in the hope that it will turn out to be very important occasionally.”79 
 Kendal attended a second Interpol event in 1930, the International Police Congress 
in Antwerp.80 He reported that this conference continued the general discussion regarding 
wireless usage, dangerous drugs, extradition, and the classification of criminals.81 On the 
subject of wireless, Kendal told the Commission that Britain’s Post Office “had agreed, 
with a number of foreign Post Offices, that three wave lengths would be allowed for the 
use of the Police if the Police applied for them.”82 Britain and Germany led the way in 
terms of wireless technology, and most of Interpol’s correspondence during the 1930s 
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ended up passing through networks controlled by one or both of these countries, even if 
the correspondence did not directly concern them. 
While the work of the commission expanded and moved forward during the 
Antwerp Congress, Kendal reported with dismay that the proceedings were interrupted by 
the intrusion of the International Police Conference. “Mr. Enright’s European 
representative [Captain Curt Szekessy],” Kendal wrote, “was present at the meetings of the 
Congress and attempted without success to attend the meetings of the Commission.”83 
Szekessy, described by Kendal as “a melodramatic figure, [a] Hungarian who speaks 
American and lives in Paris with an alleged Countess,” also served as Police Chief of 
Everglades City, located in (Barron) Collier County, Florida.84 His goal at Interpol’s 
conference was to encourage cooperation, or perhaps amalgamation with, the IPC. Kendal 
wrote that the Antwerp Congress “adopted a resolution to the effect that any application 
from Mr. Enright or his friends must come through the diplomatic channel and must state 
specifically whether the members of the organization were serving Police Officers or not 
before it could be considered at all by the Commission.”85  He also judged that “with the 
exception of Monsieur [Florent] Louwage of Belgium [there was] the strongest feeling 
amongst members of the Commission against having anything to do with Mr. Enright.”86 
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 Unfortunately for the members of the commission, the IPC’s push for cooperation 
only continued with the next meeting of Interpol at the Sorbonne in Paris in September 
1931.87 Collier spent the summer of 1931 campaigning for the inclusion of the IPC in the 
Interpol’s conference program, suggesting that the two organizations should consider 
combining the two groups.88 Interpol responded to this application by suggesting that a 
subcommittee made up of members from each organization should be created to explore 
future cooperation, but declared that Interpol would “maintain its independent position.”89 
Not satisfied with this answer, Collier and the IPC revealed in August 1931 – barely a 
month before Interpol’s conference – that they would hold their own annual meeting at the 
Sorbonne at the same time in rooms not already reserved by Interpol. “This meeting,” 
advertised the secretary of the IPC, “offers each of those attending unusual opportunity to 
take part in the most interesting and instructive series of discussion on police affairs ever 
before scheduled.”90 Interpol, obviously flummoxed by this turn of events, contacted 
members again to reiterate that the organization would consider a subcommittee meeting 
between the two groups, but would not allow either the conferences or the organizations to 
merge.91 
 Collier, doubling down on the coup attempt, wrote to Kendal at the beginning of 
September inviting him and Met Commissioner Lord Byng to attend the IPC conference at 
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his expense, and added that he had already reserved rooms for the two men at the Hotel 
George V.92 Unbeknownst to Kendal, this letter had been proceeded by a message to the 
Home Office from IPC President John O’Brien, Chief Inspector of New York City, asking 
the Home Secretary to designate Kendal and Byng as official representatives of the IPC 
conference because they had been “assigned important parts in a most comprehensive three 
day program.”93 Additionally, Curt Szekessy wrote a separate letter to Lord Byng stating 
that the IPC had “no desire to intrude in anyway in the proceedings of [Interpol] or detract 
the representatives of Europe members of the Commission from their duty towards the 
Commission,” but requested that Byng “designate one or two members of your staff as 
representatives for the International Police Conference.”94  
This correspondence forced Kendal to write a memorandum for the Home Office 
to explain the situation, which stressed that he had never given the IPC authority to use his 
name or the Commissioner’s.95 Kendal mused, based on the IPC’s behavior, that “their 
idea, quite obviously, is to try to amalgamate with and overwhelm [Interpol].”96 He 
reported, however, that Interpol “will proceed according to plan, quite separately from the 
meetings of this so called International Conference and that the Commission proposes to 
carry out its own programme and not to allow its members to be wafted away on various 
sub-committees to the Conference.”97 
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 Despite the IPC’s ham-fisted approach, Interpol’s proposed subcommittee between 
the two organizations did materialize at the Paris meeting. Referred to as “The European-
American Contact Committee,” the subcommittee included Interpol representatives from 
Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, and H.G.F. Archer (Kendal’s deputy in the CID) from 
the Met. The IPC contingent featured police commissioners from Detroit, New York, and 
Montreal. The subcommittee agreed that “efficient co-operation has become absolutely 
necessary between the criminal police authorities of all nations, considering the increasing 
extension of international trafficking which has increased the danger resulting from the 
rapid displacements from one continent to the other of international criminals.”98 On these 
grounds, the subcommittee decided that the two groups should exchange information on 
criminals arrested in America or Europe, but Interpol remained adamant that they were not 
interested in the amalgamation of the two groups. Archer reported that the Belgium 
representative, Florent Louwage, continued to support the idea of joining the two 
organizations, but as in 1930, he remained the lone enthusiast for union in Interpol.  
 Hoping that the Paris subcommittee finally settled the problem, Norman Kendal 
attended the 1932 meeting of Interpol in Rome.99 Kendal discovered, however, that Interpol 
Secretary Oskar Dressler “had weakly invited three Americans to attend as a delegation 
from the American International Police Conference.” 100 Their presence, Kendal wrote, 
caused “a great deal of trouble and argument, in theory they were not allowed to attend the 
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meetings, in practice they generally managed to be there. They had secured the support of 
the Belgian and French representatives; on the other hand, the German, Dutch and 
Scandinavian representatives – particularly the Germans and Dutch – were very angry that 
the Americans should have been invited to Rome at all. The result was an extremely 
embarrassing position in which [Florent Louwage of Belgium] kept trying to achieve 
recognition for the Americans, whilst the German most politely protested.”101 This protest, 
as had been shown in the previous year’s conference, rested on the fact that the American 
organization was seen as unofficial and unprofessional. As Amsterdam Police 
Commissioner K.H. Broekhoff explained to Kendal, “it is not possible for us to act with 
private societies regarding police cooperation. I do not think there are countries where such 
a thing is really possible…So as soon as an official American representative enters 
[Interpol] or gets into touch with [Interpol], the affair will be in order.”102 The Dutch police, 
according to Broekhoff, could not work with Americans “assisted with funds, of which we 
do not know the source…[and] who desire to break in upon us.”103 
To help manage the situation, Kendal was made chairman of a new subcommittee 
at the Rome meeting designed to find a solution to the problem once and for all. “The only 
result” of this committee, however, “was that the members of the sub-Committee agreed 
to differ.”104 Kendal met with the American delegation after the subcommittee concluded 
and told them that “the first thing for them to do was to approach the American Government 
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to appoint some responsible Police Officer as the official American representative [of 
Interpol].”105 Commissioner Rutledge of Detroit told Kendal, however, “that there had 
been great difficulties and jealousies in America between the various associations of Police 
Chiefs,” and that the government would only nominate a representative after these rival 
associations had settled their differences or amalgamated.106  
 The success of Interpol lay in the fact that the organization created connections 
between national police forces – or equivalent departments in capital cities – that did not 
require intervention by official diplomats. Indeed, as Kendal argued, “the only real value 
of the meetings is the personal relations with the head of the C.I.D. of the various 
countries.”107 Even though Interpol’s technology for sharing information remained in its 
infancy and the organization had yet to agree on what actually constituted an “international 
crime,” the individual members of the organization found the group useful because of the 
personal connections it fostered, connections that were largely free from bureaucratic red 
tape.  
The efforts of the International Police Conference, on the other hand, failed because 
the organization proposed changes to international law, which promised the intrusion of 
diplomats, and because the organization’s main representative, the United States, did not 
have a single police force to speak for their entire country. Though most European 
countries did not have a national police force, they did present a stable set of de facto 
national forces, such as the London Met and the French Sûreté, which contained police 
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officers with international experience. America, conversely, presented European police 
with a confusing rivalry between police departments in major cities as well as between 
federal agencies such as the FBI. Adding to these issues was the brash manner in which 
the IPC attempted to graft their organization onto connections already established by 
Interpol.  
Of course, even Interpol sometimes faltered. At the 1932 conference in Rome, for 
instance, a problem developed with the size of conference delegations after the Italian 
government, hoping to make a good impression on the organization, invited, in the words 
of Kendal, seemingly every “flunkey and minor official” available. The Rome conference 
led to something of a delegation arms race, with the French, German, and Swedish 
representatives all competing to have the largest entourages. Kendal reported that the 1935 
Conference in Copenhagen could have been mistaken for a “travelling circus,” with the 
Germans boasting a contingent of 12 delegates and the French arriving with 9.108  The 
Swedes, however, were unable to keep up and had decided to cut their delegation down to 
two before supporting Kendal’s motion calling for an attendance cap.  
Interpol also struggled at times with overactive representatives who tended to steer 
official communications and conference programs to tailor their own strange obsessions. 
The best examples of this sort of problem were the annual reports given by Viennese police 
officer and Interpol Secretary, Oskar Dressler, in a panel he referred to as “Interesting 
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criminal cases.”109 Some memorable crimes in Dressler’s report included the attempt to see 
if fingerprints could be lifted from spiritual bodies or ghosts. Another interesting case was 
the Pigeon Blackmailer of the Rhineland, who used his collection of carrier pigeons to send 
threats to local officials. In order to combat this menace, German police had the victim 
release the bird into the air while the police followed the animal using a biplane. The pilot 
was able to find the location of the criminal and return later to make the arrest on the 
ground. Unfortunately, there was no word as to whether or not the pigeons faced charges 
as well.  
In spite of these issues, the Met persisted with the organization, even when Norman 
Kendal was unable to attend the meeting. In 1934, Ronald Howe, Kendal’s deputy in the 
CID, attended the meeting in Vienna.110 Much like Kendal, Howe found that the regular 
sessions of commission produced little result.111 Howe reported that most of the discussion 
included issues that did not concern Britain, in particular the gypsy problem and drug 
trafficking. “At no time,” Howe wrote, “except for the election of officers, was any matter 
put to the vote. Whenever the feeling of the meeting was obviously hostile to any proposal 
it was immediately shelved.”112 Not unlike Kendal, however, Howe felt that the best part 
of the conference was during “informal gatherings” where the most useful discussion of 
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police matters took place and where he found the attendees “very intelligent, obviously 
efficient in their work and ready for discussion at any time of the day or night.”113  
Howe’s visit to the 1934 conference included a tour of police departments in 
Vienna, Lausanne, Lyon, and Dresden.114 In Vienna, Howe toured the police laboratory 
and museum, the University of Vienna’s laboratory, and the Austrian Bankers 
Association’s laboratory for counterfeit currency.115  Howe’s report mirrored Kendal’s 
pervious tour, marveling in particular at Vienna’s ability with photography. Howe was 
similarly impressed with the University’s collection of criminological exhibits, which 
included poaching and housebreaking tools, examples of illegal publications, devices to 
make forged documents and counterfeit currency, and tools used for escaping prison. Howe 
was much less impressed in his visits to Lusanne and Lyon, where he found the standard 
of scientific detection and training much lower compared to Austria and Britain. Howe 
concluded by saying that “except in the theory of training and the method of marshaling 
facts and exhibits for purposes of training, I do not think we are inferior to any of the forces 
I visited.”116 
The 1935 meeting of Interpol in Copenhagen saw a great deal of discussion on 
police wireless as well as the identification and classification of criminals.117 After a 
session on the portrait-parle, Kendal reported that “the general opinion was that all police 
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officers all over the world were nothing like as good as they should be either at describing 
people themselves or at assisting witnesses and others to describe people to them.”118 At 
Copenhagen, Kendal put forward London as a future host for an Interpol conference.  This 
idea was received with excitement, and 1936 was initially proposed as the date. Kendal 
learned, however, from the Yugoslavia representative that he had just been given 
permission from his foreign minister to host the conference in Belgrade in 1936, stating 
furthermore that there was great difficulty in gaining the invitation and he thought it 
impossible to get a similar invitation for the next year. Kendal, as a result, proposed to have 
the London conference moved to 1937 and for Belgrade to host in 1936. 
The major work of the Belgrade conference carried on from the ideas sparked at 
the 1935 conference in Copenhagen, namely, how to revise and modernize information 
exchange regarding criminal identification through Bertillon’s system.119 “Practically 
every representative,” Kendal wrote, “except the French and Belgian, was of [the] opinion 
that the whole of the Bertillon system was unnecessarily elaborate.”120 The elaborate nature 
of the conference proceedings itself also worried some members, as the Yugoslav 
government pulled out all the stops for the conference. There were a series of fieldtrips 
which acted as little more than propaganda for the government as well as the presentation 
of national honors to the heads of the organization, with Kendal receiving the Order of St. 
Sava. “There was a great deal of talk,” said Kendal, “as to the future of the Commission 
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and the danger of allowing it to denigrate into a joy ride in which far too many hangers-on, 
who were not really interested in the work, would be allowed to participate.”121 Kendal 
wrote that many members of the commission, particularly the delegates from Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark, suggested that “as the meeting is to be held in London next year, 
[Kendal] should take the initiative in trying to bring the Commission back to earth and 
make it once again, as it was originally intended to be, a simple round table conference of 
the heads of the ‘Criminal Police’ of the various European countries.”122 “They felt,” 
Kendal wrote, “and I agree with them, that matters had been allowed to drift by the 
Austrians.”123  
Kendal believed that much of these problems could be traced back to “advent of 
the Nazi regime in Germany.”124 “The Germans,” he wrote “have been sending a 
representative accompanied by a whole train of satellites…As a result, the French, instead 
of being represented by one individual as had always been the case before, produced a 
delegation of six. This rivalry is obviously most desirable, and the Scandinavians felt that 
in any event, they would not compete.”125 Additionally, Kendal judged that the Nazi 
presence at the conference encouraged the intrusion of politics in the association. “There 
is no doubt at all,” he reported, “that the German delegations have been sent with a view 
to impress the other representatives and to advertise the merits of those at present politically 
in power in Germany. The result was that the chief German delegate, whenever he spoke 
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instead of confining himself to the police side of the subject, took the opportunity of 
delivering a harangue which was primarily political.”126 On a similar point, Kendal also 
declared that “the wearing of uniform by any officer should be barred…it arose because 
the Germans insisted on attending the formal opening and any formal function…in 
uniform.”127 Kendal believed that the London meeting “would help to make the 
Commission once again a simple meeting for the exchange of views between the various 
heads of the ‘Criminal Police’ and to prevent it from degenerating into a travelling 
circus.”128 
 Kendal’s “simple meeting” opened in London in the home of the Civil Service 
Commission at 6 Burlington Gardens on June 7, 1937. In his opening remarks at the 
conference, Interpol director Michael Skubl acknowledged Britain’s importance to the 
organization and to policing in general by declaring that “hardly any other capital in the 
world can give us a better frame than the Metropolis of Scotland Yard,” and that the 
meeting “in the Mecca of the police” represented the “destiny” of the organization.129 The 
record of the conference proceedings found the organization spending less time arguing 
over the size of delegations and more time discussing the actual incidence of international 
crime. The London conference saw the specifics of exchange and cooperation worked out 
on issues ranging from counterfeit securities, a simplified version of the “portrait parle,” 
and the method of transmitting fingerprint formulas using telegraphy. The conference also 
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avoided even the hint of a joy-ride. Extracurricular meetings were held at sober locations 
including the Royal Tournament at Olympia, the Metropolitan Police College at Hendon, 
and Lancaster House at St. James’ Palace. 
 The London conference also brought final resolution to the American question with 
regard to international policing. Attempting to join the international club, J. Edgar Hoover, 
through the Department of Justice, sent a letter to the London Metropolitan Police in 
October 1936 suggesting that it would be useful to have an FBI officer stationed at the Met 
to facilitate cooperation between the two forces.130 Metropolitan Commissioner Sir Philip 
Game, using a carefully worded text prepared by Kendal, responded by saying that the best 
course of action would be for the United States to put in an application to join Interpol. 
This move, of course, was partly defensive, as the Met was wary of having an American 
police officer nosing around Scotland Yard. On the other hand, the Met was eager to 
develop a closer relationship with American law enforcement. Hoover accepted Game’s 
advice and sent one of his deputies, Major W.H. Drane Lester, to attend the London 
conference in order to explore American involvement in Interpol. At the conference, 
Lester, a former Rhodes Scholar, was invited to speak about general developments in 
criminology in the United States.131 His speech was a typical example of FBI propaganda 
from that time period, featuring anecdotes from famous cases (i.e. Dillinger, Machine Gun 
Kelly, etc.) and giving all the credit for the Bureau’s achievements to Hoover. Despite 
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Lester’s blustering, the speech was well received and led to the quick processing of 
America’s application for membership to the commission, which was ratified at the 1938 
conference in Bucharest.132  
 
CONCLUSION 
Britain’s relationship with the IPC and Interpol showed that the country was eager 
for cooperation regarding criminal justice, but only along certain lines. Though the Met 
worried over the enthusiasm exhibited by Interpol’s Austrian leadership, they appreciated 
the group’s focus on communication between chiefs of police as well as their general 
avoidance of politics and supranational endeavors. Interpol’s success was as much the 
result of its measured approach as to its central location in Europe. The IPC, conversely, 
offered a confusing menagerie of North American police officers that openly discussed 
changing international law. Furthermore, the IPC’s preference for lavish conferences made 
the organization appear, in the eyes of British police, as “nothing but an opportunity for a 
glorious spree.”133 Although Britain avoided the IPC, they remained committed to 
establishing a working cooperation with the United States with regard to criminal justice. 
As a result, the Metropolitan Police ended up playing the critical role in both the failure of 
the IPC at the international level, and in the eventual application of the FBI to Interpol. The 
Met’s position with regard to America, along with their leadership role in the 
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organization’s conferences and correspondence with the League of Nations, made British 
policing an indispensable part of the early success of Interpol. As shown by the next 
chapter, however, much of this work would be undone, first by the Nazi takeover of 
Interpol in 1938 and then by the Second World War. 
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Chapter Four: “A sort of agreeable madness”: Britain and 
International Policing during the Second World War 
 
 The Second World War is often portrayed as a period of weakness for the British 
Empire. In general this portrayal is accurate, but in some specific cases the Empire was 
never stronger than during this conflict. This is particularly the case for British policing. 
Though the Second World War brought an abrupt end to the international cooperation 
fostered by Interpol, it also provided an opportunity for the British police, perhaps for the 
first time since colonization, to expand beyond the borders of the home island. When Allied 
soldiers moved on from places like Athens, Berlin, Rome, and Vienna, it was often British 
police who moved in to maintain security. Though these were temporary arrangements, 
British police officers entered these situations with the hope of leaving a lasting impact on 
the way criminal justice was practiced in the occupied zones. Furthermore, the war allowed 
British police the opportunity to develop international cooperation with select partners, 
namely the United States, through both open and secret means. This chapter will review 
the downfall of Interpol, and describe the wartime relationship between British police and 
their allies. The next chapter will discuss how these wartime events and relationships 
encouraged the British Empire to adopt a more forward policy regarding worldwide 
policing during the postwar era.  
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THE NAZI TAKEOVER OF INTERPOL 
German police officers, bedecked in Nazi uniforms, began regularly attending Interpol 
conferences as early as 1932, and made a concerted push to take over the organization in 
1935 at the Copenhagen conference. This attempt was met with resistance from most of 
the other interested parties, including officers from the French National Police and the Met. 
The fear of encroaching Nazi influence on the organization led Norman Kendal to ban the 
wearing of uniforms at the 1937 conference in London, which Germany did not attend. 
Thus, despite the organization’s desire to avoid politics as all costs, the rise of Nazi 
Germany threated to bring an end to formal international police work.  
 This situation regarding Nazi influence on the organization came to a head on 
March 12, 1938, as a result of the Anschluss. Although this event appeared as a direct 
affront to the anti-Nazi contingent within Interpol, most members of the organization 
decided to take a wait and see approach to the development.1 In an open letter to Interpol 
members, Dutch police officer M.C. van Houten worried that the whole organization would 
“be brought into danger” by the new relationship.2 In a letter to Kendal, however, van 
Houten appeared more optimistic, arguing that despite the difficulties facing the 
organization, Interpol “will stand the crucial test.”3 Despite this confidence, van Houten 
argued that several questions should be resolved before the organization could continue, 
                                                 
1 “14th Meeting of International Criminal Police Commision in Bucharest June 1938,” 1937-1938, MEPO 
3/2072, NA. 
2 M.C. van Houten to Interpol members, March 29, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.  
3 Van Houten to Kendal, March 29, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.  
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including whether the organization should still be based in Vienna, who would serve as 
president, and whether or not the 14th meeting in Bucharest should still take place.4  
While van Houten fielded opinion on continental Europe, Kendal corresponded on 
the issue with Kristian Welhaven of the Oslo Police, and wrote that he felt the 14th meeting 
should be postponed given the uncertain situation in Vienna.5 In his reply to van Houten, 
Kendal argued that the meeting should be postponed immediately until the situation in 
Vienna could be determined – or until they had heard word from Interpol’s suddenly 
missing general secretary, Oskar Dressler. Kendal felt, repeating a common fear from the 
1937 conference, that there was a real danger “that if the Germans take control they will 
try to use [the Commission] for propaganda purposes.”6 The following week Kendal mused 
that since there was no longer an Austrian Federal Police, there was no longer a president 
of the commission, which meant that a new election would be needed.7 
 Kendal learned from various contacts in early April 1938 that Dressler was indeed 
still free, but that the current Interpol President, Michael Skubl, had been locked up. This 
news found Kendal in a despondent mood. Writing to Welhaven again, he remarked that 
this could mean the end of the organization and wondered if the IPC would attempt to 
amalgamate the remaining members. “Once politics get a firm hold,” Kendal argued, “the 
usefulness of the Commission disappears.”8 The correspondence that Kendal received from 
Germany, while not detailed, clearly showed the future direction of the organization. 
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7 Kendal to van Houten, April 4, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA. 
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Continual mention was made in this correspondence that Reinhard Heydrich – a general in 
the SS and future architect of the “Final Solution” – was in charge of the situation, and had 
suspiciously been named a Vice President of Interpol only a day before the Anschluss.9  
 In the midst of this confusion, Arthur Dixon at the Home Office wrote to Kendal to 
tell him that Britain’s dues to Interpol were outstanding, but expressed the Home Office’s 
concern about paying them before knowing the future course of the organization. Dixon 
asked Kendal to keep him abreast of developments he learned through his network of 
“influential members of the Commission” and to “avoid committing the Government to 
any specific line of policy, or indeed to continuing its membership of the Commission if it 
is reconstituted on an altered basis.”10 Kendal responded a few days later to inform Dixon 
that the Bucharest meeting would continue as planned, but that the leadership of the 
commission was still unclear. He stated that he should be allowed to attend the meeting to 
find out exactly what was going on and to take part in an election if one was held. Kendal 
concluded by encouraging Dixon to pay the membership dues because “the only reason for 
withholding it is really political and…I am most anxious that we should be the last people 
to drag in politics.”11  
Kendal’s argument rested on wishful logic, as politics were already clearly on the 
table. Indeed, prior to his response to Dixon, Kendal received word from Vienna that Nazi 
sympathizer Otto Steinhäusl had been appointed Police President in Vienna and was thus, 
ipso facto, the new President of Interpol. In a letter from Steinhäusl, the new President 
                                                 
9 Arthur Nebe to van Houten, April 7, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.  
10 Dixon to Kendal, April 14, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.  
11 Kendal to Dixon, April 21, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.  
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wrote “I congratulate myself on my new position.”12 Dressler attempted to explain away 
any problems with this development by arguing that Steinhäusl was Interpol’s president 
based on resolutions passed by the organization at the 1937 London conference.13 Dressler 
argued that Steinhäusl “went through the ‘Schober’ school” of policing, and thus 
represented the very best ideals of the organization.14 
Kendal was clearly aware of Steinhäusl’s appointment before writing the Home 
Office, but he attempted to place a glossy sheen over the situation for Arthur Dixon. This 
demonstrates Kendal’s thinking on the situation: that Interpol was a group worth saving 
and not yet beyond hope. In other words, an organization worth lying for. His remarks 
pointed to a general hopefulness – shared by other non-German members – that the 
organization could continue to operate as it had prior to the Anschluss. Kendal firmly 
argued for a wait and see approach, hoping that things would become clear at the Bucharest 
conference.   
 In the meantime, Kendal received a reply from Welhaven, who had been busy 
fielding responses from the Scandinavian members of the organization.15 Welhaven 
thanked Kendal for helping to collect opinions and strategies before the 14th meeting, as 
the Scandinavian contingent worried that the Bucharest meeting could “easily become a 
‘Polish Parliament’ if the members are not oriented beforehand as to each other’s views.”16 
Welhaven agreed strongly with Kendal that the best course of action was to avoid politics 
                                                 
12 Otto Steinhäusl to Interpol members, April 20, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA. 
13 Oskar Dressler to Broekhoff, April 20, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Welhaven to Kendal, May 2, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.  
16 Ibid. 
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until things were sorted out at the meeting in Bucharest. Kendal also received word from 
Florent Louwage of Belgium, who agreed that things should be sorted out in person at 
Bucharest, where Louwage hoped they could bring an end to “the siege of the Commission 
after private conversations between the very active members.”17 
Having collected opinions from active members of the organization, Kendal wrote 
again to the Home Office, assuring them that “unless the Germans adopt a non-truculent 
attitude there will be resignations” at the Bucharest conference.18 Anticipating the Home 
Office’s agreement, Kendal wrote to Dressler to tell him that he would be attending the 
Bucharest meeting along with his wife and daughter.19 Kendal received the go ahead from 
Whitehall to attend the meeting on May 19th.20 That same day, Oskar Dressler sent a letter 
to Kendal, addressing the latter’s challenge to the new president and operation of the 
commission. Dressler accepted that, by the book, the new state of the commission should 
be put up to a vote, but considering that Interpol had already “gone beyond its original 
scope” the group “is strictly speaking no longer an association of individual persons, but 
an association of States who send their delegates.”21 In an ominous vision of the future, 
Dressler argued that “it is the States and not the persons that bear most weight, and this 
fact…constitutes the particular value, the special importance and, above all, the official 
character of the Commission.”22 This view of the commission was diametrically opposed 
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to the views shared by most of the member officers, Kendal in particular. They believed 
that the real strength of the commission rested on the representatives involved, rather than 
the governments that they represented. In Dressler’s view, however, this conception of the 
society was already in practice, even though it was “not yet fully embodied in the 
Regulations.”23 
 More distressing news came to Kendal later that week from British Consulate-
General of Vienna. This letter provided a brief profile of the new Interpol president Otto 
Steinhäusl, who was a well-respected criminal police officer in Vienna, but was arrested in 
1934 for his leadership role in the July Putsch that failed to install a Nazi regime in Vienna 
and led to the assassination Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss.24 Though the actual 
manner of Dollfuss’ death remained a mystery, Steinhäusl was the leader of the secret SS 
group that carried out the attack on the chancellery.  This letter, however, did not reach the 
Home Office or Kendal until June 7th, the opening day of the Bucharest Conference. In the 
General Report on the work of Interpol since the London meeting, Dressler also reported 
that Michael Skubl, the pre-Anschluss President of Interpol, had retired from office. 
Unbeknownst to Interpol members, however, Skubl had been forced to retire and would 
spend the next eight years in prison for refusing to cooperate with the new Nazi regime. 
The major work of the Bucharest conference concerned the attempt to draw up a 
standard system of passport review and creation, and the prevention of forgery. These 
proceedings, though focused primarily on the matter at hand, also revealed the peculiar 
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political elements at play within the organization at the time. In his open paper, “A Study 
concerning Passports,” Florent Louwage provided a general overview of the past 
agreements and discussions at Interpol on this topic, and singled out in particular the past 
contributions of forgery expert J.A. Adler, now barred from Interpol because of his 
questionable genetic background. The commission also discussed how to uniformly 
describe criminals within police journals. Kendal, as usual, argued that standardization of 
description could be attained only in general police journals, and that all countries should 
decide for themselves which police journals they should subscribe to. Similarly, 
descriptions of criminals should only be sent to countries where the criminal could have 
gone to, rather than a blanket bulletin to all members of the organization.  
Another panel of interest was held by Oskar Dressler and Bruno Schultz entitled 
“The Day of Practical Workers.” This panel was designed to address the complaints of 
many of the member nations, Kendal in particular, that the organization needed to be 
focused more on practical work – namely, direct discussion of particular criminal cases 
along the lines of Oskar Dressler’s own regular contribution to the conference proceedings. 
Dressler and Schultz called for an entire day of future conferences to be set aside solely for 
this purpose – in particular, the discussion of new modus operandi, new methods applied 
by police, as well as a frank and open discussion of pending cases. In order to avoid the 
release of any sensitive information, Dressler moved that this day of the conference should 
be barred to journalist and should not include any written record.  
The Bucharest meeting may have begun with tension, but the conference 
proceedings showed the outward appearance of an organization continuing as though 
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nothing had happened. According to Swedish police officer Harry Söderman, “there was a 
feeling of great tension when the Commission convened in Bucharest, just after the 
Anschluss…First we all spent a week in Bucharest. Then there was a second week on the 
royal yacht, going slowly down the Danube to the Black Sea. I imagine this trip was 
arranged by our benevolent and astute host, [Dr. Eugen] Beanu25, the head of the King 
Carol’s secret police, with the idea of escaping the tense proceedings of the Commission 
in the city. Several times events had come near to open disaster, for the patience of many 
of us was tested to the utmost in that first week.”26 Yet, as Söderman reported, most of the 
bad blood between the contending members vanished by conference end: “The 
reconciliation among the 1938 convention’s contending parties, which Beanu hoped for, 
pretty well came about on the trip in the royal yacht, and how could it have been otherwise? 
At every meal Russian caviar was served in unlimited qualities. Champagne flowed from 
breakfast until late at night, beautiful gypsy singers sang melodious Transylvanian songs 
at all times. A bar, stocked to provide all the drinks of the entire world, was open free of 
charge twenty-four hours a day, and two orchestras played within earshot. In the evenings, 
when we arrived at small fishing towns, all the fishermen were out in their boats. Hundreds 
of them surrounded the ship, and in each boat there was a paper lantern and a man playing 
a mandolin. The effect of this on a dark night, to one standing on a ships bridge overlooking 
the black waters of the Danube, was enchanting. After a few days, one fell into a sort of 
agreeable madness.”27 By the end of the cruise, Söderman concluded, “the situation had 
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26 Söderman, 379. 
27 Ibid., 380. 
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been glossed over, and the members were agreed to have the Commission work for another 
year under the old system.”28 
 Though the Bucharest conference did much to lessen fears of Nazi corruption of 
Interpol, those fears reignited in December 1938 when Oskar Dressler announced that the 
1939 Interpol conference would be held in Berlin from August 29 to September 8. This 
announcement met with little reaction from the Met, with Kendal in particular still firmly 
of the opinion that the Bucharest conference had proven Germany’s sincerity and that there 
remained no reason to doubt their continued trustworthiness. Not all members of Interpol, 
however, shared Kendal’s confidence. The French Sûreté, in particular, felt that the 
Bucharest conference was merely an attempt to encourage appeasement, giving the Nazi 
police time to finalize their dominance of the organization at the newly announced Berlin 
conference. In May, the British consulate in Paris wrote to the Foreign Office to inform the 
government that the French had decided not to attend the Berlin conference, but wanted to 
know British opinion on the matter so that the two countries could coordinate their 
response.29 While considering this situation, Kendal received a follow-up message from 
Dressler which included a provisional program and asked for a confirmation of 
attendance.30 
 The Foreign and Home offices sat on the issue until mid-summer, when S.J. Baker 
at the Home Office wrote to Kendal asking for his position on the situation.31 Kendal 
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responded a week later with a long letter, arguing that it was “too early to burn our boats 
on the question of attending.”32 He went on to discuss the history of the idea of moving the 
commission elsewhere, especially the old debate about attaching the association to the 
League of Nations in Geneva. Kendal then reported that the opinion of the “neutral 
nations,” namely Holland, Scandinavia, the Balkans, and Turkey, was that Austria must be 
kept in charge in order for the commission to continue to endure. Kendal admitted that 
before the Anschluss, the Germans had attempted to introduce politics in the organization 
at the 1935 Copenhagen conference, and had not attended the London conference because 
they were not allowed to wear uniforms. Yet “at Bucharest last year the Germans were 
very careful to behave with the greatest circumspection.”33 Kendal continued by saying 
that “nobody in uniform attended and no attempt was made to introduce at any of the 
meetings anything which could be described as political.”34 He also reported that the work 
of the commission has been conducted normally, despite the Germans being in charge.  
In Kendal’s estimate, the majority of the commission still supported the status quo, 
and that if the French measure to move the conference or the organization to another 
country was put to an open vote it would be defeated “by an overwhelming majority.”35 He 
argued that “unless a state of emergency is declared here or war is declared…before the 
date of the meeting I must attend and see what happens. I am still the Senior Vice-
President….If we do not attend it is the end of the Commission so far as we are 
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concerned.”36 Kendal concluded his letter with his familiar refrain that “from the very 
outset and at meeting after meeting I have stressed the point that politics have nothing to 
do with the Commission and support for this view has been unanimous. If the Germans 
introduce political discussions at Berlin the Commission would break up.”37 In a postscript, 
Kendal added that “our relations with the German Police are exceedingly good,” and that 
“they are always prompt in replying to letters and take any amount of trouble whenever we 
ask them for help.”38 
The decision on whether or not to attend the Berlin conference, given the 
international climate at the time, necessitated correspondence with the Foreign Office. In 
a letter to Permanent Under-Secretary Alexander Cadogan, Met Commissioner Sir Philip 
Game asked for the Foreign Office opinion on whether they should attend the Berlin 
Conference.39 Game reported that the French had decided not to attend the conference, 
given the international climate. Game, however, argued that this decision was motivated 
primarily by jealously on the part of the French Police because they could not get Interpol 
relocated from Vienna to Geneva. “Our feeling here,” Game wrote, “is that the French 
action is introducing political considerations, which we have successfully helped so far to 
keep out. Our relations with the German police are good and we should like to be 
represented.”40 Game continued that “if neither the French nor ourselves attend the meeting 
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the Commission will probably die. This in itself would not be disastrous to international 
criminal work, though it would be rather a pity.”41 
 While Kendal and Game awaited a reply from the Foreign Office, Kendal contacted 
Florent Louwage to seek his opinion on the situation.42 Louwage responded a few days 
later, telling Kendal that he agreed that the commission should go on, and that he was 
attempting to convince the French to attend the meeting because only an open discussion 
of members could solve the commission’s problems.43 Kendal himself wrote to the French 
representative Mondanel, pleading “I do hope that you will be able to be there. It seems to 
me that if would be a fatal mistake at this time to bar this meeting when we know that all 
the ‘neutral’ countries are going to attend and the if we abstain it will most certainly be put 
down to political motives.”44 Kendal went on to advertise that he was “impressed last year 
with the way the Germans kept politics out of the affairs of the Commission…I feel sure 
you will agree that nobody can suggest that he is raising any question which is not clearly 
connected with the general fight against criminals.”45 “It seems to me,” Kendal concluded, 
“that the Germans have played the game so far as the I.C.P.C. is concerned and I sincerely 
hope that you will be able to be at the meeting.”46 
 While Kendal and the Met waited for a response from the French, Kendal received 
another letter from Oskar Dressler, who asked again if he planned to attend the meeting 
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and advertising that the conference schedule would provide time for hunting and fishing.47 
Kendal responded a few days later, telling Dressler candidly that he still did not know if he 
would be allowed to attend, but that he looked forward to hunting and fishing, and hoped, 
also that his wife and daughter would be able to attend the conference as well.48 It is clear 
that a large number of member nations still planned to attend the meeting. Thune Jacobsen, 
Chief of Police of Copenhagen, wrote to Kendal to invite him to stay in Copenhagen on 
his way to the Berlin conference, and said that his wife was looking forward to seeing Lady 
Kendal and his daughter again. Jacobsen hoped that the Berlin conference would come off 
because he wanted to make the commission something more than a “social discussion club 
into a real powerful organ.”49 
Initially, the Foreign Office was inclined to agree with Game and Kendal, and 
seemed convinced by Kendal’s assertion that the Germans had yet to bring politics into the 
organization and deserved a chance.50 While waiting to see what the French would finally 
do, the Foreign Office learned that the India police has decided to send a representative to 
the Berlin conference (the Foreign Office was told by the Home Office that the Indian 
Police regarded these conferences “as a pleasant jaunt and are rather apt to resent any 
outside suggestions”), and that the Palestinian Police had also received an invitation, 
though they would likely wait for approval from the Colonial Office.51After several more 
                                                 
47 Dressler to Kendal, August 4, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.  
48 Kendal to Dressler, August 7, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA. In a reply on August 17, Dressler reiterated his 
invitation and said that Kendal’s attendance “will be of the greatest importance for the Commission.” 
49 Thune Jacobsen to Kendal, July 28, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.  
50 O.G. Sargent to Sir Philip Game, July 25, 1939, FO 371/23090, NA.  
51 F. K. Roberts, Minute, July 22, 1939, FO 371/23090, NA.  
  
 151 
exchanges between Kendal and the Foreign Office trying to work out a response, the British 
Embassy in Paris learned on August 17 that the French would not attend the conference, 
regardless of Britain’s position.52 In a central office file minute regarding the situation, 
F.K. Roberts reported that he had “almost daily telephone conversations with Sir Norman 
Kendal.”53 Roberts reported that Kendal felt that he should attend the meeting because of 
German promises and because “the neutral states are hoping he will be present, and may 
intend to propose him as the first President of the Commission.”54 Kendal, however, left 
the final decision up to the Foreign Office. In a previous minute, Roberts reported that 
Kendal “admitted that the continuance of the activities of the Commission was not a matter 
of capital importance, but he naturally attaches considerable importance to the maintenance 
of friendly contact with the German police.”55  
In his final estimate, Roberts argued that Britain could not afford to attend because 
the French had decided not to go, and Britain could not be seen to stand against their ally. 
His colleagues at the Foreign Office agreed, with one chiming in that the conference was 
“rather a joy-ride anyway.” Roberts informed Kendal of the news from France via 
telephone on August 19, and encouraged Kendal not to accept Interpol’s invitation on the 
basis of growing international tension and the need to maintain solidarity with the French.56 
Kendal wrote back to Mondanel the following week to inform him that he would not be 
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attending the meeting.57 He learned from W.H. Cornish at the Home Office that the Foreign 
Office believed that Britain should still pay dues to the organization, but wanted to wait a 
few weeks until international tensions had died down.58 As it turned out, Britain would not 
pay these dues for another eight years.  
 
INTERPOL DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
The war brought an immediate end to British participation in Interpol, though the 
organization continued under German auspices until 1943. The conflict brought many 
former Interpol members to the United Kingdom as refugees. Many of these officials joined 
their governments in exile and worked on plans to reestablish control of their country if 
and when it was liberated from the Nazis. Some of these officials argued that the Allied 
countries as well as the governments in exile should reform Interpol during the war to 
maintain the personal connections between national police officers and, perhaps, to help 
control black market crime during the war. For the most part, Britain kept international 
relations with police to a minimum during the war, resigning them to tours of Scotland 
Yard and training for particular refugee officers.59  
 The issue of whether or not to continue Interpol during the war came up during 
debates for the 1939 conference, but did not really get underway until 1940. Victor 
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Altmann, former High Commissioner of Police in Vienna, wrote to Norman Kendal in 
August 1940 to suggest the reformation of the organization under British auspices. 
Altmann, who fled Austria shortly after the Anschluss, initially resettled in France, but 
moved to England after France’s capitulation in 1940. Upon arriving in Britain, Altmann 
was placed in a camp for suspicious refugees, but was released after Kendal wrote a letter 
on his behalf. After this exchange, Altmann set about attempting to field interest in 
reforming Interpol in London during the war. Altmann’s proposal was picked up by the 
exiled Yugoslav Government, which argued that “it would be a good thing to set up a rival 
organization in this country to that at present supposed to be functioning from Berlin with 
Heydrich as nominal President.”60 Kendal reported that he learned that the first Nazi 
president of the commission, Steinhäusl, had died in May 1941, and that the German’s 
replaced him with Heydrich – a move that, in Kendal’s eyes, made “any genuine 
International Police Commission on the Continent…dead as mutton.”61 When approached 
on the topic of restarting the commission by refugee police, Kendal told his eager 
continental friends that the question of international policing during the war was a matter 
for the Foreign Office and the individual exiled governments to discuss.  
Despite his attempts to pour water on the issue, Kendal continued to receive 
suggestions to restart the organization from the Yugoslavs and Altmann. Finally, in 
December 1941, Altmann sent a formal proposal to the Met to restart the organization, a 
proposal that included Norman Kendal as the new president of the organization.62 
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Altmann’s list of potential members also included delegates from each of the Allied 
countries in London (including the Soviet Union). Altmann also suggested that 
membership should include representatives from Switzerland and Sweden, “because Nazi 
criminals will flee to these countries after the collapse of their regime.”63 Altmann’s 
proposed tasks for this new international commission included old topics such as data 
collection and extradition as well as war related topics such as determining the postwar 
handling of “Nazi criminals and Quislings” in each country.64  
Kendal thanked Altmann for his proposals and sent a copy of the letter to the 
Foreign Office. In his letter to Sir Stephen Gaselee, Kendal worried that Altmann’s ideas 
were too political and that he doubted if Altmann or the other police in exile he was 
working with “are of really great importance.”65 He believed that given the failure of the 
German run Interpol as well as the ongoing war, that there was no need for a competing 
organization. He felt that the only reason to restart Interpol during the war was as a 
publicity move to “keep the spirits up of those who would be concerned.”66 Kendal 
guessed, however, that such an organization would only lead to a lot of unnecessary talking, 
and “would be certain to drift into politics.”67 He concluded that “the whole idea is much 
too ambitious and wholly premature.”68 Gaselee and the Foreign Office agreed with 
Kendal’s assessment, adding that the only use of the organization would be “to give some 
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occupation to some of the Allied police chiefs now in this country.”69 “We should,” 
Gaselee continued, “only be prepared to consider it seriously if we were pressed to do so 
by a representative panel of the Allied Governments.”70 
 Although he was not eager to see Interpol restarted during the war, Kendal felt 
strongly that when the organization returned it would need to bring the United States into 
the fold. “There were difficulties,” Kendal wrote to Gaselee, “in the past because the United 
States Government were never prepared officially to back any of those who were anxious 
to attend the meetings. Nowadays I have no doubt that they would appoint an official 
representative and this might be useful if the general idea is revived after the war is over.”  
71 The Met and Interpol worked hard in the run up to that 1938 conference to make the 
FBI’s membership mean something more than just a name on a program. Interpol officers, 
including Florent Louwage and Oskar Dressler sent flattering letters to Hoover attempting 
to coax the director to come to the conference, with Louwage going so far as to declare that 
the world could use more Hoovers.72 Eugen Binau, Chief of Bucharest Police and 
conference host, also wrote to Hoover and advertised excursions down the Danube River 
that would include “angling of brook trout.”73 Hoover, however, did not take the bait and 
did not attend the 1938 meeting. He remained, however, outwardly enthusiastic about 
American membership in the commission, telling a reporter that he considered 
international cooperation in crime “almost as necessary as local, county, state, and federal 
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cooperation in the suppression of crime within the continental boundaries of the United 
States.”74 Despite Hoover’s enthusiasm, the Bureau’s desire to join the commission in 
earnest would largely be frustrated prior to the outbreak of the war because they had been 
unable to get appropriations from Congress for Interpol dues. 
 This budgetary delay, however, would become a happy excuse in 1939, when 
America’s lack of payment was used by Hoover and the Bureau as an excuse to avoid 
conferences held during the war. This avoidance of the commission’s conference, however, 
did not preclude American participation with the organization. Oskar Dressler continued 
to send Hoover updates on the commission’s activities – including copies of conference 
programs and English language issues of International Criminal Police – as late as 
September 1941.75 Many of these copies of International Criminal Police included request 
for information or apprehension from J. Edgar Hoover.76 Indeed, it was not until December 
4, 1941 that Hoover suspended all communication with Interpol, but only after discovering 
that the organization had been moved from Vienna to Berlin.77  
Kendal’s estimation regarding America’s willingness to participate in a new 
postwar versions of Interpol turned out to be accurate. During a visit to the Met by FBI 
officers L.A. Hince and H.M. Kimball, Sir Philip Game broached the subject of restarting 
Interpol after war. In a later exchange with J. Edgar Hoover, Game discussed the need for 
the Allies to secure Interpol’s records in order to continue the organization. “The records 
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of the Commission,” Game wrote, “although doubtless containing a considerable amount 
of ‘dead’ matter were exhaustive and efficiently looked after.”78 Game also mentioned to 
Hoover the attempts by Altmann and the Yugoslav Government to restart the commission. 
Game rejected these proposals, but felt that they raised issues that the Met and the FBI 
should keep in mind for after the war. In particular, Game expected that the postwar period 
would bring an end, once and for all, to the lack of an official representative of the United 
States to the commission. Game hoped that “the United States government will appoint 
you or some senior officer of your department as their representative” to avoid the 
“considerable embarrassment” caused by the lack of such a representative before the 
war.”79 Hoover replied in November 1942, expressing his interest in the proposal, but only 
“when the pressure of immediate wartime problems has been reduced.”80 
 
WARTIME COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES 
Although the Met still had to convince the FBI of the usefulness of participating in Interpol, 
they had little trouble convincing the Americans of the need for international police 
cooperation more generally. Indeed, the Second World War would prove to be a fruitful 
period for security coordination between the United States and the British Empire. In 
addition to maintaining contact with the Metropolitan Police during the war, the FBI also 
extended their connections with Britain by establishing liaisons with MI5. Unsurprisingly, 
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this wartime relationship saw the continuation of British frustration with American policing 
and security.  
 MI5’s liaison with the FBI during the Second World War was organized through 
an organization called British Security Co-ordination (BSC). BSC was initially established 
by MI6, but came to include liaison between MI5 and the FBI because of British fears that 
the United States would be unprepared for German espionage and sabotage attempts. In 
particular, Britain feared for the safety of their consulates and shipping property in the 
United States and South America. MI5 was eager to work with the FBI, but leery of 
establishing that relationship through an organization developed by another service.  
MI5’s fears were well founded, as the head of BSC, Williams Stephenson, had 
already used his position to feed America false information regarding the presence of 
German spies in America. Inspired by the Zimmerman Telegram, Stephenson felt that he 
could urge the United States into the war with news of new conspiracies in Latin America. 
When British intelligence failed to turn up any evidence of these conspiracies, Stephenson 
made them up. His forgeries included documents proving that Bolivia was on the verge of 
establishing a Nazi dictatorship in South America, and German maps showing Nazi plans 
on how to divide up Latin America after the war.81 Though the American security 
community remained skeptical of these documents, President Roosevelt used them as the 
basis for verbal attacks against Germany in addresses to the nation in the fall of 1941.82 
                                                 
81 British Security Coordination, British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence 
in the Americas, 1940-45 (London: St Ermin’s, 1998), 277. 
82 Christopher M Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency 
from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Perennial, 1996), 102-103. 
  
 159 
Despite MI5’s concerns about Stephenson, they carried forward with BSC, primarily 
because the FBI felt comfortable with the organization. The Bureau worried that if MI5 
attempted to create a new liaison service, it could come under the eye of the State 
Department, which could hold up or edit reports emanating from the United States.  
MI5’s work with the FBI through BSC began in a limited way in 1940. Much of 
this early liaison occurred under the cover of traditional international police cooperation. 
As they had during the interwar period, the FBI sent agents to London in order to maintain 
relations with the Metropolitan Police and to receive instruction in new security methods. 
During the war these visits came to include contact with MI5, in which MI5 provided these 
agents with instruction on anti-espionage and anti-sabotage techniques. In this way, 
coordination could be encouraged without official sanction, but this lack of official 
oversight could sometimes work against British interests.  
In late 1940, the FBI sent agents Hugh Clegg and C.A. Hince to London to receive 
training in counter-espionage from MI5. After seeing these agents off, MI5 learned from 
the Mounted Police in Ottawa that the FBI was advertising a special course for South 
American police through the International Association of Chiefs of Police.83 This eight 
week course, to be held in early 1941, would offer instruction on topics including counter 
espionage and sabotage, and “will include techniques used by the British police in removal 
of time bombs, protection of water works and gas mains, and safety of civilians during 
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aerial bombardments.”84 Moreover, the course instruction would be directed by “a special 
[FBI] detail sent to London to observe such police emergency procedures in that city.”85  
Guy Liddell, MI5’s head of counter-espionage, correctly assumed that this “special 
detail” meant Clegg and Hince. Writing to Arthur Dixon at the Home Office, Liddell 
worried that if the counter sabotage information, particularly bomb disposal, was imparted 
by Clegg and Hince to South American police it would probably reach the Germans.86 
Despite assurances from Dixon and Ronald Howe at the Met that nothing secret had been 
divulged, Liddell sent word to William Stephenson, via MI6, that BSC should make a 
“tactful warning” that the FBI not share anything learned in London to the South American 
police.87 Liddell learned from MI6 the following month that Stephenson had delivered the 
message and that the FBI had cancelled the course.88  
Despite the cancellation of this course, both British and American interest in 
maintaining liaisons with South American police through international police 
organizations would remain strong and would go on to become a critical part of postwar 
international police cooperation. Indeed, BSC and MI5 supervised their own tour of British 
property and port facilities in South America during 1941.89 This tour was conducted by 
Sir Connop Guthrie, a long time representative of British shipping in the United States. 
Guthrie appointed new security officers at each British Consulate in South America and 
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took particular care in the security preparation for British oil fields in Venezuela and 
Colombia, as well as bauxite stores in British Guiana. 
 Though MI5 avoided a potential disaster with regard to the South America course, 
they still fretted over the trustworthiness of the American security community. Many 
shared the sentiments of P.E. Ramsbotham of the Foreign Office, who declared in a memo 
regarding the security liaison that “Americans are notoriously indiscreet and often find 
difficulty in resisting the blandishments of journalists in search of copy.”90 MI5 and the 
Metropolitan Police were particularly worried over the potential for German agents to enter 
Great Britain disguised as American technicians working as members of the Civilian 
Technical Corps through Lend Lease. Though they stressed to the FBI the need for these 
technicians to be vetted before being sent to Britain, MI5 made preparations to vet these 
technicians themselves on arrival. Additionally, the British placed pressure on the United 
States to keep an eye on longshoremen unions suspected of communist influence. These 
unions had agitated against American participation in the British war effort, and organized 
a number of strikes in 1940 and 1941.91 Though MI5 reported “only a few cases of minor 
sabotage” related to these strikes, they believed that these strikes represented “the greatest 
single act of prepared sabotage that has ever occurred.”92 
 Despite their deep reservations regarding the capabilities of America’s security 
community, MI5 had no choice after Pearl Harbor but to proceed with liaison through 
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William Stephenson and BSC. According to BSC, the operation was running smoothly, but 
by the summer of 1942 it became apparent that something was amiss. Guy Liddell made a 
tour of the FBI from May 28 to July 7 1942, and reported that much of the problem resulted 
from a complete lack of knowledge on the part of the FBI as to what constituted counter-
intelligence.93 In his meetings with J. Edgar Hoover and others, Liddell discovered that the 
FBI had not “made any real study of the German Intelligence Service” and had not 
“developed any special technique for dealing with it.”94 “Their main idea” Liddell 
continued, “is to act on information received and to bring spies to trial at the earliest 
possible moment.”95 Liddell saw this a typical method for an organization that was 
“primarily a police force,” and had to compete with rival organizations for “credit in the 
eyes of the public.”96 Liddell attempted to stress to FBI officials the necessity to detect and 
then turn enemy agents. “The Americans,” Liddell commented, “did not seem to have 
realized the full value and importance of building up a XX [Double Cross] agent system,” 
and instead took “a rather short-term unimaginative view” of counterespionage work.97 
 Not all of the cooperation with America focused on the war, however. MI5 were 
also eager to learn from the Americans anything they could regarding threats, especially 
the IRA, to the British Empire emanating from the United States. Within a year of 
America’s entry into the war, British personnel assigned to BSC had used their position to 
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scour the files of the FBI and NYPD for information on IRA activity within the United 
States. Of particular interest for MI5 was information relating to two IRA bombs sent from 
New York to London and Glasgow in March 1941.98 These devices exploded in the main 
Post Office of both cities, but attempts by the Met and the Glasgow police to encourage 
the FBI to investigate the matter turned up nothing. Though MI5’s investigation through 
BSC did not lead to any new information, it did provide them with intelligence regarding 
suspected IRA members operating through Irish societies within the United States. These 
reports included information on the attendance of potential subversives at Irish society 
meetings within New York City.99 
 In spite of Liddell’s reservations concerning American competence in terms of 
counter espionage, he left his American visit with a better opinion of Stephenson and BSC. 
Indeed, so confident had MI5 become with Stephenson’s performance, they began to look 
into ways to make Stephenson and BSC the coordinating body for all MI5 activities in the 
Western Hemisphere, including Canada and the colonies.100 Stephenson’s happy position 
working as the go between, however, came to an abrupt end in December 1942, when the 
FBI sent agent Arthur Thurston to London to work as the new liaison between the Bureau 
and the Security Service.101 On arrival, Thurston expressed the sentiment that the FBI was 
frustrated with the information, or lack thereof, that they had received from BSC, and sent 
Thurston to establish direct, personal liaison with MI5. In a telegram from BSC, 
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Stephenson explained the situation as the result of “departmental jealousies” in 
Washington.102 Stephenson declared that there was no cause for division between BSC and 
the FBI, but that the FBI became resentful of BSC’s contact with other American agencies, 
particularly the State Department and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The “mutual 
antipathy,” Stephenson wrote, “between all these agencies and services has to be witnessed 
to be believed and it has required much tact and negotiation on our part to steer clear of 
trouble.”103  
As the Metropolitan Police had discovered in their dealings with the FBI through 
Interpol and the International Police Conference, security cooperation with the United 
States could be a minefield. While Britain appreciated the FBI’s effort to secure better 
cooperation between the two sides, they were troubled that this new initiative took BSC 
out of the equation. Indeed, the Thurston mission was one of only a few British policing 
initiatives during the war that found the Empire on the back foot. Unfortunately for the 
British, this new FBI tactic of sending agents abroad, instead of accepting liaison in the 
United States or at a distance, represented the beginning of a trend that would carry on 
during the postwar period. 
 While MI5 hoped that the arrival of Thurston might finally bring an end to their 
difficulties, this new liaison came with its own set of problems. In an internal review 
document drafted four months after Thurston’s arrival, P.E. Ramsbotham revealed that 
despite having “gratuitously” provided Thurston with intelligence, Thurston had supplied 
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in return only one report that MI5 found useful.104 Thurston’s remaining monographs, 
reports, and summaries were, according to Ramsbotham, “extremely scrappy and of very 
little value.”105As a result of these issues, Ramsbotham determined that “unless Security 
Service has its own ‘ferret’ in F.B.I.’s Washington Office, our exchange with the F.B.I. 
will continue to be one-sided.”106  
The “ferret” chosen for this new assignment was G.C. Denham, the former 
Inspector General of the Singapore Police and a close friend of MI5 director Sir David 
Petrie. Denham was a colleague of Petrie’s in the India Police, and during the war had 
worked for MI5 in Singapore, Burma, and India. In a carefully worded letter, Petrie notified 
the American Ambassador John Winant that Denham would be sent to Washington D.C. 
to act as the “British counterpart of Mr. Thurston.”107 By sending Denham, Petrie hoped 
that MI5 could help reach J. Edgar Hoover’s objective of securing “better and speedier 
exchange of information on all matters…of common interest.”108 In a separate letter to 
Hoover, Petrie advertised Denham’s intelligence experience in India and China, writing 
that “Denham’s knowledge of Intelligence matters, particularly Japanese activities, in the 
Far East is probably far more up-to-date and extensive than that possessed by any but a 
very few officers today.”109 
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 Denham’s mission began in the summer of 1943, and after several weeks of work 
in New York and Washington, he wrote an extensive report on the situation in America to 
Petrie.110 Denham reported that the problem with liaison between MI5 and the FBI came 
down to a conflict in personalities caused primarily by Stephenson and BSC. He felt that 
many of the people that MI5 placed within BSC – including many former members of the 
colonial police – felt that America was simply a sideshow and were working for their 
pensions. Denham stressed, however, that the liaison with the FBI was worthwhile because 
it provided an opportunity to use the Bureau’s extensive records system, which MI5 could 
act upon without restriction from the US court system. Though he felt J. Edgar Hoover was 
“undoubtedly a real personality worthy of admiration,” Denham seemed to pity the FBI 
because of the restrictions posed on the organization by the federal government and the 
court system.111 “This country,” he judged, “really does not realise the necessity of dealing 
stringently with spies and saboteurs and the age long hostility towards the police - a very 
different body to the F.B.I. who have a very high standard of officer.”112 This hostility, 
Denham continued, “vents itself against the F.B.I. in the most childish and venomous way. 
So great is this difficulty that I fear that XX cases are not likely to be very successful in 
this country because the most the F.B.I. can do is to cajole. They are practically bereft of 
any weapon which might help them towards coercion.”113  
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Bureau officers revealed to Denham “that they would rather deal with XX cases in 
Cuba or Panama where the local police are not hindered to the same extent and are probably 
under [the FBI’s] thumb and in their pay.”114 Though he would eventually become the great 
boogeyman of the American left, Hoover and the FBI did not always wield this power. The 
leeway the FBI were given to extract information from enemy combatants, even during a 
war, often paled in comparison to the power exercised by even middling colonial officers 
in the British Empire. Hoover and the FBI’s realization of this fact became the most 
significant outcome of the security exchange during the Second World War because it 
encouraged the Bureau’s spread overseas during the postwar period. 
 Although it appeared that Denham’s visit would lead to better relations with the 
FBI, MI5 abruptly changed course at the end of July 1943 when they learned from MI6 
that the Thurston mission had been a ploy by Hoover to break up British intelligence work 
in the Western Hemisphere.115 As a result, MI5 decided to stand behind William 
Stephenson, arguing that changing the liaison at this point would show weakness and 
encourage confusion. Though removed from the liaison with the FBI, Denham continued 
with a planned tour for MI5 in Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, and British Honduras.116 
MI5 continued to worry over potential security breaches in the Caribbean and South 
America, and suspected that the Germans would put more emphasis on the region after 
suffering heavy losses in the North Atlantic. Denham reported that the British personnel in 
the area could be trusted to do their work without added assistance. He concluded, however, 
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by warning that the United States intended to place additional emphasis on the region, and 
that the Empire would need to work hard in the postwar period to control not only 
communism and smuggling, but also the often destructive pursuits of its ally.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Second World War may have brought about the destruction of Interpol, but it did not 
destroy international police cooperation. Even as the primary body for cooperation began 
to crumble, the correspondence between Kendal, van Houten, Welhaven, and others 
demonstrated the strength of the personal relationships between national police 
departments. Though the leaders of these departments worried over the future of formal 
cooperation, the strength of the informal ties between these police officers meant that 
cooperation would survive. Indeed, even during the war, British police maintained 
cooperative relationships with various allied governments, in particular the United States. 
Unfortunately, this wartime relationship with the United States and the FBI saw the 
continuation of difficulties experienced during the prewar period. British police and 
security officials continued to find America to be a confusing, vexing, but ultimately 
necessary partner in security. British police, however, entered the postwar period confident 
that they would continue to improve and perfect this coordination from a position of 
leadership. But as the Thurston mission revealed, Hoover and the FBI were becoming 
dissatisfied not only with the nature of international cooperation, but with cooperation 
itself. Most of the world’s police entered the postwar period hoping to recreate what they 
had lost during the Second World War. Instead they often found themselves struggling to 
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manage American police missions that operated in foreign countries with or without 
permission.
  170 
Chapter Five: The Empire of Policing: Britain and International 
Policing, 1945 – 1948 
The immediate postwar period found Britain attempting to build upon and take 
advantage of wartime developments regarding security. The destruction or weakening of 
many foreign police forces during the war seemed to offer an opportunity for British police 
to remake global security in their own image. This attempted makeover occurred on two 
fronts.  The first involved the police missions in occupied Austria, Ethiopia, Germany, 
Greece, and Italy. These missions were not altruistic pursuits, but instead represented a 
form of imperialism based upon the assumed superiority of the British model of policing. 
By using their colonial and domestic police as missionaries for civilian policing, the British 
state hoped to build a postwar world that resembled and depended upon Britain with regard 
to security. In this work, Britain relied heavily upon their prewar experience of educating 
and training police from throughout the Empire at the Metropolitan Police College at 
Hendon. Though limited in its scope and duration, the Hendon program gave key figures 
in the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, and Metropolitan Police the misplaced confidence 
from which they developed the occupation police missions of the postwar era.  
The second front from which the British attempted to remake foreign police after 
the Second World War involved Interpol. Although it was an important member of Interpol 
during the prewar era, the postwar period found Britain pursuing an even greater role in 
the organization under the direction of Metropolitan Police Officer Ronald Howe. Taking 
over for the retired Norman Kendal, Howe was undoubtedly more eager than his 
predecessor for international work, but this enthusiasm tended to be based on seeking the 
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limelight rather than on a serious concern with global crime or police cooperation. Though 
Howe helped to place Britain in a greater leadership role in Interpol, the realities of the 
Cold War ensured that this new position was largely squandered.  
This chapter will begin with a study of Hendon College in the prewar period, and 
continue with an analysis of each of the major occupation missions after the war. It will 
conclude with a discussion of the recreation of Interpol in 1946. The next chapter will 
discuss how this forward, international policy regarding policing was replaced in the late 
1940s with a reactionary policy designed to maintain imperial control. 
 
THE OCCUPATION MISSIONS 
The most obvious example of Britain’s new forward policy regarding policing was 
represented by the so-called Public Safety missions into occupied countries during and 
shortly after the Second World War. Though these missions began as an attempt to promote 
law and order in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, they quickly developed into the 
basis for British informal influence into these occupied zones. The First World War had 
offered an opportunity, particularly for Germany, to remake another nation’s police, yet 
this conflict never resulted in an attempted reorganization.1 The situation was different for 
the Second World War for three main reasons. First, due to the extent of destruction caused 
by the war, officials assumed and planed for a longer duration of occupation. Second, the 
horrors and atrocities perpetrated by fascists police in these regions before and during the 
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conflict seemed to require an entire makeover, not only of personnel (many of which could 
have been implicated in war crimes), but also of the philosophical foundation of these 
forces. Third, the British worked to extend these missions in order to combat communist 
influence, both within the police forces themselves and within the general population of 
each occupied country.  
 Undoubtedly the most important and vexing of these occupation missions involved 
Austria and Germany. It was in these countries that the most destruction was wrought, the 
worst police atrocities occurred, and where the fear of communist infiltration was the 
greatest. British officials reasoned that it was not simply German police that needed to be 
reformed, it was also German policing itself. For the policing missions in former Nazi 
territories, Britain chose public safety branch leaders with both colonial and domestic 
policing experience.2 For Austria, this was John Nott-Bower, and for Germany, it was 
G.H.R. Halland. Nott-Bower and Halland both began as officers in the Indian Police. From 
there, Nott-Bower joined the London Metropolitan Police, rising to the position of 
Assistant Commissioner by 1940 (eventually to become Commissioner of the Met in 1953), 
while Halland worked as head of the Lincolnshire police before becoming the first 
Commandant of the Metropolitan Police Training College at Hendon.3 Halland was then 
appointed as one of the Inspectors of Constabulary, before being called upon during the 
war to serve as Inspector General of the Ceylon Police. Here then were two imperial police 
in the truest sense of the word – they represented perhaps better than any other officers the 
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varied experience within the British Empire that had become so valued by both domestic 
and colonial policing authorities.  
Of these two, however, it was Halland in Germany who would be the most 
proactive in his attempt to export and establish British policing methods while in 
occupation.4 This reality was the result of three main factors. First, Nott-Bower, though 
committed to British police, was less of an evangelist than Halland. He was more interested 
in denazification than in the wholesale makeover of the Austrian police. British officials 
also assumed that Austria was the victim of German style policing, rather than a 
practitioner.5 Finally, British officials working in Austria had less fear of denazification 
and avoiding communist sympathizers because they had superior intelligence on local 
police. This intelligence was provided by Norman Kendal, who worked with Nott-Bower 
prior to his departure for the occupation force to select acceptable Austrian police from his 
list of former associates at Interpol.6  
Halland, conversely, possessed little intelligence regarding local police prior to 
arriving in Germany. Even if Halland possessed this intelligence, however, it would have 
done little to dissuade him from pursuing the complete reconstruction of the German 
police. Along with Herbert Dowbiggin, G.H.R. Halland stood as the greatest advocate for 
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British style policing in the world. Yet unlike Dowbiggin, Halland rarely showed an 
appreciation for on-the-ground realities that could necessitate a different model of policing. 
His forceful rhetoric regarding police training and organization won Halland many 
admirers throughout the Empire, but his dogmatic approach to policing ultimately led to 
disastrous consequences for the British occupation mission in Germany and elsewhere. 
 
HALLAND AT HENDON 
Before being stationed in Germany, Halland had long advocated the spread of 
British style policing abroad. In his capacity as Commandant of the Met’s Police College 
at Hendon, Halland recommended the inclusion of colonial police officers in the college’s 
student body, and also pushed for Hendon graduates to consider colonial work instead of 
domestic service.7 In these efforts, Halland mirrored the pursuits of Herbert Dowbiggin in 
his tours of colonial police forces in the prewar era. Halland and Dowbiggin viewed 
Hendon training as a way to help professionalize and demilitarize the colonial police from 
the top down. Additionally, both men hoped that the Metropolitan Police could be 
convinced to help fund and staff the training of colonial police at Hendon, thus avoiding 
traditional Colonial Office concerns regarding logistics and expense.  
Hendon was the pet project of Metropolitan Police Commissioner Hugh Trenchard, 
who viewed the college as the police version of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst 
and the centerpiece in his effort to reform the Met in the 1930s.8 Trenchard’s tenure as 
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Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1931 – 1935) saw the development of the Met’s first 
true scientific laboratory, statistical branch, and map room. He also worked closely with 
Norman Kendal to eliminate corruption in the Criminal Investigation Department.9 
Trenchard believed that the only way to make these reforms stick was to reform the Met’s 
officer corps by way of a new training college. This college would focus on attracting 
university graduates to take up positions in the force, allowing Trenchard and subsequent 
Met commissioners to bypass or supplant the existing officer class that had risen through 
the ranks. Unsurprisingly, Trenchard’s college was heavily criticized by the press, which 
viewed the college as a militarization of the Met, and by senior police officers, who felt 
that the college would necessarily create internal divisions within the Met between 
graduates of the college and old guard officers. 
Trenchard was initially skeptical of including provisions for Colonial Police in his 
designs for the college because he felt that he already had his work cut out for him in trying 
to reform Scotland Yard.10 Prior to Hendon, the Metropolitan Police provided occasional 
courses and organized tours for colonial police officers on leave, but never offered the 
colonials training in a regular fashion.11 A select number of colonial police received 
instruction at the training school for the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) at Newtownards 
during the 1920s, but the Colonial Office always viewed this instruction as temporary and 
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increasingly inappropriate. If the Colonial Office was serious about reforming the colonial 
police, they needed to move as far away from the Irish model of policing as possible. 
Although they clearly desired a better alternative than Newtownards to train colonial 
police, the Colonial Office did not pursue a replacement until after the RUC closed their 
training depot in 1932.  
The first request to include colonial police at Hendon came from George Tomlinson 
at the Colonial Office nearly a year before the college opened.12 In this request, Tomlinson 
reminded Trenchard that colonial governments “greatly appreciated…[Scotland Yard’s] 
‘ad hoc’ Course in such subjects as finger-print classification and equitation,” but now 
wondered if the Met would be willing to take on training for the colonial police on a more 
permanent basis at Hendon.13 Tomlinson had been pushed to make this request by colonial 
governments in the Malaya and New Zealand, but similar requests from other colonies 
began to flood in as news of the college spread.14 The situation in Malaya was particularly 
dire, as a number of recruits to this force failed their examinations during the 1920s. 
Malaya, along with the other colonies, believed that a lack of prior training and seasoning 
lay behind these failures, and looked to the Colonial Office for a solution. Most of these 
colonial requests for help went to G.S.M. Hutchinson and R. D. Furse – the Colonial Office 
heads of Personnel and Recruitment –, but several also went to G.H.R. Halland directly at 
Hendon.15 
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 To help encourage the colonial police in considering Hendon, Halland gave a tour 
of the new college to members of the Colonial Office – including Tomlinson, Hutchinson, 
and Furse – in November 1934.16 Halland shared with his visitors his belief that the college 
was “destined to be one day the training school of all Police Officers in the various forces 
of the United Kingdom.”17 In addition, Halland stated his enthusiasm for including 
members of the colonial services, particularly the Dominions and India. According to 
Hutchinson, “Halland said that if he were the Inspector General of Police of a Province in 
India, he would prefer to have appointed to him an Officer who had been trained at the 
Metropolitan Police College rather than one trained in India.”18 Hutchinson wrote that this 
was “an important admission from a former Commandant of a Police training school in 
India.”19 Halland also encouraged the Colonial Office to propose special courses that could 
be taught for specific colonies, whether those courses involved learning a language or a 
particular method of policing important to the colony in question. 
Trenchard eventually directed the managers of the college to draw up a list for the 
Colonial Office of potential expenses that would need to be met before accommodating 
colonial police at Hendon. This budget, which estimated a cost of over four hundred pounds 
per officer, greatly cooled the Colonial Office’s eagerness for the scheme.20 Though the 
Colonial Office allowed for a small number of the Malaya police to attend Hendon, the 
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price of this instruction led them to largely ignore requests from other colonies. When 
pressed on the subject, the Colonial Office argued that police in other colonies would not 
find Hendon courses useful. In this analysis, Colonial Office officials drew a clear division 
between policing the dominions and the dependencies. “I cannot help feeling,” wrote 
G.S.M Hutchinson, “that an eighteen months course would go far beyond the needs of a 
Police Officer for service in Africa. In the years to come it may well be that…a policeman 
will be regarded as belonging to a profession in the same way as a Doctor or a Lawyer; and 
that he would be required to undergo a standardized course of training before entering his 
profession. But such an idea would take a great many years to materialise, if it ever does.”21 
This skepticism was share by Colonial Office Under Secretary J.E.W. Flood, who worried 
about the militarized nature of colonial policing, but believed that British style policing 
could not be applied everywhere. “It is probable,” Flood concluded, “that Hendon might 
turn out a better policeman for duty in London but I should put my money on the R.U.C. 
[Royal Ulster Constabulary] for turning out a policeman for the backwoods of Nigeria.”22 
Both Hutchinson and Flood hoped, however, that if the scheme did eventually materialize, 
the Colonial Office could rely on Halland, “who knows our Service, is interested in it and 
should prove a useful ‘buffer’ should Scotland Yard, as is very probable, put difficulties in 
our way when we do ask them to allow our officers to be trained at the College.”23  
The squabble over price meant that the Hendon issue remained dormant until 1937, 
when Sir Philip Game, who replaced Trenchard as Commissioner of the Met, offered to 
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accommodate colonial police at the school at a reduced rate.24 In considering this new 
proposal, the Colonial Office requested the opinion of Herbert Dowbiggin, who believed 
that Hendon offered a means to improve the quantity and quality of colonial police. 
According to Dowbiggin, the issues of quantity and quality were connected: in order to 
improve the quantity of police recruits, the Colonial Office must first find a way to improve 
the quality of those police. The young, bright police the Colonial Office hoped to attract to 
colonial policing were too often put off by a service that time and again showed a 
preference for veteran police from Ireland or Palestine. “Sir Herbert Dowbiggin,” 
according to one Colonial Office minute, “got the very definite impression that the men 
now at Hendon who have been provisionally selected for the Colonial Police Service are 
inferior in quality to the men being trained with them for the Metropolitan Police. He thinks 
that the prospects of advancement in the Colonial Police Service should be good  enough 
to secure for it the pick of the field available in any year, and it is his decided view (with 
which, he says, Lieutenant Colonel Halland agrees) that the Colonies should get the best 
men.”25 In particular, Dowbiggin believed that the colonial police should be able to select 
“a certain number of men of the University Honours Degree type, who would approximate 
as closely as possible to their colleagues in the Administration, for the larger Colonies and 
particularly for Colonies where the native is becoming educated and some form of 
democratic government is on the horizon.”26  
                                                 
24 “Proposed Course at Hendon Police College for All Cadets Selected for the Colonial Police Service,” 
1937-1938, CO 850/94/4, NA. 
25 Colonial Office Minute, December 14, 1937, CO 877/16/3.  
26 Colonial Office Minute, February 12, 1938, CO 877/16/3.  
  180 
Although Dowbiggin generally preferred the well-educated and trained, he also felt 
that these types of officers were not appropriate for all levels of policing. According to the 
Colonial Office, Dowbiggin considered “that in the subordinate European ranks it is 
essential to have a mixture of different types. One of the first duties of a policeman is to 
get information. Some of this information is to be picked up in Clubs by officers, but for 
others you want a man who can mix freely and without suspicion in other walks of life, 
e.g. the pub or with the stewards on visiting ships. He would regard 5% of ‘gentlemen’ in 
the ranks as enough, and is convinced that a great mistake has been made in Palestine, and 
is still being made in Kenya, by taking too many of the public school type into the 
subordinate grades.”27  
 Dowbiggin expanded upon these ideas in a lengthy letter submitted to the Colonial 
Office for consideration on the training issue. In this letter, Dowbiggin clearly outlined his 
views not only on the training of colonial police, but also police throughout the British 
world. Again, as with his written reports on various colonies, this letter demonstrated 
Dowbiggin’s insistence that colonial and domestic British police needed to be consider on 
the same plane, rather than as polar opposites. “The position briefly,” Dowbiggin wrote, 
“about Police appointment in the Higher Ranks in England, in the Dominions, in India and 
in the Colonies to-day is that good-will and brawn are not the only qualifications required 
of Police Officer. Conditions have changed very much in the last 25 years. Improved means 
of communication and increased facilities for so called ‘education’ throughout the world 
have produced a clever type of traveling criminal, traffic conditions that require control, 
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local bodies and legally minded individuals with whom a Police Officer is required to deal. 
Thirty years ago an Ex-Army, Ex-Navy, or County gentleman was the type looked for 
when a Police Office was required.”28 Dowbiggin continued by explaining why he felt it 
was inappropriate for college graduates to completely make up the officer corps: “I would 
not advise a boy of your School joining a Force such as the Hong Kong, Ceylon, etc., Police 
as a Non-commissioned officer for the reason that in these Forces European Non-
commissioned officers are enlisted mainly to deal with soldiers and sailors, passengers 
passing through the Ports, etc., in a Colony for the most part peopled by natives. These 
Forces do not want a high proportion of Public School men. A soldier or sailor is more 
likely to ‘go quietly’ with and give information to a Police Officer who has himself been 
in the Army or Navy than to a lad of your School.”29  
 After continued debates over price, the Colonial Office finally agreed to help 
support a group of nine colonial officers to attend Hendon during the 1937-38 academic 
year. These students included men from Gold Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanganyika, and 
ranged from new cadets to existing officers.30 In addition to providing a place for these 
students at Hendon, Halland also arranged for these students to attend language courses at 
the School of Oriental Studies in London.31 This first group proved successful, with 
Halland reporting that the students did “reasonably well at the College…especially in view 
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of [their] preoccupation with language study.”32 The first class of colonial officers was 
followed in 1938 by another group that included students from Ceylon, Cyprus, and Hong 
Kong.33 Unfortunately for Halland and the other supporters of this program, the college 
was shut down in 1939 by Commissioner Game at the beginning of the war. With Hendon 
closed, Halland continued to serve the Met in London until 1943, when he became 
Inspector General of the Ceylon Police – Herbert Dowbiggin’s old position.34 Halland’s 
tenure in Ceylon, however, lasted only a year, as he resigned over what he saw as the 
militarization of the police under the guidance of the Colonial Office during the Second 
World War.  
 The attempt to include colonial police officers at Hendon College represented an 
important precursor for British policing missions – both within and outside the empire – in 
the postwar era. The Hendon scheme demonstrated that the Colonial Office was finally 
becoming serious about changing their approach to colonial policing – as long as someone 
else was willing to help with the bill. Hendon also showed that the Metropolitan Police 
were willing to take on the training of police outside of Britain. It represented the 
fulfillment, however briefly, of Dowbiggin and Halland’s belief that domestic and colonial 
policing could and should be seen on the same plane, rather than as distinct entities. The 
ability of the Met to accommodate colonials at Hendon encouraged the British government 
to use Met training schools and programs as a destination for foreign police officers – 
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particularly those from occupied territories after the Second World War. What better way 
to advertise British policing abroad than to send foreigners to the home of British policing 
itself? 
 The planning for what would become the Public Safety missions to occupied 
Europe was largely overseen by one of Hendon College’s first graduates, Eric St. Johnston. 
St. Johnston graduated at the top of his class at Hendon in 1936, and from there served as 
the chief constable of Oxfordshire. In 1943, St. Johnston was selected by allied command 
to plan the occupation force after the Normandy invasion. “I found myself,” St. Johnston 
wrote, “in a room in Whitehall furnished simply…and on my desk a directive, ‘Prepare a 
plan to control the civil population when the Allied Armies re-enter North West Europe’ a 
task which was certainly a challenge…[because it] would include not only the police, but 
also the fire, prison, and civil defense services.”35 St. Johnston set about writing a lengthy 
operational manual for each proposed occupation mission, and also oversaw the training 
of the officers that would staff each force. In this work, he coordinated with a number of 
American police advisers, including O.W. Wilson, Dean of the School of Criminology at 
the University of California, Berkeley and a disciple of August Vollmer. Although this 
American presence was important in the planning stages of the occupation, “the Americans 
had very few professional police officers on whom to call for Public Safety work.”36 This 
meant that British police officers made up the majority of the occupation police in Europe, 
even those forces ostensibly belonging to American Civil Affairs. St. Johnston himself was 
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stationed in France shortly after D Day, but found that the French police had no use for any 
sort of foreign police mission. Nevertheless, St. Johnston was entered into the French 
Legion of Honor, despite the fact “that the only valuable assistance [he] gave the French 
was to get their night clubs re-opened.”37 
The occupation missions developed by St. Johnston and allied command, however, 
would not be showered with honors, and they would largely fail in their attempts to convert 
the local population to British style policing. Indeed, Britain would remain unsuccessful in 
remaking their own colonial police, and it is likely they would have remained unsuccessful 
even if the Hendon program had continued during the war. As one of the first colonial 
graduates of Hendon and Uganda police officer, A.S.K. Cook, remembered, the careful 
instruction by Halland and the Metropolitan Police was poor preparation for life in the 
colonies: 
Looking back, I think that attendance at the College by Colonial cadets was very 
worthwhile. I think it would have been still better if more time had been spent in 
training us in the simple but vital administration tasks encountered in running a 
police unit in the colonies - housing, clothing, and equipping our men, dealing with 
their pay, allowances, promotion, and discipline and so on. Doubtless there were 
differences in these matters between forces, but it occurs to me that it would have 
been possible to distil a course consisting of the common essentials and to teach 
that. Apart from anything else it would have alerted young officers, whose 
imaginations may have been full of romance of far-flung places, to the dull but 
necessary realities on which their efficiency and that of their commands would 
largely be based; and on which they would have to spend a part of their time the 
large size of which might have surprised them.38 
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In Uganda, Cook discovered a police force with “strong echoes of a military and semi-
military past, and little if any sign of the characteristics in spirit and practice of a police 
force which had grown out of public responsibility for law and order.”39 As with many 
other colonial police officers, however, Cook admitted that he “was looking for a police 
career not in Britain but in Africa…so it did not do outrage to my principles.”40 
 
GERMANY 
In 1945, G.H.R. Halland was named the inspector general of the Public Safety 
Branch (PSB) of the Civilian Control Commission for the British occupation force in 
Germany. He brought with him to this position much of the reform minded emphasis that 
drove him in his colonial police work and as the commandant of Hendon. Indeed, his zeal 
for reform was so great that he began preparing for his new role at PSB as early as August 
1944, when he prepared a secret memo for the Foreign Office on the “Reformation of the 
German Police System as a Long-Term Policy.”41 Halland felt – along with many other 
occupation officials – that in order for Germany to become a successful postwar nation, it 
needed to be infused with democratic ideals. Halland contended that the reform of the 
police was a crucial part in that process, and he worked to create “a demilitarized, 
denazified, and disarmed” German police.42  
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Halland believed this task would be difficult because of the longstanding 
acceptance in Germany of an armed and arbitrary police force, and his report to the Foreign 
Office included a sonderweg analysis of German policing. “The Police,” he wrote, “have 
long been used as one of the main agencies…for subduing the will of the people to the 
point where day to day compliance with the dictates of their authoritarian masters has 
become an habitual attitude of subservience.”43 Using Raymond Fosdick’s European 
Police Systems for background, Halland argued that long historical trends led to the 
“extreme militarization of the German Police,” and although this “cancer” grew 
exponentially after 1933, “it was not purely a Nazi growth.”44 The “roots” of this cancer, 
Halland contended, “go deep, and a severe and drastic operation will be required for its 
removal.”45 
 Halland believed that the best way to remove this cancer from German policing was 
to transplant the very best features of British policing to the continent. These features 
included “the civilian status of the constable, his legal and constitutional position as a 
servant of the community, his quiet demeanour and helpful attitude as a guardian and 
protector of the public,” and, most importantly, “the safeguard against unlawful or arbitrary 
action on the part of the constable, more particularly in the matter of arrests and 
detention.”46 Halland admitted that British principles of policing could not be “applied 
slavishly in all their details,” but he felt that they nevertheless “proved so successful in 
                                                 
43 G.H.R. Halland, “Preliminary Memorandum on the Reformation of the German Police System as a 
Long-Term Policy,” August 25, 1944, FO 371/46817, NA, 2. 
44 Ibid., 1-2. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid.  
  187 
[Britain] during the last hundred years or so…that they cannot at least be ignored as 
constituting one of the main models to be examined.”47 Halland’s report also considered 
the potential reforms within American and Russian occupied zones, but felt that British 
policing remained the most desirable model because it managed to create a modern police 
force without the need for a centralized force, such as the FBI, which could easily become 
corrupted by politics. 
 Before submitting his ideas to the Foreign Office, Halland shared the initial draft 
of his plans for Germany with Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Philip Game, asking 
for severe criticism.48 Game wrote that he felt Halland’s plan moved “a bit too fast,” and 
focused too much on the superstructure of the police rather than on building up the 
foundation of a solid force.49 Game agreed that the real need was to “get rid of the Gestapo 
idea” and “third degree methods,” but he also felt “it would be wise to maintain the existing 
German forms of local Government, including even police, to as great extent as possible 
rather than force on them alien systems such as our own.”50 “After all,” Game concluded, 
“the German systems have evolved from history and experience just as ours have and I 
have always understood that German local government, though perhaps too paternal to suit 
us, is very successful in Germany.”51 Despite Game’s reservations, Halland remained 
steadfast, arguing that he could achieve his goals if he took care to “hasten slowly.”52 
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 Upon entering service in Germany in the summer of 1945, Halland started his work 
by breaking up the national command and centralization of German police that developed 
during the Nazi period. In the place of centralized control, Halland developed a 
decentralized model along British lines that included a mix of large city police forces with 
a set of regional police forces that were based on local population. Halland hoped that this 
work would help German police avoid being taken over by the political whims of a single, 
central power. In addition to decentralization, Halland took away arms from German 
police, though a small collection of weapons were available at police stations in case of an 
emergency.53 According to the Public Safety Branch, “the Germans needed to be taught 
that police authority was to rest on respect, not to be dictated by a quasi-military force 
whose aggressive manner had traditionally instilled fear into the population.”54 Along these 
lines, Halland also attempted to closely monitor police recruitment in the occupied zone to 
make sure the new German police did not contain any former military officers or Nazi party 
members. Because this requirement ruled out a number of qualified local candidates, PSB 
was forced to look far afield for experienced German police, even going as far as to recruit 
200 members of the defunct international Shanghai Municipal Police.55 Recruitment was 
further complicated by the fact that Halland forbid potential recruits or police from joining 
a union, and watched closely for any sign of communist sympathy.56  
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Halland and PSB did their best to encourage the civilian instincts of their officers, 
including sending them to the London Metropolitan Police for further training and 
instruction.57 This move to professionalize new German police into an international 
policing community fell short of including them in early postwar meetings of Interpol, 
despite inquires by the Met and others.58 Although the Met was frustrated in this regard, 
they were able to lend assistance to the PSB by providing a small force of CID detectives, 
known as the Special Enquiry Bureau, to perform investigations into serious crimes while 
the German police got on their feet. The most important area for investigation involved the 
black market, especially the suppression of trade in precious metals confiscated by the 
Nazis.59 The Met added to this expert assistance by also providing a contingent of women 
police to recruit and train a corresponding force in Germany.60 
The idealism maintained by Halland and the rest of PSB with regard their work was 
quickly shattered by the realities of life in postwar Germany. Like other zones in occupied 
Germany, the British Zone was subject to a wave of displaced persons that often terrorized 
and attacked the local sedentary population. Initially, the PSB hoped that the British army 
could be relied upon to help maintain order and police these displaced populations without 
arming the police. By the autumn of 1945, however, PSB and the British military were 
forced to arm limited numbers of German police with carbines to help to protect the local 
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population located around displaced person camps. This setback did not discourage 
Halland in his objective to have an unarmed German police force. He made sure that “while 
German police forces openly carried rifles and pistols in the other [occupied] zones…the 
British urged the use of truncheons and continued to support the restricted use of 
firearms.”61 This continued insistence on unarmed policing led to a troubling situation in 
the winter of 1946, when food shortages led to violent disturbances and riots throughout 
the British zone. These shortages not only affected the general population, but the German 
police themselves. In 1947, “a medical examination of 6,000 Hamburg police found 90 
percent of them suffering from exhaustion because of a shortfall in rations.”62  
Even after he was presented with this information, however, Halland opposed 
raising the ration level for these police because “he believed any inequality between police 
rations and the general population deprived the police of their civilian status.”63 Not unlike 
Dowbiggin, Halland believed that the community at large was as important as the police in 
preventing crime. Unfortunately, the population had little desire to trust Halland’s police, 
particularly after it was learned that his force had been lax in vetting new police for ties to 
the Nazi past.64 In addition, the public balked at Halland’s attempt to divest German police 
of their non-policing functions – including traffic control, food inspection, 
institutionalization of the mentally ill, and fire prevention – in order to make them more 
similar to the Bobby.65 This divestment meant that German police were no longer allowed 
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to dispense fines and short jail terms without permission from the courts, a development 
which placed a great strain on the already overburdened judicial system and raised legal 
fees for those committing even minor offenses.66 The aggravation of the public based on 
the Halland’s reforms led many Germans to believe that Britain was purposefully using 
“fifth-rate administrators…to penalize them; they could not believe that Britain had built 
an Empire with such men.”67 When West Germany resumed control over their police in 
1948, they removed nearly every reform instituted by Halland and the PSB. 
 
GREECE 
Greece seemed to offer Britain another opportunity to spread their methods of policing in 
the postwar period. The British, however, would find this opportunity just as frustrating as 
the mission to Germany.68 The focus of this mission, the Greek Gendarmerie, had already 
undergone an extensive period of remaking during the Nazi occupation. The Gendarmerie 
became a vital cog in Germany’s occupation force, and proved critical in its attempt to rid 
the country of communist influence. By the time British troops arrived to liberate Greece 
in late 1944, both the left and the right in the country had lost faith in the Nazified force. 
To this end, the Foreign Office sent a police mission under the command of Sir Charles 
Wickham, the former head of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, to reform the Gendarmerie 
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along British lines. Wickham’s staff, including 45 police officers and 6 clerical staff, began 
to arrive in Greece in July 1945.  
 The appointment of the former leader of the notorious Ulster Constabulary to the 
Greece mission led to considerable criticism from the public and within the government. 
Wickham, however, “was more sensitive than his critics realized to the dangers of a 
militarized police force, and did not want to create a Greek ‘Black and Tan’ special 
constabulary.”69 Instead, he hoped to create a police force that could remain police, in spite 
of the ongoing civil war. To aid his mission, Wickham looked for willing Metropolitan 
Police officers, rather than members of the Ulster Constabulary, to join the police mission. 
Both Wickham and the Foreign Office were aware that the open warfare between 
communist and non-communist forces in the country made the application of British 
policing difficult, but they nevertheless felt that the level of fighting made that model all 
the more necessary. If the British could establish a professional and impartial police, 
washed clean of the Nazi taint, it would represent a tremendous advertisement for the West.  
 Wickham’s early reports on the mission featured dispiriting tales of poor training, 
lack of equipment, illness among the British staff, and a long list of political crimes 
perpetrated by the local population.70 Ambushes of police patrols, coordinated attacks on 
police stations, and organized prison breaks occurred on a routine basis. While this 
atmosphere offered no chance to disarm the Greek police71, Wickham hoped that he could 
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still encourage the new police to operate above politics. This goal, however, remained 
beyond the reach of even the British members of the mission, who tended to focus their 
efforts on the communists. As one of the seconded Metropolitan Police veterans put it, “the 
Communists here are a bad crowd, they seem to be all criminals and murderers, unkempt, 
lousy and brutal. Compared with the British model they represent the difference between 
the Alsatian and the Wolf. They are too near the Russian type to appeal to the London 
Policeman.”72 The British police attached to the mission did their best to avoid letting their 
prejudices show while training the Gendarmes, but the Gendarmerie naturally gravitated 
to an anti-communist stance. Indeed, Wickham and the British mission often dealt with 
political interference from right wing Greek politicians, who directed the Gendarmerie 
against the communists after the Gendarmes passed through the new British run training 
centers. Additionally, these politicians often ordered officers within the Gendarmerie to 
request transfers so that right wing police recruits could be stationed together. 
 Wickham attempted to mitigate political interference, but could do little to 
discourage the military role of the police as violence continued to increase throughout 
1946.73 By the end of that year, the Gendarmerie had swelled from about 14,000 men to 
nearly 30,000, with most of this increase coming from the old military occupation force. 
The Greek government, much to Wickham’s chagrin, formed these new Gendarmes into 
mobile patrols to attack bands of communist in the hills outside of major metropolitan 
areas.74 The Gendarmerie, Wickham reported in April 1947, “is coming more and more 
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under the control of the Ministry with the Supreme Commander having little or no say in 
anything but routine matters…Orders are issued without proper consideration as to whether 
or not they can be carried out and frequently, therefore, nothing happens.”75 Many of these 
mobile patrol units were under the direct control of particular Greek politicians, who used 
these units to eliminate communists as well as to suppress political rivals in their 
constituencies. This activity was largely supported and funded by advisers from the United 
States, which appreciated the concerns of the British police mission so long as they did not 
interfere with the elimination of communist forces. Wickham and the British mission could 
do little as they watched their trainees fight guerrillas, and police newly established 
concentration camps for suspected communists and their families.76  
 Seemingly a glutton for punishment, Charles Wickham also conducted a brief tour 
of Palestine for the Colonial Office in November 1946 to help the local police find a way 
to maintain their professional standards in the face of increasing domestic terrorism.77 
Wickham’s report for the Colonial Office expressed the hope that “the police should do the 
policing and the army the fighting,” but also admitted that terrorism often required the 
police to assist the armed forces.78 Not unlike Dowbiggin, Wickham believed that the best 
use of the police in this situation was intelligence gathering. “Police must endeavor,” 
Wickham argued, “to establish friendly relations with the public and obtain its respect and 
confidence for the public is the main source of all information.”79 To facilitate this 
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information gathering, Wickham advocated the elimination of armored patrol cars, which 
“performs no useful police duty” because “its crew have no contact with the public and 
cannot use their powers of observation.”80 “Motorized fighting police,” he continued, 
“alienate the public. They resemble too closely the Gestapo and are too inclined to forget 
the first lesson of a policemen – civility to the public.”81 Palestine police would perhaps 
argue that their first lesson was to stay alive, but seemingly no amount of danger was too 
great to dissuade Charles Wickham. The Colonial Office kindly accepted Wickham’s 
report, though they noted in the very first line of an internal memorandum that the report 
offered “no immediate solution to the problem of terrorism.”82 
 
ETHIOPIA AND ITALY 
British police from Kenya had been stationed in Ethiopia since 1942.83 Their mission was 
to help to maintain order in the country while Haile Selassie reestablished his government 
following the collapse of the Italian regime. The police mission also helped to free British 
soldiers stationed in East Africa for more pressing campaigns elsewhere.84 The British 
police in Ethiopia were under the command of former Inspector General of Ceylon, and 
ardent Dowbiggin disciple, P.N. Banks. From 1942 to 1946, Banks and a small cohort of 
East African police officers helped to train a new generation of Ethiopian police, steering 
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them away from the paramilitary style of the Italian police as much as possible.85 In 
addition, the British police in this mission also helped to encourage the inclusion of native 
police in the force, though not necessarily native Ethiopian police. A.S.K. Cook, one of the 
members of the British police mission, recalled that the native police “consisted of a 
mixture of Eritreans…and Sudanese” who helped to patrol “by vehicle, camel, horse, and 
mule…[areas] which it seemed had rarely, if ever, seen a police patrol before.”86 Though 
outwardly a goodwill mission, this work had important strategic implications for the 
British. The Colonial and Foreign Offices hoped that by helping the Selassie regime, 
Britain could rely on Ethiopia to help manage their interests in East Africa, namely Kenya 
and Somaliland. Colonial officers in East Africa hoped that the new Ethiopian police could 
be relied upon in the postwar period to help the British maintain control over difficult 
indigenous populations along the border regions between Ethiopia, Kenya, and 
Somaliland. 
 This hope, however, appeared to come to an abrupt end at the beginning of 1946, 
when Emperor Selassie alerted British officials that he was removing British police 
advisers from his country and replacing them with police advisors from Sweden. Sweden 
maintained close relations with Ethiopia throughout the prewar period, and the Ethiopian 
capital, Addis Ababa, contained a relatively large Swedish expatriate community. 
Additionally, the neutrality of Sweden in diplomatic relations offered Selassie a way to 
avoid siding with either the Western or Eastern bloc, particularly with regard to the 
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sensitive matter of internal security. Having sheltered Selassie and his government in exile 
from 1936 to 1941, Britain had legitimate reasons to feel betrayed, though they showed 
little outward sign of disappointment. Instead the Foreign Office, driven primarily by 
economy, took a realist view of the situation. In the words of Egyptian Department official 
D.M.H. Riches, the loss of British influence on Ethiopian security was unfortunate, but the 
work of British police during the war “raised the [Ethiopian] Police to a good state of 
efficiently and we have not, in fact, failed to produce a reasonable number of officers.”87 
Furthermore, the British “organization of the Police Force has in fact contributed towards 
the solution of some of our permanent headaches in Ethiopia i.e. disorder on the Kenya and 
Somaliland frontiers has been mitigated to some extent by the organization of proper police 
forces in Borana and in Harar.”88 “[There] is no reason,” Riches continued, “for saddling 
ourselves with a continuing responsibility for the [Ethiopian] Police, particularly when 
other foreigners, presumably with experience of police work, are available.”89 This was 
particularly the case, Riches concluded, because “the Swedes have produced ten or twelve 
officers and are subsidizing them; [while] we should find it difficult to find one or two and 
we should certainly not be willing to pay anything towards their salaries.”90 Though the 
Colonial Office worried that “Swedish officers may…give credit to biased reports of the 
situation on the frontiers of Ethiopia,” the Foreign Office followed Riches analysis.91 
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 Upon hearing the Foreign Office’s decision, however, Emperor Selassie 
experienced an abrupt change of heart, deciding in June 1946 that he wanted “to organize 
a police force for the whole of Ethiopia under British police officers.”92 In particular, 
Selassie hoped that Ethiopia’s Territorial Army could be converted into a peacetime police 
force under the direct control of the Emperor himself. To this end, Emperor Selassie 
encouraged P.N. Banks to approach the Foreign Office on the matter while Banks was on 
leave in London. Selassie’s new offer, however, came with the stipulation that the British 
would pay most if not all of the costs for this new Ethiopian force. It was a shrewd gamble 
by Selassie, who was keenly aware of the British desire to maintain their influence in 
Ethiopia and East Africa more generally, though perhaps less aware of Britain’s financial 
difficulties following the Second World War.  
In presenting this new offer to the Foreign Office, however, P.N. Banks went to 
great lengths to avoid sugarcoating the financial implications of this proposal. He estimated 
that the new plan would cost the British government well over eight million pounds.93 
Though he was under no illusion that the Foreign Office would agree to such a scheme, 
Banks did suggest that Britain could maintain some influence over the situation by finding 
funds for supplies, equipment, and uniforms for the new Ethiopian force. Writing to the 
Treasury to consider this proposal, P.S. Scrivener of the Foreign Office agreed that there 
was no chance the country could afford a full police mission, yet he did recommend the 
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support of Banks’ lesser proposal.94 “It is a British interest,” Scrivener maintained, “that 
Ethiopia should be peacefully administered. She is surround by British-controlled 
territories…and we are going to pay some quarter of a million pounds sterling to our tribes 
on the Ethiopian borders for damages.”95 “Moreover,” he continued, “with an Englishman 
at the head of the police…we should be able to exert a very effective influence on the 
Ethiopian Government.” Scrivener concluded by saying that “all this will become even 
more pertinent when the new strategic conception of the Middle East based on Kenya 
becomes a reality, for then it will be absolutely essential for us to have a friendly and 
peaceful Ethiopia which…will command the flanks of our most important means of 
communication throughout the whole of our new strategic area.”96 Scrivener’s arguments 
led the Treasury to provide some funding for equipment and uniforms, but never in the 
amounts prescribed.97 Banks, however, did manage to secure a formal visit by Ethiopian 
police officers to the Metropolitan Police in order to view their operation and receive a 
small amount of training in forensics.  
 Britain experienced a similar degree of frustration in their attempts to extend their 
model of policing to Ethiopia’s old enemy, Italy.98 Foreign Office officials proposed a 
police mission to Italy shortly before the Potsdam Conference, arguing that such a mission 
would help the Italians with “the re-organization of their police forces and the general 
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improvement of international security arrangements in Italy.”99 Britain’s ulterior motive, 
of course, was to use the police mission to help Italy become “a useful member of the 
European comity of nations,” specifically “to look to the West rather than to the East” for 
direction.100 The Foreign Office felt that leaving the Italian police to their own devices 
would risk the country falling to communism, which “would create a very serious situation 
on our lines of communication with the Middle East.”101 
 The Italian government expressed genuine enthusiasm for the proposal. In 
particular, they looked to the British to help reorganize and rehabilitate the Carabinieri, 
which had been used as the main suppressive force in Mussolini’s regime.102 The Italian 
government, however, worried that if a British police mission was announced, local 
communist factions in the country would demand that this mission include Russian police 
as well. After conferring with several police advisers, including G.H.R. Halland, the 
Foreign Office decided that in order to avoid drawing the Russians into the mission, the 
proposed police mission would be secretly attached to the British Military Mission in Italy. 
This backdoor approach initially proved successful, as the small British police attachment 
helped the Carabinieri peacefully manage municipal and national elections in Italy in 
1946.103 The Foreign Office hoped that the success of this early mission would encourage 
the Italian Government to “summon up sufficient courage to ask for a proper Police 
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Mission in which case these police officers could hive off from the Military Mission and 
take up an independent existence.”104 
Unfortunately for the British, this invitation never came, and their hopes of a long 
term mission quickly shrank from view. By October 1946, the British Embassy in Rome 
reported that the “ordinary civil police were in serious need of reorganization and toning 
up.”105 “300 recruits,” the Embassy reported, “who had just passed out of Italian police 
training school had gone in a body to present their compliments to a local Communist 
leader.”106 Furthermore, there was a growing “tendency on the part of the Italian 
Government to give heavy arms, such as armoured cars, to the police, which was contrary 
to all proper police practice and liable to turn the police force into something like a Balkan 
Militia with a potential political role.”107 As with Ethiopia, the failure of the British 
government to establish a long lasting police mission to Italy led them to attempt to 
influence the situation by inviting Italian police officers to lectures and training at Scotland 
Yard.108 
 
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF INTERPOL 
As British police attempted to remake continental police forces in their own image, they 
also pursued a more involved, forward policy with regard to international police 
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cooperation. Several attempts were made by allied governments in exile during the war to 
restart Interpol on some basis in London. These proposals, however, were largely put down 
by Norman Kendal, who felt there could be little purpose in maintaining an international 
organization during wartime. Yet when Kendal retired from service in February 1945, he 
was replaced at the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) by an officer that was only 
too eager to see the return of the organization, Ronald Howe. In his approach to Interpol, 
and policing in general, Howe could not have been more different than Kendal. Eric St. 
Johnston, Kendal and Howe’s subordinate at the CID, described Kendal as “formidable” 
with “penetrating eyes…[and a] grime exterior,” whereas Ronald Howe “was an elegant, 
dapper bachelor always immaculately dressed and perfectly groomed.”109 Whereas Kendal 
was stoic and pragmatic, Howe was effusive and impatient. His energy and enthusiasm did 
much to jump start the reconstruction of Interpol, but this enthusiasm masked a lack of 
direction and purpose when the excitement of the organization wore off. 
Like Kendal, Howe was an Oxford graduate that transferred to the Metropolitan 
Police after serving in the public prosecutor’s office.110 He was given his post by Hugh 
Trenchard, a man he considered to be the greatest soldier turned civil administration since 
Wellington.111 Howe’s background and education fit in well with Trenchard’s reform 
agenda, and he found himself quickly elevated within the CID. Serving as Kendal’s second 
in command throughout the 1930s, Howe attended several Interpol events, including the 
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1934 annual conference in Vienna.112 Howe’s reports from these events tended to focus on 
the personalities involved rather than the substance of the discussions. In addition to 
Interpol, Howe was also the head of the 1936 Metropolitan Police tour of police 
departments in the United States and Canada to investigate the police use of wireless 
telegraphy and radio telephones. This tour included major cities, such as New York, 
Chicago, and Washington as well as smaller departments in Cincinnati, Kansas City, and 
August Vollmer’s force in Berkeley, California.113 Although disappointed in the standard 
of education amongst American police, Howe returned from this visit enthusiastic about 
all things American, including their use of “extensive contact between police and criminal 
for the purpose of obtaining information.”114 
Though he lacked Kendal’s international experience, Howe nevertheless possessed 
enough knowledge to pick up the issue of cooperation between the Met and other forces in 
the postwar period. Unsurprisingly, the initiative to reestablish police cooperation after the 
war came from the former leadership of Interpol. In the spring of 1945, letters addressed 
to Norman Kendal from Interpol leaders Florent Louwage of Belgium, Interpol’s 
counterfeiting expert J.A. Adler, and K.H. Broekhoff of the Netherlands – with Broekhoff 
hoping to encourage Kendal to be the leader of the new organization.115 This exchange was 
followed shortly by a letter to Howe from Swedish police officer Harry Söderman, who 
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wrote regarding his concern that Interpol’s archives, last deposited in Berlin, might fall into 
Russian hands.116 The fear of eastern influence on the organization was increased in 
December 1945, when the Czechoslovak Government wrote to the Foreign Office to 
suggest that Interpol be resettled in Prague.117 Söderman hoped that Howe could help him 
secure passage with the British occupation force to track down the organization’s archive.  
Howe responded to these requests by stating that he did not think the return of 
Interpol could be prepared while the war continued, but that everything was being done to 
track down the commission’s archive.118 Despite this rebuff, Söderman and Louwage 
continued to correspond on the issue in spring 1946, hoping to collect a number of 
continental police officers to their cause.119 Söderman even went so far as to include former 
Interpol General Secretary, Oskar Dressler.120 Dressler expressed his eagerness to return to 
his work at the commission, despite the fact that he had continued to work for the Nazi-run 
Interpol during the war, while most of his colleagues in Vienna languished in prison. 
Dressler, surprisingly, managed to avoid association with the Nazi period of the 
organization, though this may be due largely to the fact that his colleagues during this 
period garnered more attention, not least of all because of the spectacular nature of their 
deaths. Reinhard Heydrich was killed by the Czech resistance in 1943, Arthur Nebe was 
brutally murdered in 1944 for his participation in the attempted assassination of Hitler, and 
Kurt Daluege was executed by military tribunal in 1945. 
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 Greater consideration for the reconstruction of Interpol began in the fall of 1945. 
The Home Office, working with the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, 
approached Howe for information on Interpol to help the new UN consider its relations 
with all international associations.121 Howe responded by saying that the organization “was 
extremely useful and now that communications by air will be far easier than ever, personal 
knowledge of and contact with the heads of the various detective departments of other 
countries will be of enormous value to us here.”122 This endorsement led to a meeting 
between Howe, the Home Office, and members of the Dutch police to discuss the restarting 
of the organization in October 1945. The Dutch police, unsurprisingly, argued that the new 
commission should be located in The Hague. Howe supported this idea, but faced 
resistance from the Home Office, which vaguely argued that the commission was “bound 
up with all sorts of other matters and that nothing can be done at the moment.”123 Although 
they called for patience, the Home Office believed that when it was reestablished, Interpol 
was “likely to be in future of greater value than before the war, especially in view of air 
travel, in facilitating contact between the detective departments of other countries.”124 
The Home Office and Foreign Office spent the next few months squabbling over 
the nature of the organization, and whether or not Interpol should be attached to the United 
Nations.125 The Foreign Office maintained that the organization should be attached directly 
to UN headquarters, while the Home Office argued, incorrectly, that Interpol was solely a 
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European organization, and thus should not be seen as a true international organization 
within the orbit of the United Nations. The Home Office backed the Dutch bid to host the 
organization at the Hague because it was convenient geographically, it had the necessary 
office space available, and it already maintained an international office within their 
Ministry of Justice.126 “London,” they argued, “is not really suitable as the headquarters of 
this body, and Paris is not suitable as the French do not particularly shine at running this 
sort of organization.”127 It appears that the Home Office made this argument in the hopes 
that the organization could remain close to Britain, yet out of French hands. Regardless of 
the position of British ministries, the diplomatic, red tape nightmare that drove the founders 
of Interpol to create their organization outside of the control of traditional government 
offices had come to pass under British auspices. 
While Howe and the other members of the organization waited for official sanction 
to reconstruct the organization, Howe received word from G.H.R. Halland on the search 
for Interpol’s prewar archive.128 The Public Safety team tasked with searching for the 
archive found – among the “files which escaped the hazards of war and occupation” – 
approximately 10,000 index cards that referred to subjects pursued by Interpol since it 
began, as well as 1,000 cards that catalogued examples of counterfeit currency and stolen 
objects, including jewelry and art.129 The discovery team catalogued these files with the 
help of Paul Spielhagen, a member of the Berlin Criminal Police and part time worker at 
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Interpol.130 Spielhagen helped FBI agent John Condon examine the documents for files of 
interest to J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI. Condon believed that the files would be of interest 
to a new version of Interpol, but that they represented little interest to the FBI.  
Although Spielhagen told the Public Safety team that these files were relatively 
intact, many former members of the commission continued to assume that a good portion 
of the prewar archive had been stolen by the Soviets or lost by some other means. In his 
autobiography, Harry Söderman argued that some of the commission’s files were 
absconded out of Germany prior to the end of the war by Carlos Zindel, one of the Nazi 
police officers that managed the group during the war.131 According to Söderman, Zindel 
filled his car with Interpol documents and drove to the French headquarters in Stuttgart to 
give up himself and the archive. The French authorities in Stuttgart beat and harassed 
Zindel, leading him to commit suicide by consuming a cyanide capsule. Söderman offered 
no source for this fantastical story and did not say what happened to Zindel’s archive, but 
this tale would be accepted by fellow members of the commission and repeated as gospel 
for decades after. 
 The Public Safety team responsible for Interpol’s archive held the documents in 
Berlin, and waited to transfer the files to a new version of the commission. This team 
assumed that “events in Europe in the last five years make it questionable [if] the persons 
described in the indexes are still at large.”132 Yet many police, including Ronald Howe, 
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believed that the criminals who survived the war were simply waiting to reemerge in the 
postwar period. As Harry Söderman described, “it was hard to believe that the steamroller 
of war…had left any of the prewar galaxy of international swindlers, forgers, and con men 
still operative. To our surprise, however, many of the old, familiar characters turned up 
again…the only difference was that now they had graying temples and were hard to 
recognize from their prewar photographs.”133 In addition to the return of interwar criminals, 
police also feared the emergence of a new criminal class from the refugee camps in 
continental Europe. Ronald Howe believed that “in countries which had suffered the 
German occupation a new generation had grown up with an outlook based wholly on 
subversion and which had come to regard the police as simply the clearing house for the 
Gestapo…something, if not to be openly defied, then certainly to be circumvented.”134 
“Those who came from the refugee camps,” Howe concluded, “felt no allegiance to a world 
which had treated them so cruelly.”135 
British police, in particular, were afraid that this postwar criminality would focus 
on their country. According to one member of the Met’s Criminal Record Office, “not since 
the Crusades has Europe been inflicted with such a large moving population, many devoid 
of honest principles, many imbued with criminal tendencies, and most with nothing to lose. 
As at this period of history, the ports of the United Kingdom are unprotected by visas, this 
country, the gateway to the rest of the world, will be the objective to be gained by every 
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European embarked on a career of international crime.”136 Sharing a similar sentiment, 
Ronald Howe believed that “people are seldom purified or refined by prolonged suffering, 
and when they lose their homes in one country it is very often a mistake to imagine that 
they will spend the rest of their lives working off a debt of gratitude to the country which 
ultimately receives them.”137 Howe and the Met believed that postwar “Europe had become 
a paradise for the international crook and the black marketer,” filled with potential Harry 
Limes looking for opportunities abroad.138 As was the case during the interwar period, this 
fear of international crime spread among police with little reference or referral to the actual 
occurrence of such crime. The rhetoric used to describe this threat was remarkably similar 
to the fear of returning soldiers in the post-First World War era. To be sure, the propagation 
of this fear helped to establish the necessity for policing in the postwar world. Looking at 
the internal debates of police at this time, however, reveals that the promotion of this fear 
was not shrewd propaganda, but the result of a legitimate, if unsubstantiated, conviction. 
 Howe and the Metropolitan Police did much to feed this fear, especially through 
the publication the Illustrated Circular of International Confidence Tricksters.139 Originally 
released by the Met in 1935, the circular contained two parts: an introduction describing 
various forms of confidence crimes, and an index that included the biographies and modus 
operandi for known confidence men operating before the war. This circular focused, in 
particular, on confidence men that operated in hotels in major metropolitan areas 
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throughout Britain and Europe. Beginning in the spring of 1946, Howe and the Met worked 
to update this circular with new types of crimes as well as a revised list of criminals. As 
part of this work, Howe corresponded with police throughout Europe, the United States, 
and the colonies to check if the criminals listed in the 1935 edition – under the age of 75 – 
were still alive and at large. This correspondence resulted in a tremendous response from 
foreign police departments, particularly those in Canada and Australia. These departments 
wrote back with detailed information including current aliases, updated fingerprints, and 
new photographs when available.  
With this information, the Met published a new edition of the circular in 1947 and 
sent out copies to 566 different police forces throughout the world. At least two of these 
copies also went to private security firms working for Harrods Department Store in London 
and the American Express Company.140 Along with this new circular, the Metropolitan 
Police entered into negotiations in 1946 with police in the Netherlands and France 
regarding wireless communications between their forces. Just as they did prior to the war, 
the Met and the French Sûreté disagreed over the appropriate frequency for these 
communications, but by 1947 the two sides began exchanging hundreds of notices and 
warrants over wireless.141  Thus, as they did during the prewar period, police in Britain and 
elsewhere did not wait for official sanction when pursuing international cooperation. 
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Official sanction to this work finally came in April 1946, when Florent Louwage 
invited the former members of Interpol to an International Conference of Criminal Police 
in Belgium. The British Home Office and Foreign Office begrudgingly gave Ronald Howe 
permission to go to this meeting, even though the Foreign Office maintained that Interpol 
should only meet under U.N. auspices.142 The conference met at the Palais de Justice in 
Brussels between June 3 and 5 1946, and included delegates from Chile, Czechoslovakia, 
Egypt, Iran, Portugal, and Turkey. The assembled members unanimously decided to 
revitalize the commission with two differences: Interpol would now be based in Paris, and 
the President of the organization could hold his position from any member country and was 
no longer required to be attached to the host nation.143 Paris was chosen as the 
organization’s home because the French members regarded the hosting of the commission 
“as an honor rather than a burden,” and also agreed to take up the main financial and 
administrative burdens for the organization.144 
Despite these changes, the new Interpol did maintain some continuity with the past. 
The leadership of the organization included prewar stalwarts Florent Louwage as President 
and Louis Ducloux of the French Sûreté as Secretary General. In addition, Ronald Howe 
was chosen as one of three Reporters General, along with Werner Müller of the Berne 
Police and Harry Söderman of the Stockholm Police.  These five officers – Louwage, 
Ducloux, Howe, Müller, and Söderman – formed the organization’s new executive 
committee. This committee worked to maintain Interpol as “an international criminal 
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record office and a means of liaison between the police forces of the member countries,” 
rather than as “a body of detectives flying from continent to continent investigating 
crimes.”145 Furthermore, this group worked to keep the organization free from the United 
Nations, and thus, outside the control of politicians. Summing up the views of the 
committee, Howe concluded that “all politicians are in a sense amateurs, and therein lies 
one of the main sources of the weakness of political organizations in the international 
field…If there is to be peace in the world it will not be something either concocted by the 
politicians or enforced by the military.”146 
Beyond the leadership committee, the commission also reappointed J.A. Adler as 
the head of Interpol’s counterfeit and forgery department – despite the objections of Harry 
Söderman, who hoped to secure this important position for himself.147 Howe worked with 
Adler to request currency examples form the Royal Bank and Royal Mint, as well as from 
several Commonwealth countries. Adler, for his part, worked to track down and destroy 
counterfeit British bank notes circulating in postwar Europe.148 Adler focused, in 
particular, on tracking down the famous Himmler notes, produced by Jewish forgers in 
concentration camps during the Second World War.149 The Germans release approximately 
150 million pounds of counterfeit British bank notes to neutral countries during the war in 
hopes of destabilizing the British economy. Most of these notes were destroyed outside the 
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primary counterfeiting camp at Ebensee, but examples of the currency continued to appear 
throughout the postwar period – especially in connection with Jewish efforts in Palestine. 
The member nations of Interpol corresponded with Adler and each other as they had before 
the war using telegraph. The French authorities in charge of these messages, however, 
decided that they should include an easy to recognize telegraphic address to help 
distinguish them from other telegrams. They settled on the contraction of “international 
police,” or INTERPOL.150  
Although the Brussels conference successfully brought about a new commission, 
the specter of new political divisions cast a shadow over the organization. Söderman 
reported that many of the prewar member states from Eastern Europe arrived to the 
Brussels meeting with new, communist representatives.151 While these members avoided 
the aggressive takeover tactics used by Nazi representatives during the interwar period, 
they did make it clear that they hoped the commission would reconsider its stance regarding 
political crime. The inclusion of eastern representatives in the commission worked not only 
to heighten tension within Interpol, but also complicated the relationship between the 
organization and the United States. 
As during the interwar period, Interpol and the Met found themselves frustrated in 
their attempts to coax J. Edgar Hoover to join their international body. The FBI first heard 
of the plans to reestablish the organization from Vladeta Milicevic, a former minister in 
the Yugoslav government who hoped to encourage the FBI to help host the organization at 
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the UN in New York.152 Milicevic claimed that Ronald Howe told him that the FBI was 
already working toward that end. The FBI reached Howe through the American Embassy 
in London and learned of the meeting planned for Belgium in the summer of 1946.153 Howe 
offered to send along the formal invitation from Louwage to the Bureau if Hoover wanted 
to participate. Following on this exchange, Louwage himself sent a lengthy invitation to 
Hoover, telling the FBI director that he attached “a high importance to your presence at 
this meeting.”154 In addition to this letter, Louwage also met with FBI agent Horton Telford 
in Paris to stress in person the significance he placed on the FBI’s participation in the 
organization. Hoover, however, replied that he could not attend because of the short notice, 
but he expressed his desire to receive a report of the discussions and decisions reached by 
the new commission.155 
 There were three issues playing into Hoover’s decision not to send a representative 
to the Brussels conference. First, the FBI worried over having to pay back dues owed to 
the organization since American joined in 1938. The FBI struggled to secure Senate 
appropriations for these dues, and by the time they were secured the war had begun. 
Second, Hoover remained skeptical of the utility of Interpol for the United States. Although 
it joined the commission before the war, the FBI still viewed Interpol as a European group 
that could offer the Bureau little in terms of leads on criminals or technical information 
regarding identification. Finally, and most importantly, the FBI worried over the inclusion 
                                                 
152  Vladeta Milicevic to J. Edgar Hoover, March 9, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-208X, FBI. 
153 J.A. Cimperman, Legal Attache, to J. Edgar Hoover, April 12, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-210, FBI.  
154 Florent Louwage to J. Edgar Hoover, April 27, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-213, FBI.  
155 J. Edgar Hoover to Florent Louwage, May 7, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-216, FBI.  
  215 
of Russia and its satellites in the organization. Although Louwage stressed that Interpol 
would avoid policing politics, the FBI judged that this promise was meaningless so long as 
communists countries were included because in those countries there was “no distinction 
between the political and criminal police.”156 For the FBI, at least, it required “a 
considerable stretch of the imagination to picture Russia or any of its Balkan satellites 
cooperating with the Bureau in extraditing a criminal located in those countries but wanted 
in the United States.”157 
While these issues allowed Hoover to keep Interpol at arm’s length, the problem of 
domestic rivalry within the United States encouraged him to maintain some contact. As 
FBI agent H.H. Clegg warned, “if the FBI doesn’t participate as a member there is a 
possibility that the Secret Service, the Treasury Enforcement Agency or New York City 
Police might be elected to represent the United States.”158 Considering the cost to remain 
in the commission, Clegg bluntly judged that Interpol was not “worth $1,500 or even $15 
as far as any practical value accruing to the Bureau…[but] if there is any American police 
agency to be affiliated with the group obviously it should be the FBI.”159 Florent Louwage, 
in an incredibly flattering letter to Hoover, offered the FBI a way to avoid the dues owed 
to Interpol, so long as the Bureau agreed to participate in the organization.160 Hoover 
replied that he would consider this proposal, but hoped in the meantime that the 
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commission would accept some of his articles for inclusion in Interpol’s journal.161 The 
offer to function as yet another platform in Hoover’s propaganda empire was not what 
Louwage hoped for, but given the past reluctance of the FBI with regard cooperation, it 
was about as much as he could have expected. 
 Ironically, the FBI’s position regarding participation in Interpol changed in the lead 
up to the September 1948 meeting of the commission in Prague. Because the meeting was 
located in a Russian satellite and occurred in the midst of the Berlin Blockade, the FBI 
unsurprisingly made no attempt to attend this meeting. This sentiment was shared by the 
Metropolitan Police, as Ronald Howe became the only member of the executive committee 
to not attend the Prague conference.162 Yet it was at this moment that Interpol, frustrated 
with Hoover’s intransigence, sent an invitation to the conference to the Secret Service and 
US Narcotic Bureau.163 Though there was no chance that either of these departments would 
attend the Prague meeting, it sent a clear signal to Hoover and the FBI that Interpol was 
tired of waiting.  
In addition to this ploy by Interpol, another push toward cooperation came from the 
US State Department. Writing the FBI in April 1948, State Department officials reported 
that Interpol’s radio system was the only system in Paris “available for communication 
with Washington in case of national emergency except the French Government commercial 
radio-telegraph system.”164 Since this commercial system “would be immediately taken 
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over [by the French] in case of invasion,” the State Department suggested that the FBI 
“reconsider participation in [Interpol’s] radio network to keep this possible avenue 
open.”165 Thus, after the conclusion of the Prague conference, the FBI reversed its tone and 
policy toward Interpol, culminating in the Bureau’s attendance at the 1949 Interpol 
conference in Berne.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The immediate postwar period found British police actively pursuing opportunities 
to extend their influence over global security and international police cooperation. This 
pursuit rested upon the assumed superiority of British policing methods, and it was made 
possible by the general collapse of competing policing models during the Second World 
War. Yet even though circumstances could not have been better for this forward policy, 
these new endeavors were largely frustrated.  
With the Public Safety missions in occupied Europe, failure rested with the inability 
of British police to adjust or modify their model of policing to a hostile environment. If 
these missions were pursued by Metropolitan Police officers alone, this failure would be 
relatively unremarkable. Yet these occupation forces were led and designed by decorated 
veterans of the colonial police service – officers who were used to dealing with the most 
difficult security situations. More remarkable still is that these officers continued to insist 
upon British style policing in occupied zones after significant disasters. The hubris of these 
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Public Safety missions was exemplified by G.H.R. Halland, who maintained – despite the 
near collapse of the British zone in west Germany – that “the original basic plans made for 
the re-organization of the German police…were sound enough; but sufficient time was not 
allowed for the full implementation and consolidation of these plans before control of the 
police was transferred.”166 The presence of colonial officers in these missions points to two 
conclusions. First, the gap between metropolitan and colonial policing models – in the 
minds of practitioners – was never as far apart as they appear in retrospect. Second, the 
preference for Bobby style policing in these situations represented not just an altruistic 
pursuit, but also a fervent belief that this method of policing was the best way to maintain 
order – even in the most violent of circumstances.  
The assumed superiority of British policing also played a role in the postwar 
resurrection of Interpol. Above all the other competing international policing bodies of the 
interwar period, it was Interpol that appealed the most to British police because of its 
avoidance of political crimes and supranational schemes. This preference to avoid politics, 
however, prevented British police from helping to guide Interpol in the postwar period as 
they had done before the war. This avoidance was personified by Ronald Howe, who may 
have been easier to get along with than Norman Kendal, but he lacked Kendal’s sense of 
direction and purpose with regard to international cooperation. As a result, Interpol entered 
its second life by drifting into the same political rocks that destroyed the prewar 
organization. The easy assurance with which British police entered the postwar period 
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would quickly be dispelled during the 1950s through a serious of colonial emergencies and 
the collapse of participation in Interpol due to Cold War politics.
  220 
Chapter Six: Retreat into Empire: British Policing in the World, 1948 – 
1958 
British police entered the immediate postwar period with grandiose ideas of 
remaking global security in their own image, yet these ideas soon crashed against the reality 
of occupied Europe and the Cold War. Adding to this failure were a series of colonial 
emergencies in Malaya and Kenya that forced renewed attention on colonial policing rather 
than international work. These emergencies largely frustrated British attempts to reform 
their colonial police, as local forces often abandoned high principles in favor of an iron 
fist. Ironically, this work was pursued in Britain under the auspices of a Labour 
government. Historically skeptical of police – even British domestic police – this 
government nevertheless found itself pursuing imperial security with a rigor never before 
seen. 
Alongside the poor performance of Britain in Europe and Empire, the country also 
suffered a setback in their work with Interpol when the United States withdrew from the 
organization in 1950. This event, precipitated by Cold War tension, led the United States 
to direct their own form of international police work that largely avoided cooperation with 
foreign police. These new American efforts focused on the policing of politics and the 
suppression of communism throughout the developing world, and largely dwarfed British 
efforts to export their own model of policing in the same areas. The American pursuit of 
global criminal justice and the emergence of colonial disturbances helped to ensure that the 
British and their police were never again able to regain a leading role in international 
policing.  
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REMAKING THE COLONIAL POLICE1 
Postwar disturbances in the Caribbean and the Gold Coast impressed upon the Colonial 
Office the need to finally make good on their prewar promise to reform the colonial police. 
The Colonial Office hoped that such reform would not only reduce the chance for violent 
outbreaks in the colonies, but also increase recruitment for the perennially understaffed 
colonial police. Some mention was made about preparing colonies and their police for self-
government, but even the postwar Labour government worked under the assumption that 
independence – for the majority of colonies – was a long way off. Indeed, the Colonial 
Office hoped that a reformed colonial police could help Britain maintain control over their 
possessions throughout the Cold War.  
 The fact that Britain wanted to maintain colonialism throughout the postwar period 
is unremarkable. What is remarkable is that the British proposed to maintain that control 
using non-violent, civilian style policing whenever possible. The origin for this thinking 
relied heavily on Herbert Dowbiggin’s interwar tours. Dowbiggin’s assumption was that 
civilian style policing should be encouraged not only because it would help to improve the 
image of the empire, but also because it was the best style of policing for gaining 
information. The best way to avoid a disturbance was to see the signs before it occurred. 
The Colonial Office would learn, however, that the establishment of this model of policing 
required two resources that were in short supply in the postwar empire: money and time. 
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The lack of these resources, combined with the exigencies of nationalism and the Cold 
War, helped to ensure that police reform often gave way to a renewed investment in 
military style policing throughout the empire. 
 
A FORMAL DOWBIGGIN: THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF COLONIAL POLICE DEBATES 
The weight of Herbert Dowbiggin’s influence on the idea of colonial police reform can 
best be seen through the policies pursued by the Colonial Office in the postwar period. In 
their prewar attempts to encourage the development of British style policing throughout 
the empire, the Colonial Office had relied heavily upon Dowbiggin and his tours of colonial 
police forces from 1929 to 1937. Not only did Dowbiggin serve the Colonial Office through 
his formal reports, but he also gave his opinions and thoughts on various issues ranging 
from recruitment to training. Unsurprisingly, then, the postwar attempts to reform the 
colonial police began by considering how to encourage similar reports and advice on a 
permanent basis.  
Dowbiggin and his tours became the basis for the Colonial Office’s scheme to 
create an Inspector General of Colonial Police. The suggestion for this new position came 
during the interwar period from R.G.B. Spicer, Dowbiggin’s former subordinate in Ceylon 
and the head of the Palestine Police. In a letter to A.C.C. Parkinson, head of the Eastern 
Department of the Colonial Office, Spicer argued for “the need of a coordinating head of 
Colonial Police Affairs at home.”2 In particular, Spicer wanted “somebody with real 
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authority and knowledge who can co-ordinate Police organization with Colonies, who can 
advise on disputed matters, and who can inspect and sum up the weaknesses and strength 
of the multifold Forces coming under the Colonial Office.”3 Furthermore, he believed that 
this officer’s work should include conferences in which colonial police chiefs could attend 
to promote professionalization. Spicer contended that colonial police wanted “regularizing 
and standardizing throughout the service, we want the good points of one Force made 
common, and available to us all.”4 He concluded by suggesting that the Colonial Office 
already possessed the “obvious square peg for the much needed square hole,” Herbert 
Dowbiggin.5 “The Ceylon Police,” Spicer argued, “is kept alive by its Chief, he is as you 
know a galvanic person, gives up almost the whole of his leave to the study of Police 
progress at home, and pushes it out to Ceylon.”6  
Colonial Office secretaries Charles Jeffries and George Tomlinson agreed with the 
need for such an officer, but also felt that it was unlikely to find funding for such a position.7 
Jeffries and Tomlinson compared Spicer’s suggestion to the other official advisers to the 
Colonial Office. These positions – which included advisers for law, finance, medicine, 
agriculture, veterinary, education and fisheries – all received substantial pay for their work, 
but the Colonial Office could not yet rationalize the need for a policing adviser. Tomlinson 
proposed, however, that Dowbiggin might be posted “ad hoc in that capacity for a limited 
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term…to see how the post works in practice.”8 Tomlinson seemed to believe that they could 
delay the decision on the Inspector General role until Dowbiggin officially retired. Until 
that time, the Ceylon Police under Dowbiggin could continue to function as “the best 
training school that we have.”9 Alex Fiddian agreed with Tomlinson’s take, arguing that 
“it would probably be possible to obtain some use of Sir Herbert Dowbiggin’s services in 
advising at this Office on questions of recruitment and training without the necessity of 
creating a post with a high sounding title and a largish salary, which neither the Treasury 
nor the Colonies would want to pay.”10  
Fiddian worried, however that hiring Dowbiggin might  look “like a concession to 
that well-known newspaper stunt of ‘Here’s a good man retiring from the public service!; 
surely there is some post, some way in which his ripe administrative experience can be 
utilised and not lost to the public.’”11 J.E.W. Flood shared Fiddian’s reservations, and 
believed that even though everyone admired Dowbiggin the scheme to hire him as an 
adviser might antagonize local officials within the colonies. “I venture,” he wrote “to 
suggest that the government of our Dependencies rest with the Governor and not with the 
Colonial Office. It is for the Governor to propose that his Police Force should be inspected 
if he thinks fit...It is not for the Colonial Office to shove Inspectors and inspections down 
the throat of the Governor.”12 Additionally, Flood argued that colonial police chiefs in these 
regions “might take the line that an inspection pushed upon them from outside was a slur 
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on their capacity.”13 Flood surmised that much of the proposed work of the Inspector 
General could only be accomplished by an officer that knew the local situation. “A Police 
Force,” Flood contended, “more than any other kind of Colonial Department – more even 
than education – has to be part of the people of the country, and its value depends on its 
local knowledge.”14 Flood’s criticism of Spicer’s idea, however, must be considered 
alongside his hatred of Colonial Office work in general:  
If there were no advisers here at all, Colonies would have to solve their own 
problems instead of pitching them at the heads of the Office, which appears to be 
the modern tendency and is, I suppose, inevitable from the growth of the idea that 
there are a lot of supermen hanging about the Colonial Office whose advice will be 
worth far more than that of the local head of a Department. Of course the general 
public has a vague idea that every mortal thing is settled from the Colonial Office 
and that therefore the Office is being constantly inundated with telegrams and 
dispatches of all kinds of trivial points giving all kinds of information...Members 
of Parliament continually ask questions which appear to indicate that they think that 
nobody can move in a Colony without the motion being reported to the Secretary 
of State [for the Colonies]. If that were the case, I agree that advisers would be 
necessary, but thank Heaven it is not the case….In fact the idea of a Police Adviser 
is on a par with the resolutions which we occasionally get from the shrieking 
sisterhoods who, leaping to the conclusion that the Colonial Office is always being 
asked to deal with ‘questions peculiarly affecting women,’ urge strongly that the 
staff of the Office should be supplemented by some intellectual virago whose only 
function it would be to examine everything from “the woman's point of view.”15 
 
While the rest of the Colonial Office “supermen” did not go to Flood’s extremes, they 
certainly remained hesitant in their support for the police adviser position. 
 The issue of a colonial police adviser remained dormant until Dowbiggin contacted 
Tomlinson at the Colonial Office to discuss his retirement from the Ceylon Police in 
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1935.16 Dowbiggin told Tomlinson that “he was very anxious not to find himself without 
employment” after retirement and was looking for opportunities in Britain. He reported 
that he received vague offers of employment from the Prison Commission as well as the 
Home Office, who offered him a post as one of the two British Inspectors of Constabulary. 
Dowbiggin approached the Colonial Office with this information because “he felt that if 
the Colonial Office wished to make use of him after his retirement he would feel morally 
bound to regard the C.O. as having a prior claim.”17 With Dowbiggin clearly fishing for 
work, Tomlinson decided to share with him that the Colonial Office had been debating for 
several years the idea of creating an Inspector General for Colonial Police. Tomlinson, 
however, felt that Dowbiggin should be encouraged to consider one of his other offers 
because the Colonial Office could offer only ad hoc advisory work at uncertain pay. 
 The issue went dormant again until the Second World War, when several colonies 
throughout the empire began to agitate the Colonial Office for advice on maintaining order 
during the emergency.18 Once again the Colonial Office trotted out the old arguments, but 
this time they put the issue directly to the colonies for consideration through a circular 
letter. This circular proved that the idea was widely supported, particularly by colonies in 
Africa and the West Indies. Those colonies that resisted the idea – including Ceylon, 
Cyprus, and Malaya – believed that “Colonial Police Forces vary so greatly, and are 
confronted with such different problems and local conditions, that uniformity and 
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‘standardisation’ are impossible.”19 Despite the support for the idea, however, the Colonial 
Office continued to hold the line, concluding that “so many of the Colonial Police are 
armed, and under war conditions an Inspector-General would be able to do comparatively 
little useful work.”20 The Colonial Office also worried about finding an appropriate 
candidate for the position because Dowbiggin was “now sixty-one and although…he is still 
very active, that is rather old for an appointment which would entail a great deal of hard 
travelling.”21 Even though this brought an end to the consideration of Dowbiggin for the 
position, the Colonial Office assembled a potential list of candidates to pursue after the 
war, including Percy Sillitoe and R.G.B. Spicer.22 In addition, the Colonial Office worked 
with the Metropolitan Police to provide advising to the Barbados and Jamaica police in 
1944-1945.23  
Although the idea of an Inspector General failed during the war, the conflict clearly 
caused the Colonial Office to turn a corner on the issue. As explained by Charles Jeffries, 
“the war had caused general unsettlement. The traditional social structures were being 
seriously weakened as people gravitated from the country to the towns or from agricultural 
to industrial employment. The blessings of civilization can never be unmixed; they increase 
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the opportunities for the criminal as well as for the respectable citizen. It was inevitable 
not only that crime should become more widespread and more difficult to prevent and 
detect, but that industrial disputes and inter-racial clashes should become more common 
than in the past.”24 In addition to the general fear of crime rising in the colonies, Jeffries 
also added that there was a fear of “the efforts of Communists in many places to stir up and 
aggravate any element in a local situation which might be troublesome or dangerous to the 
authorities.”25 
 1948 proved to be the critical year in rethinking colonial policing, and imperial 
security in general.26 There were two causes for this change. First, in February 1948 riots 
in the Gold Coast led to violent police action against demonstrators, which in turn led to 
renewed calls for colonial police reform.27 Second, 1948 saw the completion of the 
UKUSA Agreement, which provided for the sharing of signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
between the United States and the United Kingdom.28 Though ostensibly an agreement 
between America and Britain, the pact also came to include Commonwealth members such 
as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand as well as the colonies. The reason for this inclusion 
derived from the American need for intelligence gathering stations close to communist 
territory. Prior to the development of the satellite, Britain’s current and former colonies 
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offered this proximity at several points across the globe.29 The necessity of these colonial 
listening posts contributed to America’s support of British colonial rule during the 1940s 
and 1950s, particularly in Cyprus.30 Additionally, Britain offered America a window into 
the thought processes of several nonaligned countries throughout the world because these 
countries continued to pass SIGINT via Enigma Cipher Machines. Used by Germany 
during the Second World War, this cipher system had been decrypted by British 
Intelligence during the conflict, but this achievement remained a secret until the 1970s – 
largely because of the continued utility of the decrypt to early Cold War SIGINT.31 
Sparked by riots in the Gold Coast as well as growing pressure from the United 
States for imperial intelligence, Clement Attlee met with Commonwealth premiers in 1948 
– including those from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon – to coordinate and improve security 
standards throughout the British world. As part of this process, the Colonial Office was 
brought in as a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which coordinated 
intelligence within Britain and with the United States. The inclusion of the Colonial Office 
in JIC also brought it into closer contact with MI5, which took on the role of advising 
colonial security agencies in order to improve intelligence collection and coordination. 
During the Second World War, MI5 had increased their officers throughout the empire, 
and also supported the wartime tours of G.C. Denham, who visited colonies throughout the 
Caribbean in 1943 to improve their internal security. From 1948, however, MI5 greatly 
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increased their imperial presence through the introduction of Security Liaison Officers 
(SLOs), who worked with colonial police special branches to collect intelligence.32  
In order to coordinate the work of SLOs, MI5 director and former colonial police 
officer Percy Sillitoe conducted dozens of tours of colonies from 1946 until 1953.33 
Sillitoe’s tours of the colonies reflected a genuine need for security oversight as well as his 
own desire to escape the drudgery of his domestic work at MI5, a place he referred to as 
“the Muttonhead Institute.”34  As Sillitoe argued, MI5 was “becoming ever more aware 
that among peoples under British rule who were gradually becoming politically mature and 
groping towards self-government, the firebrands and malcontents – as well as the men who 
sincerely felt that Britain was pursuing an overbearing policy towards them – were being 
stirred wherever possible to rebellion and trouble-making by Communists.”35 Sillitoe 
conducted advisory trips to Egypt, Palestine, South Africa, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya. In the course of these tours, Sillitoe concluded that 
the colonial police were in desperate need of an expert to help “ensure first-rate local police 
efficiency.”36 Sillitoe told the Colonial Office “that it seemed to me unfortunate and 
illogical that while there were at the time five Inspectors of Constabulary for Britain, there 
was nobody at all inspecting and reporting on the police in the colonies. Colonial governors 
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certainly sent in reports of their own, but that had hardly the same effect as a report by an 
expert in direct touch with conditions on the spot and also with the Colonial Office.”37 
Sillitoe’s comments, as well as the growing pressure from postwar colonial 
demonstrations, seemed to have finally convinced the Colonial Office that something 
substantial needed to be done, and in November 1948 Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech 
Jones appointed William Johnson to a three year term as the first official Colonial Police 
Advisor.38 A domestic police officer, Johnson had served in the Portsmouth Police before 
becoming the Chief Constable of Birmingham during the Second World War.39 In 1945, 
he became one of the Inspectors of Constabulary, working under the Home Office. As 
Colonial Police Advisor, Johnson was tasked with reviewing each colonial police force to 
help them improve their organization, administration, and professionalism. Furthermore, 
Johnson was asked to help improve contact between colonial police departments as well as 
between the colonies and police in metropolitan Britain.40 Johnson’s position was designed 
to be a civilian adviser, and the Colonial Office hoped that his advice would help to 
encourage civilian style policing throughout the empire. To help him in this work, the 
Colonial Office also hired former Met Assistant Commission George Abbiss as Johnson’s 
deputy. Johnson’s tour of colonial police departments, however, ended up serving as a 
painful remainder of the backwardness of most colonial police forces. Additionally, this 
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tour helped to engender the ill will of colonial police officers, who felt that only a veteran 
of colonial policing could properly judge policing in the empire.41 
 
THE TOURS OF THE W.C. JOHNSON 
Johnson’s tour in 1949 included Cyprus42, Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast43, 
Nigeria44, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. Most of 
Johnson’s visits found him spending a week or more in each colony, visiting not only the 
main capital headquarters, but also most, if not all, of the regional police headquarters. His 
reports took into account the tremendous difficulties facing colonial police in each district, 
but also stressed the need for attention to significant issues. The most significant issue 
Johnson pointed to in his reports were the poor conditions of service, which he felt led 
colonial police to either overwork or to not work at all.  These conditions included poor 
pay, lack of housing, lack of uniforms, and underfunded pension systems. The problem of 
compensation was particularly desperate because of a lack of standardization between 
colonial police departments. For example, an “Assistant Superintendent in Nyasaland with 
a commencing salary of £550 is required to accept a [promotion] scale which takes 15 years 
to reach a maximum of £1,000. His colleagues in Northern Rhodesia commences at £870 
and reaches the maximum at five years. The duties are relatively the same and Nyasaland 
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cannot expect to attract the best type…whilst this anomaly remains.”45 In addition to poor 
pay, colonial police officers – particularly those serving in Africa – often lacked the 
necessary equipment to conduct their work: cars, radios, and record keeping departments.  
To complicate this whole matter, Johnson also discovered that police in these areas were 
often having to fill in for the failures of other municipal services. In Nigeria, Johnson found 
police “having to deal with building construction and repairs,” as well as “vehicle 
examination and licensing.”46 Many colonies in Johnson’s tours also required their officers 
to work double duty as the local fire brigade. 
 Johnson’s tours also revealed that colonial intelligence gathering would be 
frustrated so long as the colonies lacked a functioning Criminal Investigation Department, 
or CID. He revealed that in many cases colonial police departments without an effective 
CID simply resorted to arresting and jailing a suspect without evidence or charge. Suspects 
in Cyprus, for instance, “have been arrested and remanded in custody up to a period of 
eight days where the actual evidence available has been little more than suspicion with the 
result that they have to be released for lack of evidence.”47 Johnson also stressed that the 
general professionalism and living conditions of members of the force would need to be 
improved before any work could be done on developing Special Branches. “The 
effectiveness of practically all internal security measures,” Johnson argued, “is determined 
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ultimately by the degree of loyalty and efficiency of the Police Force as a whole.”48 Before 
you could win the hearts and minds of the colonial public, Johnson contended, the Colonial 
Office needed to placate the ambitions and pockets of colonial police officers.  
 Johnson summarized his individual reports for Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech 
Jones at the end of 1949.49 Despite his specific concerns about the policing situation in the 
colonies, Johnson sanguinely remarked that colonial police have a more “helpful and less 
aggressive” relationship with the public in recent years, and that the general tendency of 
these police “has been to come more and more into line with the British Police System.”50 
He admitted, however, that “taking the Service as a whole it still remains much more 
related to a military organisation than to that of a civilian Police Force as known in this 
country.”51 Furthermore, he remarked that “in the eyes of the native people the Police are 
still in varied degree viewed with hostility and suspicion.”52 To change this perception, 
Johnson advocated, above all, better training in police work because “if they have been 
trained as soldiers it is inevitable that they will act as such although wearing Police 
uniform.”53 Although they agreed completely with Johnson’s analysis, the Colonial Office 
continued to despair of their ability to actually affect change on the situation because the 
final decision rested with Colonial Governors. “Colonial Governments,” Creech Jones 
argued, “were primarily responsible for their own internal security and in default of the 
                                                 
48 “Report by the Police Adviser, Mr W C Johnson, on His Visit to Nigeria,” 1949-1950, CO 537/5783, 
NA. 
49  W.C. Johnson, “Report of the Police Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,” December 28, 
1949, CO 537/5440, NA.  
50 Ibid., 1. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid., 6.  
  235 
existence of adequate forces locally, they had no choice but to rely on the Police for this 
purpose.”54 
 Johnson continued his work for the Colonial Office in 1950 with a new tour that 
included colonies in the West Indies and East Africa. He spent January through April 1950 
in Jamaica, British Honduras, the Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands, Trinidad, British 
Guiana, Barbados, and the Bahamas. From May to September 1950, Johnson toured Kenya, 
Uganda55, Tanganyika56, Zanzibar, Mauritius57, Northern Rhodesia58, and Nyasaland as 
well as Swaziland, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland. In the review of his 1950 tour, Johnson 
argued that the problems found in the 1949 tour were equally important to the West Indies 
and East Africa.59 He continued to stress that colonies needed to improve conditions of 
service in order to attract and keep the best officers.60 In particular, he encouraged the 
Colonial Office to help the colonies train colonial officers in Britain, and to help them 
secure up to date equipment, particularly for transportation and communication.  
Johnson argued passionately that it was time for the colonial police to stop being 
seen as a secondary concern, particularly as colonies began to push for self-government. “I 
have become increasingly concerned,” Johnson wrote, “as to the relative status of the police 
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vis-à-vis other Government departments and which is so very evident whenever the 
question of salary or pay arises…I cannot help feeling that unless and until trouble arises 
[the police] are regarded as one of the lower grade sections of Government employees 
rather than a Service which, under normal conditions, can and will make a valuable 
contribution to the peace and well-being of a country and, moreover, during times of 
disturbance is the main instrument upon which the whole community must depend for 
protection and security.”61 Johnson felt that this issue was pressing because “undesirable 
political influences,” such as communism, were beginning to make their way into the 
colonies. “The police,” Johnson stated, “have been and must increasingly be used as the 
instrument of Government to combat disruptive activities inspired and encouraged for the 
purpose of destroying, or at least impairing, recognized Authority.”62 Despite this advice, 
he maintained that “their use in this direction, essential as it is, must not be allowed to 
confuse the true purpose of a Police Force or the basic principles of policing, even though 
recent events may increasingly involve the use of force and of arms.”63 Continuing to offer 
contradictions, Johnson wrote that “there may be no precise declaration of war but, for 
example, an exploitation of the situation in Malaya by strongly reinforcing the bandit 
elements and in so doing creating war conditions in fact. In such circumstances, no-one 
would suggest for a moment that the police should thereupon assume a civilian role…But 
the situation in Malaya is surely unique and I consider it would be quite wrong to determine 
                                                 
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid.  
  237 
basic policy for Colonial Police Forces as a whole upon conditions in that country.”64 Not 
unlike Dowbiggin in Palestine or Halland in Germany, Johnson continued to press for the 
maintenance of British style policing, even in the midst of serious colonial emergencies. 
Like these other policing experts, Johnson considered imperial and domestic policing on 
the same plane rather than distinct ventures. This policy would largely be followed by 
Johnson’s successors as Police Adviser to the Colonial Office, W.A. Muller65 and Ivo 
Stourton,66 during the 1950s. 
 
COLONIAL POLICE TRAINING AND CONFERENCES AT RYTON-ON-DUNSMORE 
In order to follow through with the recommendations from Johnson’s reports, the Colonial 
Office worked to employ a new scheme of training for colonial police officers at the 
Metropolitan Police College at Ryton-on-Dunsmore.67 To help colonies pay for this 
training, the Colonial Office drew upon a £1.5 million purse provided by the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1945.68 Through this grant, the Colonial Office was able 
to secure 50 spots at the college for prospective and current colonial police officers. While 
this training was primarily administered by domestic British police officers, the 
                                                 
64 Ibid.  
65 “Co-Ordination of Reports of Inspector-General of Colonial Police,” 1952, CO 968/278, NA. 
66 “Hong Kong: Report on Inspections of Hong Kong Police by Deputy Inspector General of Colonial 
Police,” 1954 1953, CO 1023/106, NA; “Reports of Inspector General of Colonial Police,” 1955-1956, CO 
1030/168, NA. 
67 “Review of Colonial Police and Security Forces: Co-Ordination of Police Adviser’s Reports; Report to 
Minister by Secretary of State,” 1949-1950, CO 537/5439, NA. Courses were also held at Hendon and 
Bramshill.  
68 Arthur Creech Jones, Circular Telegram, “Colonial Police Service – Training at the Police College, 
Ryton-on-Dunsmore,” September 15, 1949, CO 537/5439, NA.  
  238 
commandant of the College, P.D.W. Dunn, encouraged the Colonial Office and William 
Johnson to look for a veteran colonial police officer, who would serve as the Director of 
Colonial Studies, to teach veteran colonial police and candidates particular courses that 
applied to their work.69 This move was necessary, as Johnson put it, because “there are 
some aspects of policing peculiar to the Colonial Service not covered and for which we 
must make provision if the best use is to be made of the courses for our purposes.”70  
Thus, in addition to receiving training in finger printing and traffic control, colonial 
police officers also received a substantial amount of riot training from the War Office’s 
School of Infantry Training.71 This riot control training made it clear that the instructions 
were only to be relied upon in case of an actual emergency, but they also included a 
conspiratorial element.72 “Before the war,” Colonial Studies Director F. Wallace argued, 
“most riots in the British Colonial territories had their roots in either religious intolerance 
or unpopular legislation. These were usually comparatively simple matters to deal 
with…Nowadays, however, Colonial civil disturbances follow another pattern that of the 
calculated embarrassment of the local Government by persons of conflicting political 
ideologies. The direction of such disturbances may well emanate from outside the 
particular territory, may be part of a larger pattern, and one frequently disguised as a local 
issue.”73 Though most colonial police would be unable to pick up on “conflicting political 
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ideologies,” they were encouraged to believe that “his Government is whole-heartedly 
behind him.”74 Wallace, nevertheless, emphasized the use of minimum force in dispersing 
riots, as automatic weapons were “not compatible with…the Common Law of England.”75  
The influence of this training on colonial policing is questionable, particularly as 
colonial emergencies during the 1950s made it more difficult for colonial governments to 
spare their officers.76 Additionally, even when colonial police could attend the courses, it 
was not always clear that the training was imparting the desired British tradition on the 
police. Home Office files reveal that course instructors complained about colonial police 
segregating themselves from the majority of Ryton students. Many domestic officers and 
trainees felt “that some Colonial policemen show little interest in our Statute law or the 
details of our organisation, [and] they overlook the main aim, which is to propagate the 
ideals and character of the British policeman and his relationship to the public.”77 For their 
part, many colonial police and trainees found these courses useless. M.C. Manby, who 
served in Singapore, Malaya, and Kenya, felt that the course gave him “an illuminating 
view of the English police which even then felt itself perversely misunderstood and was I 
thought, out of tune and losing touch with its public…I felt…that the directing authorities 
considered that the colonial policemen on the course were not worth listening to, or even 
perhaps capable of talking about, anything more than Riot Drill.”78 Striking a similar note 
was R.A.F. Viggor, veteran of the Uganda police, who argued that the “courses in the U.K. 
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had, in my view, two disadvantages at a time when there was a requirement to select and 
train a considerable number of local officers in a fairly short time scale, namely: 1. The 
limited relevance of part of the syllabus, in particular that of the Police College to 
conditions in Uganda. The limited education and in some cases intellect of many of the 
students increased their difficulty in relating what they had been taught to local police 
work. 2. the limited number of vacancies on these courses.”79 Viggor went on to argue that 
“it was not appreciated by all officers that the African policeman, unlike his UK 
counterpart, would not work as an individual, conscientiously without close supervision 
backed by a system of discipline which enabled suitable punishment and be administered 
without delay for minor or comparatively minor infractions. Such a system was regard by 
many officers as ‘military’ and inappropriate for a civil police force.”80 
 The Colonial Office hoped to smooth out some of the differences between domestic 
and colonial police through a series of conferences between colonial police commissioners 
at Ryton and Bramshill, held between 1951 and 1960.81 These conferences provided a place 
to discuss the reports by the Inspector General as well as an opportunity for colonial 
commissioners and their officers to receive training on everything from forensics to traffic 
regulation. In addition, the conferences were designed to promote discussion between 
colonies on police work in “‘cold war’ conditions and in the event of a major war.”82 The 
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idea for the conferences developed out of William Johnson’s tours, though they may also 
have owed something to police in Canada. In the midst of Johnson’s second tour in 1950, 
a proposal arrived at the Colonial Office from Leon Lambert, Deputy Director of the 
Quebec Provincial Police, to establish a Commonwealth Police Association for 
Commonwealth countries and those colonies still within the empire.83 Lambert’s proposal 
reached the Colonial Office through the Home Office, and invitations were also sent to 
police in Australia, Ceylon, India, Ireland, Martinique, New Zealand, Pakistan, and South 
Africa. Thought the Colonial Office agreed that the idea had some merit, Johnson and the 
other members of the office concerned with policing concluded that the proposal would 
cost too much and could damage relations within the commonwealth.  
The first conference of colonial police commissioners featured police from the 
Bahamas, Cyprus, the Gold Coast, Gambia, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaya, 
Mauritius, North Borneo, Sarawak, Sierra Leone, Somaliland, Tanganyika, Trinidad, 
Sudan, and Uganda.84 The geographical distribution of these colonies made this police 
conference not simply a colonial policing event, but, as argued by Home Secretary James 
Chuter-Ede, a “global” policing conference.85 On the advice of Charles Jeffries, Chuter-
Ede delivered the opening remarks of the conference, which stressed the need for colonial 
commissioners to address “the internal canker of communist inspired subversion and 
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treachery” throughout the colonies.86 The emphasis on internal security was shared by 
those colonial officers attending the conference. For instance, police from Malaya and 
Sierra Leone wanted discussion of military aid for civilian forces and riot procedure, while 
Kenya proposed talk on the use of “sickening gas.”87 Kenya Police Commissioner M.S. 
O’Rourke bluntly declared, “I believe the objection [against sickening gas] arises 
principally from mawkishly sentimental reasons and not real humanitarian ones, for of 
course there can be no argument as to which is more humane, the sick stomach or the bullet 
in the belly.”88 
 Yet even in the midst of this discussion regarding communism, rioting, and tear 
gas, the members of the conference and the Colonial Office still called on colonial police 
forces to press toward the ideal of British policing. This emphasis was seen most clearly in 
the conference’s discussion of how to police colonies “at the later stages of colonial 
constitutional development.”89 Charles Jeffries chaired a working party to consider the 
issue in the run up to the 1954 conference. This working party felt that while sufficient 
efforts were being made to improve colonial police, there remained a strong concern that 
these improvements would not be finished before “constitutional advance.”90 “So long as 
a Colonial police force remains under the direct control of a Governor,” the working party 
contended, “British tradition and public opinion provide a safeguard against improper use 
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of the force.”91 Yet, as the colonies developed, “that official will in process of time be 
replaced by a local politician, who will find the Police Force as an instrument in his hands 
which he may use properly (by United Kingdom standards) or of which, either from 
temptation or desire, he may not be able to resist the improper use for the ends of his own 
party or even himself.”92 Jeffries and the working party worried that without some 
constitutional safeguard to keep police out of politics, the various colonial forces could 
become time bombs waiting to go off after the British departed.  
 Despite this fear, however, the Colonial Office remained surprisingly sanguine 
about their ability to reform the police before departure. Indeed, though they worried that 
the situation in Malaya could arise elsewhere, the Colonial Office nevertheless felt that it 
would remain an “abnormal” situation.93 No one embodied this optimism regarding 
colonial security more than Charles Jeffries, who publicly promoted the police reform 
movement in his book The Colonial Police, which was published shortly after the first 
meeting of colonial police commissioners. In this book, Jeffries stated his belief that there 
were three overlapping phases of colonial policing beginning with the establishment of law 
and order by the military, followed by a semi-military constabulary, and concluding with 
the development of a civilian police force. Dowbiggin’s Ceylon was the only colony to 
undergo all three stages, but Jeffries contended that the Ceylon experience could be 
duplicated elsewhere. An early proponent of the policy of trusteeship, Jeffries believed that 
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the betterment of empire for both the rulers and the ruled was part of Britain’s general 
mission as a great Christian nation.  
 
ARTHUR YOUNG AND KENYA  
Unfortunately for Jeffries and the Colonial Office, these prosaic declarations 
regarding the progress of the colonial police arrived in the midst of the Mau Mau uprising 
in Kenya.94 The response of the Kenya Police, in concert with the King’s African Rifles, 
to this uprising established new lows for British imperialism, and exposed the failed 
transition of colonial police forces to a British model. Under “emergency regulations,” the 
Kenya Police participated in an undeclared war against Mau Mau insurgents while also 
establishing a brutal system of interrogation, torture, and imprisonment for Kikuyu 
suspected of being sympathizers to the uprisings. In their work to suppress the local 
population, Kenyan Police relied heavily on elements of the hearts-and-minds campaign 
waged by Field Marshal Gerald Templer in Malaya.95 This influence was first initiated by 
Thomas Askwith, who was sent by Kenya’s Governor Evelyn Baring to study the operation 
of Malayan detention camps in 1953.96 Askwith’s subsequent policies, however, caused 
the situation in Kenya to deteriorate even further, and led to the appointment of another 
Malayan veteran, Arthur Young, as commissioner of the Kenya Police. 
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 For those invested in reforming the colonial police, Arthur Young seemed to 
represent the ideal commissioner for Kenya. A veteran of several domestic police services, 
including the London Metropolitan Police, Young rose to become Chief Constable of the 
City of London Police in 1949 before being loaned out on temporary assignments to aid 
colonial police services in crisis.97 His selection for work in the colonies resulted from his 
high reputation among domestic police officers as well as his stint as a police adviser for 
the Allied Control Commission in occupied Italy from 1943 to 1945. Young’s first 
temporary assignment came in the Gold Coast in September 1951, where he advised police 
after the disturbances of 1948. From there Young was named Commissioner of the 
Malayan Police in 1952, and worked closely with Templer to institute the hearts-and-minds 
philosophy. Throughout these tours, Young upheld the ideal of British policing, believing 
that there were “four fundamental principles…to democratic police service.” 
The recommendations which are contained in my report are based on the four 
fundamental principles which I consider are indispensable to a democratic police 
service. (a) the organization and purpose of the police should be to provide a service 
rather than a force. (b) The police should by their efficiency merit the respect, and 
by their humanity deserve the esteem, of the public. (c) The police should enjoy 
freedom from political and all other forms of external influence since only in such 
independence can they exercise that impartiality which is necessary to justice and 
to the protection of the rights of individuals. (d) The police should receive pay and 
conditions of service which signify the value of their services to the public, and 
appreciate the special qualities required of a policeman, as well as the exacting 
moral responsibilities and physical demands which his office imposes upon him.98 
 
Though Young admitted that British policing could not “be prescribed or produced by 
appropriate organisation or technical efficiency alone,” he nevertheless declared that “the 
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underlying principles of a police service in a democratic state are constant and universal.”99 
Nearly all of his policies on the ground in the Gold Coast and Malaya prescribed a careful 
study – if not outright mimicry – of police procedure in the United Kingdom.  
The extent to which this advice was actually followed, however, was 
questionable.100 While working with the Gold Coast Escort Police, Young suggested that 
“instead of whacking people over the head with our riot sticks it would be much better, 
and, I think, more effective if you exercised tact and forbearance and did all you could to 
persuade the crowds to conform with your requirements.” Upon leaving the Gold Coast, 
the Escort Police presented Young “with two riot sticks – one labelled ‘Tact’ and the other 
‘Forbearance’” and promised to employ tact and forbearance in their future work.101 
Young’s advice often appeared naïve and overly earnest, even for the early 1950s. In 
Malaya, he required police to wear “a badge of friendship,” featuring two clasped hands 
next to the words “ready to serve,” hoping to build up a closer relationship between the 
police and the public.  Young revealed in his memoir for the Oxford Records Project that 
he thought of the idea for the badge from watching The Wizard of Oz “in which a dejected 
lion was transformed into a brave and spirited one by being awarded a medal for 
courage.”102  
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 While Young’s work in the Gold Coast and Malaya won him international 
recognition, his efforts in Kenya would be brief and ineffective. Arriving in November 
1954, Young discovered a colonial state totally under the control of the local settler 
population, which was completely opposed to any reform to their police state.103 The 
settlers argued for this repressive system because of the threat to European lives, but 
Young, who had nearly been killed several times in Malaya, judged that the danger to 
Europeans in Kenya to be “unbelievably small…[while] the Africans themselves suffered 
much more grievously.”104 Whereas the government of Kenya hoped that Young would 
immediately install the reforms he used in Malaya, Young felt that he could make no 
progress until charges of police violence were investigated and punished.  To proceed with 
these investigations, the Commissioner argued that he needed to secure the independence 
of the police and its internal rule from the Kenyan government.  
Young, however, found his moves in this direction blocked by Governor Evelyn 
Baring and Baring’s secretary, Richard Turnbull, who argued that “the logic of [Young’s] 
case was all very well but that his knowledge and experience of East Africa assured him 
that the time for such reforms had not yet come and that it was still very far away.”105 After 
repeated attempts to present police atrocities to Baring and the Kenyan Government, 
Young submitted his resignation at the end of 1954. In his initial report of the resignation 
to the Colonial Office, Young openly discussed the violence perpetrated by police as well 
as the problems relating to the independence of the police from the government. When he 
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returned to London in January 1955, however, Young was forced by Colonial Secretary 
Alan Lennox-Boyd to revise his report to take out all reference to police brutality and 
torture.106 Lennox-Boyd assumed that the release of Young’s unedited report would not 
only bring down Evelyn Baring, but the Colonial Secretary himself. 
 Bound by the Official Secrets Act, Arthur Young was unable to divulge the extent 
of atrocities in Kenya, though he did attempt to impress the severity of the situation upon 
the 1954 meeting of colonial police commissioners, which he addressed in July 1954. Even 
in the midst of this disaster, however, the members of the conference continued to offer 
appeals to the importance of democratic policing. Without a sense of irony, “the 
Conference recognized that it was most important for police to establish friendly and 
frequent contacts with the public, particularly children and old people…so that the 
confidence thus engendered in the public would serve to counteract their traditional feeling 
of resentment towards the police as being the strong arm of the imperialist power.”107 By 
the third meeting of the conference in 1957, however, the tide had turned against these sorts 
of declarations. The program for this conference clearly showed the loss of enthusiasm and 
forward thinking seen in earlier conferences. Yet instead of blaming the nature of colonial 
policing for the loss of this momentum, the members of the conference tended to blame 
indigenous police. The move toward “localization” led many officers at this conference to 
complain that “while it was everywhere desirable to produce an effective civil 
constabulary, the material available for recruitment in a number of territories was of so low 
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a quality that there was very little chance of achieving this object until educational and 
social standards had improved throughout the community, which would take a very long 
time.”108 
This argument for the continued necessity for European police also received 
support outside of the Colonial Office, as seen by Gerald Templer’s report to the Cabinet 
in 1955.109 Asked by the Cabinet to review imperial security, Templer produced a wide 
ranging report of the Empire’s military, police, and security services strength.110 Though 
he allowed for the development of self-government in several colonies, Templer 
nevertheless argued of the continued necessity of British presence in the emerging 
commonwealth to head off the spread of communism. To this end, he stressed the reform 
and demilitarization of the police. Templer, following the recommendations of the 
Inspector General of Colonial Police, argued for the establishment of a police department 
in the Colonial Office, with two additional deputy inspector generals of Colonial Police. 
Additionally, he called for better pay, better housing, and better promotion rates in order 
to recruit the best talent. Yet Templer stipulated that the capital for this reform would have 
to come from the British Government, as Colonial Governors could only be led by 
money.111 This money would never materialize, and Britain was left to make haphazard 
eleventh hour transitions to indigenous policing throughout the period of decolonization.  
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THE COLLAPSE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION 
As Britain struggled to reform policing in empire, they also fought to maintain police 
cooperation with foreign countries. Similar to imperial reform initiatives, however, this 
effort largely failed due to politics. In particular, the careful cultivation of the United States 
as a member of Interpol came to a sudden end in 1950, and helped to damage the 
functioning of international police cooperation for another decade. This event resulted from 
Cold War political divisions as well as personal animosity between the FBI and members 
of Interpol’s executive committee. The failure of Britain and the other leading nations of 
Interpol to keep the United States within their organization would contribute to America’s 
pursuit of unilateral criminal justice initiatives during the 1950s.  
 The beginning of the divide between the FBI and Interpol came in April 1949, when 
ten Czech nationals left their country on two stolen commercial airplanes and flew to the 
American zone of occupied Germany to seek asylum.112 In April 1950, the Prague Police 
issued warrants for the arrest of these individuals on the basis of stealing the aircraft and 
for “endangering the lives of the passengers on board the planes.”113 After some hesitation, 
Interpol agreed to circulate these warrants issued by Czech authorities to the members of 
their organization in May 1950. Interpol’s Secretary General, Louis Ducloux, argued that 
the warrants needed to be circulated because the individuals involved committed a 
“common law crime” – a crime recognized as a crime by all members of the organization 
– by stealing the two aircraft. The FBI, which knew of the location of the offenders, refused 
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to comply with the warrant, stating that the accused were political refugees and not 
criminals.  
 Along with the issue of the Czech refugees, the FBI’s relationship with Interpol 
encountered further difficulty at the group’s 19th General Meeting in June 1950 at the 
Hague. The FBI was represented at this meeting by their Paris Legal Attaché Jack West, 
who hoped to receive a further explanation regarding the decision to circulate the warrants 
for the Czech refugees.114 He left this meeting, however, with the firm opinion that the FBI 
needed to withdraw from the organization. This conviction had less to do with the 
controversy over the Czech refugees than with personal differences between West and 
members of Interpol’s executive committee. In his report on the conference to J. Edgar 
Hoover, West revealed that the trouble started as soon as he registered at the conference. 
At the registration desk, he not only learned that the American delegation at the conference 
included the head of the U.S. Secret Service, U.E. Baughman, but that Baughman’s name 
appeared before West’s on the conference program. When he approached Jean Nepote, 
Interpol’s assistant Secretary General, on the issue, Nepote claimed that participants were 
listed alphabetically. When this turned out not to be true, Nepote blamed the Dutch 
organizers of the conference. West learned, however, from the Dutch representative to the 
conference that Nepote was responsible for writing the program. At the conference 
reception, West noted with distain that Baughman was “surrounded by a number of 
[Interpol] officials. Camera flash bulbs popped steadily and after each shot there was 
jostling and maneuvering on the part of the delegates so that those who had not been 
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photographed with the Chief of the Secret Service might have the opportunity. [Interpol] 
officials and delegates seemed delighted to have such an important personality among 
them.”115 
 In addition to the Baughman kerfuffle, West also reported a disagreement with 
Interpol General Reporter Harry Söderman. At the first plenary session of the conference, 
West reported that Söderman “brusquely informed” him that he was adding two American 
police experts to the United States’ list of representatives to Interpol as technical advisers. 
Söderman asked West to send a cable to the FBI to advise on the matter before making a 
formal announcement. West learned, however, that the two presumed experts had already 
taken up their positions at the conference. He refused to send the cable to Washington, 
arguing that the FBI was the only recognized US representative to the organization and 
would designate their own technical advisers on an as needed basis. West surmised that 
Söderman’s insistence on appointing these two advisers to the commission stemmed from 
their assistance in revising Söderman’s book, Modern Criminal Investigations.116  
Along with their disagreement over the advisers at the conference, Söderman and 
West also exchanged barbs earlier that year at a dinner with Louis Ducloux and former 
Legal Attaché Horton R. Telford in Paris.117 At this dinner, Söderman – who had spent 
several months as a technical instructor at the New York Police Department – openly 
shared with West his criticism of the FBI, including Hoover’s propaganda and the political 
nature of the Bureau’s work.  West concluded that Söderman’s hatred of the FBI was the 
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result of his time with the NYPD, which provided Söderman with financial assistance in 
the preparation of his book. West believed that Söderman’s support for the NYPD and his 
advancement of the two police advisers represented “a concrete example of how [Interpol] 
is used by its officials to further their own personal interests.118 On the basis of his 
interactions with Söderman and Nepote, as well as the issue of the Czech refugees, West 
recommended that Hoover resign from the commission. West believed that the FBI could 
still liaise with other countries, and “enjoy the fruits of membership in [Interpol] without 
financial obligations or the hazards of entangling commitments.”119 
Hoover briefly debated the issue with his executive council before sending a 
resignation letter to Interpol President Florent Louwage in July 1950. Hoover argued that 
the Bureau’s membership in Interpol did not “justify the financial outlay involved,” and 
felt that the commission could rely upon a close relationship from other US agencies or 
departments in the absence of the FBI. 120  Hoover added that “the FBI were also surprised 
to notice what is apparently a change in the policy of the I.C.P.C. with regard to non-
involvement in political matters.”121 Reminding Louwage of the warrants for the Czech 
defectors, the FBI director stated that these “individuals [were] wanted by another 
government on obviously political charges although the circulars indicated that the 
apprehensions were desired for vaguely described criminal charges.”122 Hoover concluded 
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that “the issuance of such notices may well open the door to the use of the Commission for 
purposes other than those provided for in its statutes.”123 
The London Metropolitan Police remained surprisingly quiet on this issue until 
after Hoover’s resignation. Whereas Norman Kendal had successfully shepherded the 
United States into international cooperation, Ronald Howe took a hands off approach to 
the postwar rift between the FBI and Interpol. Writing to Howe on the issue, Harry 
Söderman felt that the problem related to the “communist hysteria in the U.S.” which 
allowed Hoover to build up “a formidable fortress to defend himself if some superior would 
ask for the reason for his resignation.”124 Söderman called on Howe to write to Hoover 
because he was “the only man who may be able to put things straight again.”125 Howe, 
however, felt that he could not convince Hoover to reconsider, believing that such a move 
would be “wasting our breath.”126 He recommended instead that the Executive Committee 
of Interpol consider asking another American police agency, perhaps the New York Police 
Department, to join. Howe admitted the idea was not ideal, but continued to believe that 
“we must have some American representative with us.”127  
 In the midst of these discussions, Florent Louwage travelled to Washington in order 
to convince the FBI to reconsider.128 During this meeting, Louwage claimed that the 
decision regarding the Czech refugees had been made by Louis Ducloux alone, and without 
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reference to the other members of the Executive Committee. He also blamed Söderman for 
stepping out of line by appointing the two technical advisers to the Commission, and 
promised that Louis Ducloux and Ronald Howe “would see to it that Söderman was not re-
elected to any position in [Interpol].”  With regard to the membership fees, Louwage said 
“the Bureau could not pay any fee or only $30.00 or $300.00” because they wanted the 
Bureau’s membership above all.129 The FBI maintained that the membership fee, whatever 
it was, was not the issue, though FBI Agent Hugh Clegg added that “it seemed strange that 
[Interpol] executives were meeting at various expensive spas in Europe instead of 
conserving the funds.”130 The Bureau remained firm on their commitment to leave the 
organization, and Louwage returned to Europe empty-handed.  
The members of Interpol’s Executive Committee met in Copenhagen in February 
1951 to discuss this issue as well as the upcoming general meeting in Lisbon.131 At this 
meeting, Ducloux continued to argue that the reasons for Hoover’s withdrawal from the 
origination were “debatable” and suspected the real reason for the FBI leaving the 
organization was because of expense. Ducloux felt that “the expense of the American 
yearly contribution is more than offset by the activities engaged in by the [Interpol] in the 
fight against the counterfeiting of dollars.”132 The committee also discussed the possibility 
of including either the U.S. Secret Service or Harry Anslinger’s Narcotics Bureau as 
possible replacements for the FBI, but both organizations had declined official 
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membership. As a result, Louwage stated that the Czechoslovak case had devastated 
Interpol’s relationship with the United States, and that “in the future, even if they appeared 
to be covered by the implications of Common Law, requests concerning facts of a political 
character should be refused by [Interpol].”133 
Despite Hoover’s reservations, however, Ronald Howe and the Met continued their 
support of the organization, and advised the Foreign Office to maintain British 
membership. The Foreign Office expressed their approval, saying that even though “the 
Commission has once been used in an attempt to secure the return of political refugees is 
not sufficient reason for this country ceasing to participate in its activities.”134 Part of the 
reason for Howe’s enthusiasm was the fact that Louis Ducloux was replaced as Secretary 
General for the commission by Marcel Sicot in June 1951. Howe believed that Ducloux’s 
departure would mean that no further political crimes would be offered up to the rest of the 
commission for consideration. Although Sicot avoided political crimes, he pursued several 
policies which upset British police. In particular, under Sicot, Interpol briefly worked to 
become an intergovernmental organization (IGO) instead of a non-governmental 
organization (NGO) in the eyes of the United Nations.135 Howe, the Met, and the Foreign 
Office resisted this project, as they believed that making the organization a meeting of 
sovereign states rather than police officials would bring politics into the equation.   
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Along with their efforts to resist the move to IGO status, the Met also worked to 
discourage colonial and Commonwealth police from joining the organization. This effort 
reflected the postwar policies of the Colonial Office, which hoped to keep the colonies and 
Commonwealth countries under the influence of the British state. After the establishment 
of the office of Inspector General, for instance, the Colonial Office discontinued support 
for individual colonial police officers to attend meetings of Interpol, preferring instead to 
send the Inspector General of Colonial Police as the sole representative of the British 
Empire. This approach was partly encouraged by Interpol’s statues, which stated that “only 
sovereign states or autonomous countries [could] be members” of the organization.136 This 
decision meant that British Colonies could only work with Interpol through either Scotland 
Yard or the Inspector General of Colonial Police.  
 This situation, however, did not completely discourage all colonial police eager for 
international cooperation. In March 1957, Singapore put forward a proposal to establish a 
regional Interpol headquarters in the colony to help to control crime in the Straits, Ceylon, 
Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia (Burma, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Thailand).137 The 
Colonial Office attempted to head off this proposal by arguing that this regional office 
would not be legal under Interpol’s constitution. Additionally they argued that that this new 
office would include a number of countries which they “felt could not be trusted with 
confidential information.”138 In particular, the Colonial Office expressed concern with 
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Burma and Thailand, where they suspected local police of colluding with drug traffickers. 
The Colonial Office, however, was not entirely against the idea of some sort of Interpol 
office within a British colony, as such as station could help bring newly independent Asian 
countries into the Western fold, perhaps preventing them from joining an emerging Afro-
Asian bloc. Interpol, for their part, worried that the new regional office, would “mean 
duplication of records, staff and accommodation…and perhaps some loss in efficiency in 
dealing with more than one Region.”139 Interpol’s leadership also worried that a regional 
office in Singapore might encourage new member countries in the Middle East and South 
America to push for their own regional centers.  
Despite the trepidation of the Colonial Office and Interpol, the bloc of concerned 
countries, led by Singapore, pushed forward with their proposal, hoping to include it for 
discussion by Interpol’s general assembly at the 1957 Lisbon conference.140  This final 
push was only put down after a private meeting between the Singapore bloc and Interpol 
leadership in Paris, during which Interpol agreed to extend wireless communications to 
Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the organization agreed that any new Interpol facilities in 
Southeast Asia would be staffed by local officers rather than Europeans.141 
 The lengths to which the Singapore bloc were willing to go in order to be included 
in Interpol’s future shows the continued enthusiasm of the colonial police for international 
police work. That this plan was so firmly rejected by both Interpol and the Colonial Office 
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shows how much international police cooperation had change since its origins in the 
interwar period. Whereas the interwar period often saw metropolitan police following the 
initiatives of colonials with regard to cooperation and the exchange of technical knowledge, 
the postwar period found metropolitan forces taking advantage of those initiatives to pursue 
their own political motives. Much like other international movements of the interwar 
period, the pursuit of international police cooperation and crime control became an avenue 
used by the British and others to defend imperialist policies and Cold War agendas. 
 America’s abuse of international policing during the 1950s and 1960s is a well-
worn topic in the historiography of the Cold War.142 CIA and FBI funded instruction 
programs for police from the developing world played a role in the creation of brutal police 
states in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Yet Britain also attempted to create similar 
programs during the postwar period until emergencies within their existing empire forced 
them to redirect resources. The most important of these missions occurred in Colombia 
between 1948 and 1952143, but British police also advised local forces in Lebanon144 and 
Thailand.145 In each of these instances British police worked to combat leftist elements to 
protect conservative, and often brutal, regimes. Although eager to continue this work into 
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the 1950s, Britain found it increasingly difficult to spare police officers for these missions 
because of colonial crises. While the police missions to Lebanon and Thailand could rely 
partly on nearby colonial police, the mission to Colombia was manned primarily by a group 
of retired police officers scraped together at the last minute.146 The deficit of available 
personnel, combined with a general lack of funding, limited British efforts to influence 
policing throughout the developing world during the 1950s and 1960s. The lack of British 
presence in this field helped to open the way for a series of American policing missions, 
particularly in Asia and South America.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The postwar period initially seemed an era of promise for British policing ventures abroad. 
Not only would Britain help to establish democratic policing in Continental Europe, but 
they would finally reform the woefully backwards colonial police. Yet by the late 1940s, 
the plans to remake Europe had gone astray, and the hopes to mend imperial policing were 
on their way there. These missions appeared to have the best intentions, but their execution 
relied on underfunded police as well as a slavish dedication to a model of policing that 
rarely functioned outside of Britain itself. In a similar way, British hopes to mend and 
strengthen democratic policing through Interpol also suffered a tremendous loss with the 
withdrawal of the United States in 1950.  Though Interpol would continue to thrive under 
the direction of the French Sûreté, it never enjoyed the same influence that it experience 
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during the interwar period because it lacked close relations with the United States and the 
United Nations. And while America would rejoin the organization in 1960, it returned after 
spending the previous decade promoting repressive policing and surveillance throughout 
the developing world.
  262 
Conclusion 
In September 1949, Sergeant Arthur Troop of the Lincolnshire Constabulary 
decided to create an international organization.1 Calling it the “International Police 
Association,” Troop hoped that his organization would “link together through a sense of 
service and friendship, all serving and retired police officers, irrespective of rank, sex, race, 
colour, language, or religion.”2 Though he envisioned the organization as primarily a 
goodwill service, Troop hoped that it could eventually host conferences, publish journals, 
and even maintain a library to support international police cooperation. Troop used his 
department’s directory to send leaflets about his organization to dozens of police 
departments in Britain, and several more around the world. He reported that his scheme 
received support “from almost every corner of the British Isles, and from Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, France, Holland, Gold Coast, Kenya, and elsewhere.”3 
 Upon seeing Troop’s advertisements regarding the organization, the Home Office 
wrote to Troop’s commanding officer at the Lincolnshire Constabulary, R.H. Fooks, to see 
if the advertisements were legitimate or some sort of scam.  Fooks reported that the 
advertisements were indeed genuine, and that Troop was a member of the force. Although 
Troop conducted his work for the International Police Associaion during off hours, Fook 
felt that his subordinate did not understand the amount of work that would be involved with 
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running an organization, let alone an international one.4 Yet Fook felt that “nothing short 
of a definite order from me that Troop should forthwith desist from his activities would 
have served to stifle his enthusiasm.”5  
The Home Office felt satisfied that the association was a “purely unofficial venture” 
that seemed “to be doing little more than arranging good-will correspondence with police 
officers and organizations abroad and fixing up facilities for cheap holidays for policemen 
in continental countries.”6 Other official police bodies, however, were convinced that 
Troop was up to something. The Chief Constables Association of England and Wales, for 
instance, wondered if the new organization could be “a vehicle capable of subtle subversive 
activity,” and forwarded their concerns to MI5.7 The Security Service responded by 
appealing to the Home Office for information, forcing the Home Office to reassure the 
counterespionage group that there was “no suggestion that the organizers…have any 
ulterior motive.”8 
 Although the International Police Association was cleared of subversive activity, 
the British Government remained concerned that group would reach for official recognition 
from foreign governments. This fear was realized in September 1950, when the National 
Federation of Belgian Police Forces invited International Police Association representative 
and City of London Police constable Herbert Godwin to their 50th Anniversary Congress.9 
                                                 
4 R.H. Fook to S.H.E. Burley, Home Office, September 9, 1949, HO 45/25265, NA. 
5 R.H. Fook to K.A.L. Parker, Home Office, August 9, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA. 
6 S.J. Baker, Home Office to W.W. Thornton, June 30, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA. 
7 Extract from the Minutes of the No.8 District Conferences of Chief Constables’ Association of England 
and Wales, June 21, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA. 
8 Home Office Minute, August 2, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA. 
9 Herbert Godwin, “P.C.’s visit to Antwerp (Belgium),” September 27, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA. 
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In Godwin’s report on the Congress to the City of London Police, the lowly constable 
described how he was received like a foreign dignitary, staying at a “first class hotel” and 
provided with 800 Francs to cover his expenses.10 At the conference itself, Godwin 
discovered that he had been named the delegate for all of Great Britain, and that despite 
attendance by police from other countries, the Union Jack was the only flag other than the 
Belgian Tricolors decorating the conference venue. During the conference proceedings, the 
collected assembly unanimously passed a motion to support the development of the 
International Police Association.  
As part of the closing ceremonies, Godwin delivered a speech – simultaneously 
translated into Flemish by a police officer from Bruges – thanking the congress for their 
support for the International Police Association, and expressing his hope that the 
association could one day develop into “a world wide Federation of Police Forces to 
safeguard the Rights and Privileges which we justly earn in our everlasting war against 
crime and the criminal.”11 Godwin followed this congenial statement, however, with a 
curiously offensive conclusion, in which he stated his hope that police in Belgium might 
one day attain the “happy status” enjoyed by British Police.12 Godwin believed that British 
Police, unlike their continental counterparts, had passed through the period of being 
considered “a necessary evil” by the general public, and now stood “as Guide, Counsellor 
and friend” to “every peace loving citizen.”13 Upon receiving a copy of Godwin’s report, 
                                                 
10 Ibid.  
11 Herbert Godwin, “Copy of Final Speech to Belgian Police Congress,” September 27, 1950, HO 
45/25265, NA. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
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the Home Office worried that he had given European police an inflated impression of the 
International Police Association, but were thankful that “Godwin expressed no 
objectionable opinions” in his remarks to the congress.14 
 Despite the Home Office’s attempts to discourage Troop and his associates, the 
International Police Association continued to grow as an unofficial body for police around 
the world. In addition to hosting international conferences and holiday tours, the 
association began a scholarship whereby member police could visit the United Kingdom 
to study British policing.15 The group also created an international youth camp for the 
children of member police located at Gimborn Castle in Germany. By the early 1970s, the 
organization boasted a membership of over 100,000 police and retired police, making it the 
largest international police organization in terms of individual members in the world.16 
Though the organization never influenced policy in the same way as Interpol or the 
International Police Conference, the International Police Association was granted 
consultative status by the United Nations in 1967 for its work as a goodwill organization. 
Troop himself was awarded a British Empire Medal in 1965, though the Home Office still 
judged that his organization “could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be described as 
serving a necessary purpose.”17 
The International Police Association may have not received government backing, 
but the beliefs that animated this organization closely resemble those that drove Britain’s 
                                                 
14 Home Office Minute, October 31, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA. 
15 “International Police Association: Congress to Be Held in Blackpool in 1964,” 1962-1964, HO 287/531, 
NA. 
16 “International Police Association: Acceptance by HRH The Duchess of Kent of Invitation to Perform 
Opening,” 1973-1975, HO 290/86, NA. 
17 Home Office Minute, February 5, 1963, HO 287/531, NA.  
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work with official forms of international policing. Although it was largely designed to be 
a Rotary International for police officers, Troop’s organization nevertheless shared a 
conviction with official bodies that the world needed police cooperation on a global scale. 
Similarly, the group’s effort to provide scholarships for police training represented a belief 
that police needed professionalization in order to meet challenges posed by modern 
criminals. Finally, the International Police Association’s Lincolnshire origins pointed not 
only to the enthusiasm of British police for international work, but also to the assumption 
that British police were inherently superior to their foreign counterparts – even if they were 
no name Police Constables like Herbert Godwin.  
 As this dissertation has shown, British hubris with regard to policing caused them 
to avoid the early versions of international police cooperation during the 19th century. Yet 
the perceived increase in international crime – represented most clearly by the panics over 
bomb-throwing terrorism and white slavery – eventually drove the country to join 
European efforts to control the menace. European police, for their part, clearly desired this 
connection to Britain because of the international prestige and assumed technical 
proficiency of Scotland Yard. American police possessed some of this same desire for 
connection to Britain, as evidenced by the work of Raymond Fosdick and August Vollmer. 
British police during this period remained skeptical of the utility of international police 
cooperation, but they never showed any hesitation in taking on the mantra of “the best 
police in the world” or the “Mecca of policing.” 
 While the early phase of international police cooperation largely found the world 
pursuing Britain, the interwar period found the Empire beginning to engage with the 
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movement, but only on terms it could accept. In this way, the Metropolitan Police, through 
the work of Norman Kendal, played a decisive role in the elevation of Interpol over Enright 
and Collier’s International Police Conference. This development resulted from Kendal and 
Met’s desire for police cooperation that was free from politics, free from supranational 
policies, and most of all, free from joyriding. Indeed, Kendal’s personal commitment to 
Interpol was so strong that it found him defending – almost to the start of the war – the 
Met’s relationship with the organization after the Nazi takeover. And though Britain did 
not support the continuation of the organization during the Second World War, it played a 
leading role in the postwar reconstruction of Interpol through Ronald Howe.  
 Simultaneous to this work with international police organizations, Britain also 
oversaw the reform of its colonial police forces. Although this reform has typically been 
regarded only within the realm of imperial history, this dissertation has shown that this 
work occurred within and interacted with an international context. Indeed, the main agent 
behind the colonial police reform movement, Herbert Dowbiggin, operated under the 
assumption that there was no distinction between policing a colonial environment and 
policing elsewhere in the world. Dowbiggin insisted that colonial police were capable of 
civilian, British style policing without needing to resort to violence or support from the 
armed forces. At the same time, Dowbiggin’s insistence on civilian policing rested not only 
on a desire to reform colonial police, but also developed from a conviction that British style 
policing produced the best information to maintain imperial control.   
 Dowbiggin’s unofficial reforming efforts eventually influenced official police 
missions during the postwar period. These missions – including Britain’s occupation work 
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and the tours of the Inspector General of Colonial Police – found the Empire pursuing a 
forward policy with regard to policing that looked to actively spread British style policing 
around the globe. British police often presented these missions as altruistic endeavors to 
encourage democratic principles, but they frequently included significant repressive 
elements. These elements can be seen, for instance, in the encouragement of anticommunist 
principles during the occupations of Germany and Greece, or the recommendations 
regarding Special Branch work in the reports of the Inspector General of Colonial Police.  
 Yet even in the midst of these calculated political endeavors, one cannot completely 
discount the notion that British police experts meant what they said when they proposed 
civilian police reforms. Indeed, the dogmatic commitment of G.H.R. Halland to civilian 
style policing nearly led to the collapse of the British occupation of Germany. In a similar 
way, Arthur Young naively designed friendship badges for Malayan Police based on the 
Wizard of Oz despite several attempts on his life by insurgents. Thus there was at least 
some genuine effort to encourage the velvet glove instead of the iron fist with regard to 
police missions and colonial law enforcement.  
Too often, however, these projects failed because of a lack of funding, a lack of 
time, or local resistance. Many rank and file police were as frustrated as Halland and Young 
with this failure. Geoffrey Morton, a veteran of the Palestine and Nyasaland Police, wrote 
in 1957 “what a pity it is that in almost every colonial territory no effort is made to build 
up an efficient and contended police force until an emergency arises. When that happens 
the powers that be suddenly wake up to the fact that the police force is the most important 
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section of the whole government.”18 Striking a similar chord was Christopher Harwich of 
the Uganda Police Force, who felt that it was an “anomaly that the police, generally 
considered the eyes and ears, and, when required, the strong arm of government, are refused 
the least facilities to gain the confidence and co-operation of the public.”19 Peter Wynn 
Norris, also of Uganda, appeared more optimistic about Britain’s efforts, claiming that 
“there was a time when the British Police tradition applied to the policing of some of the 
larger townships. Patrols were generally unarmed except for a standard British Police type 
truncheon.”20 But Norris also worried about the British legacy in Uganda, saying that 
whereas in the colonial period “a corporal and three constables could go out to tackle 
serious cattle raiding in Karamoja and arrest and bring to trial law-breakers, a post-
independence approach was to send several companies of the military armed with 
automatic weapons.”21 Norris admitted that he did not know if the British “legacy was the 
right legacy,” and supposed that the policing that “was right for Devon [England] need not 
be right for the West Nile.”22 
One is left to wonder what difference these democratic efforts, particularly in the 
colonies, might have made had they received the resources they needed. Would the world, 
for instance, need to have waited until the 21st century to know the truth about the 
repression of Mau Mau if Arthur Young had been supported in his work in Kenya? It is 
                                                 
18 Geoffrey J Morton, Just the Job; Some Experiences of a Colonial Policeman. (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1957), 242. 
19 Christopher Harwich, Red Dust : Memories of the Uganda Police (London: Vincent Stuart, 1961), 153. 
20 Peter Wynn Norris, Aide de Memoir, Law Enforcement XX, Uganda 3, Maco-W, MSS. Afr. s. 1784, 
RH. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.  
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easy to criticize the foolish way officers like Halland and Young pursued democratic 
reform, but it is hard to argue that theirs was not the sort of foolishness that most would 
want to see in their police.  
 It was too often the wrong sort of foolishness that plagued Interpol during the 
postwar period. Although Ronald Howe and the Met played an important role in rebuilding 
the organization after the Second World War, they did little to help steer Interpol away 
from political issues during the Cold War. Admittedly, this failure was largely out of 
British hands because the organization spent this period dominated by French police. In 
addition, the United States and the FBI seemed bent on pursuing unilateral policies with 
regard to international criminal justice with or without a political excuse. Yet these 
problems persisted even when a Metropolitan Police officer, Richard Jackson, assumed the 
leadership of Interpol in 1960.23 His three year tenure did see the return of the United States 
to Interpol, but also witnessed new politically based divisions, particularly over the 
inclusion of Israel in the organization.24 This issue also played into Interpol’s struggles 
with policing terrorism, a struggle that eventually encouraged member nations to develop 
their own international police organizations such as TREVI (1975) and Europol (1999).  
 While British police have historically argued against the mixing of politics with 
international policing, the advent of The Troubles from the late 1960s and Al-Qaeda in the 
2000s brought about a clear change in this approach. This new approach, however, 
developed largely without consulting established international organizations such as 
                                                 
23 Richard Levfric Jackson, Occupied with Crime (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). 
24 “Refusal of Visas for Pakistan for Delegates from Israel Attending Meeting of International Criminal 
Police Organisation Held in Lahore. Code VR File 1642,” 1959, FO 371/142396, NA. 
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Interpol, and instead relied upon close coordination with select allies, particularly the 
United States. It is ironic that international police associations flourished in a period when 
the perception of international crime was greater than the occurrence, but now struggle in 
an age where the threat of this criminality is all too real.  
Britain now appears far more eager to build up the capabilities of their domestic 
police than with encouraging cooperation with foreign forces. Indeed, the international 
crime that saw a lessening of international police cooperation also witnessed the steady 
buildup in the repressive power of British security through surveillance services like CCTV 
and GCHQ. This transition can perhaps best be observed by considering the policing of 
two international events. Whereas the world marveled at Britain’s New Police at the Great 
Exhibition of 1851, it expressed concerns over the country’s use of soldiers25 and rooftop 
rockets26 to secure the 2012 Summer Olympics in London. Long gone are the days in which 
British police could argue they possessed a different model for law enforcement than other 
countries. In a world seemingly filled with school shootings, bombs on trains, and planes 
as bombs, there is little reason to believe that they will ever do so again.
                                                 
25 Robert Booth and Nick Hopkins, “London 2012 Olympics: G4S failure prompt further military 
depoloyment,” The Guardian, July 24, 2012. Accessed July 24, 2012.   
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/24/london-2012-olympics-g4s-military. 
26 Robert Booth, “London Rooftops to carry missiles during Olympic Games,” The Guardian, April 29, 
2012. Accessed July 2, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/apr/29/london-rooftops-missiles-
olympic-games. 
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